NO. 12-09-00096-CR
NO. 12-09-00097-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
JOHN NELSON LANDRUM,
APPELLANT ' APPEAL FROM THE 7TH
V. ' JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
THE STATE OF TEXAS, ' SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON REHEARING
PER CURIAM
John Nelson Landrum has filed a motion for rehearing, which is overruled. The opinion of July 7, 2010 is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted in its place.
John Nelson Landrum appeals his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen years and two years respectively. Appellant’s counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967) and Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Thereafter, Appellant filed a pro se brief. We dismiss the appeal.
Background
Appellant was charged by separate indictments with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine. Appellant pleaded “guilty” as charged to each charged offense. Appellant further pleaded “true” to using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the commission of or in immediate flight from the aggravated assault. The trial court admonished Appellant and accepted his “guilty” pleas. The record contains Appellant’s stipulation to the evidence underlying each offense. Following a bench trial on punishment, the trial court found Appellant “guilty” as charged in each cause and sentenced Appellant to imprisonment for eighteen years for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and two years for possession of a controlled substance. This appeal followed.
Analysis Pursuant to Anders v. California
Appellant=s counsel filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California and Gainous v. State. Appellant=s counsel states that he has diligently reviewed the appellate record and is of the opinion that the record reflects no reversible error and that there is no error upon which an appeal can be predicated. He further relates that he is well acquainted with the facts in this case. In compliance with Anders, Gainous, and High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), Appellant’s Anders brief presents a chronological summation of the procedural history of the case and further states that Appellant=s counsel is unable to raise any arguable issues for appeal.
Appellant subsequently filed a pro se brief in which he raised the following issues: (1) the trial court’s deadly weapon finding is not supported by legally sufficient evidence; (2) the trial court’s deadly weapon finding is not supported by factually sufficient evidence; (3) Appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault is not supported by legally sufficient evidence; and (4) Appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault is not supported by factually sufficient evidence. We have reviewed the record for reversible error and have found none. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).[1]
Conclusion
As required by Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), Appellant’s counsel has moved for leave to withdraw. See also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). We carried the motion for consideration with the merits. Having done so and finding no reversible error, Appellant’s counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is hereby granted and the appeal is dismissed.
Opinion delivered August 11, 2010.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
[1] We are troubled by the trial court’s pronouncement of Appellant’s sentence, particularly the statement that Appellant pay restitution to the Texas Department of Public Safety. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.037 (Vernon Supp. 2009); see also Aguilar v. State, 279 S.W.3d 350, 353–54 (Tex. App.–Austin 2007, no pet.). However, the trial court did not set forth a particular dollar amount to be paid as restitution in its oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgments of conviction each set forth $0.00 in restitution. As such, there were no de facto orders of restitution to a nonvictim and, thus, no reversible error in that regard.