NUMBER 13-13-00510-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
LETICIA RENDON, Appellant,
v.
TARGET STORE # 2152, Appellee.
On appeal from the 103rd District Court of
Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Garza, Benavides and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
In this slip-and-fall case, appellant Leticia Rendon contends that the trial court
erred in granting a no-evidence summary judgment in favor of appellee, Target Store
#2152 (“Target”).1 Specifically, by several sub-issues, Rendon contends that: (1) the trial
court failed to review the evidence in the light most favorable to her, the non-movant; (2)
the circumstantial evidence that Target failed to reasonably inspect the floor raised a fact
issue as to whether Target knew or should have known of a dangerous condition; and (3)
there was more than a scintilla of evidence supporting a spoliation finding. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND2
In her deposition testimony, Rendon stated that, about 8:00 p.m. on the evening
of December 12, 2009, she went to the Target store located in Brownsville, Texas.
Rendon was accompanied by her niece, Aracely Villarreal. It was drizzling outside.
Rendon and Villarreal had been in the store about ten minutes when they turned down a
center aisle and walked toward the back of the store. As she neared the next cross-aisle,
Rendon slipped and fell to the floor. Rendon said that the floor was “very shiny” and
“slippery” and “[t]hat’s why [she] fell.” Rendon knew the floor was slippery because it
looked very shiny. Although Rendon did not see anything on the floor, Villarreal found a
clear plastic cap on the floor nearby. Villarreal picked the cap up and placed it on a shelf.
Rendon did not know whether the cap had anything to do with her fall. When she fell,
Rendon did not feel any moisture on the floor or on her clothing. Although she did not
think her shoes were wet, Rendon said that the drizzling outside may have contributed to
the accident because “people [are] walking with wet shoes.” She did not know “exactly
what was on the floor other than it was shiny and it felt slippery.” When she fell, Rendon
1 Appellee notes that the proper party is Target Corporation and that it was incorrectly sued as
“Target Store #2152.”
The background facts are taken from deposition excerpts which were included in Rendon’s
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summary judgment evidence.
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felt pain in her wrist, arm, foot, and tailbone. After she was helped to her feet by Villarreal
and another customer, Rendon continued shopping for a short while, but left the store
without making a purchase because she did not find what she was shopping for. Rendon
did not report the injury that night because she was “hoping the pain would go away.”
The following morning, a friend drove Rendon to Target, and she reported the fall
to Fred Regalado, the manager on duty. Rendon showed Regalado where she fell in the
store. According to Rendon, Regalado told her that there was “probably” a video
recording because the store’s cameras are always operating. When asked whether the
plastic cap on the floor played any part in her fall, Rendon said she did not know.
Villarreal’s deposition testimony was consistent with Rendon’s. Villarreal did not
see Rendon fall because it occurred very quickly. She saw a small “lid” on the floor and
thought Rendon might have slipped on it. She picked the object up and placed it to the
side. When she picked it up, it was not wet.
Regalado testified that in December, 2009, he was an executive team leader in
charge of asset protection at the Target store. Although he did not recall meeting with
Rendon or completing the “Guest Incident Report” describing her accident, he
acknowledged that he filed the report on December 13, 2009. The report described the
weather conditions on December 12 as “drizzling throughout the day.”
Regalado stated that Target’s policy is that each employee, or team member, is
responsible for inspecting and maintaining the floor. There was no specific schedule for
cleaning or inspecting the floor, but those tasks were done on an ongoing basis.
Regalado did not recall whether he was working on the evening that the fall occurred.
Regalado recalled that several photographs were taken of the location where Rendon fell.
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The photographs were attached to the incident report. The accident occurred in the
center aisle in an area that Regalado described as “between infant and boys.”
Regalado stated that he was certain that there was no video recording of the
accident because very little shoplifting occurred in that area of the store, and therefore,
no video cameras were directed at the area. Regalado admitted that he may have told
Rendon that he would check for a video recording, but would not have told her that a
video “probably” existed because he knew it did not. Even though Regalado knew there
was no video because of the location, he would not have disclosed that to Rendon
because he would not have discussed camera strategy with her. Regalado stated that
he was “100 percent certain there was no camera pointing in that direction.” Regalado
was “absolutely certain” that there was no camera directed at the area because he was
responsible for the camera strategy in the store. Regalado was questioned about other
slip-and-fall accidents at the Target store. Most of the accidents he was questioned about
occurred before he worked at the store. On the “Electronic Incident Report” documenting
the incident, Regalado admitted that the section entitled “video” is marked as “unknown.”
On June 17, 2013, Target filed its no-evidence motion for summary judgment. In
its motion, Target asserted that Rendon had no evidence that: (1) Target had actual or
constructive knowledge of an allegedly hazardous condition on its premises; (2) the
allegedly hazardous condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) Target failed
to exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; or (4) Target’s alleged conduct
proximately caused Rendon’s alleged injury. See CMH Homes, Inc. v. Daenen, 15
S.W.3d 97, 99 (Tex. 2000) (listing elements of a premises liability claim). On August 16,
2013, Rendon filed a response. As summary judgment evidence, she submitted: (1) the
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Target incident report and the electronic incident report; (2) excerpts from the Target
Team Member Handbook; (3) photographs of the location where the accident occurred;
(4) excerpts from the depositions of Rendon, Villarreal, and Regalado; (5) excerpts from
Target’s discovery responses; and (6) her own affidavit. On August 19, 2013, Rendon
filed a supplemental response, to which she attached excerpts from the deposition of
Adolfo Ruiz, the manager or team leader at the Target store the night Rendon fell.
On August 29, 2013, the trial court granted Target’s no-evidence motion for
summary judgment. The order states that the trial court heard the motion on August 27,
2013.3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
166a(i) is essentially a motion a for pretrial directed verdict. Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish,
286 S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is
appropriate when there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim on
which the adverse party will bear the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i);
Scripps Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v. Belalcazar, 99 S.W.3d 829, 840 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2003, pet. denied). The motion must be specific in challenging the evidentiary
support for an element of a claim or defense. Gish, 286 S.W.3d at 310. “When reviewing
a no-evidence summary judgment, we ‘review the evidence presented by the motion and
response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment
was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and
The docket sheet notes that the trial court found “no evidence as to bases [sic] of fall and no
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evidence of spoiliation [sic] of video.” The order itself does not state the grounds for the trial court’s decision.
No reporter’s record of the hearing is included in the record.
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disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.’” Id. (quoting Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006)).
A trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment unless the
nonmovant produces more than a scintilla of summary judgment evidence to raise a
genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) & cmt.;
Hamilton v. Wilson, 249 S.W.3d 425, 426 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); City of Keller v.
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). A nonmovant produces more than a scintilla
of evidence when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-
minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d
598, 601 (Tex. 2004); see City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. A nonmovant produces no
more than a scintilla when the evidence is so weak that it does no more than create a
mere surmise or suspicion of a fact. Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124
S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003).
The elements of a premises liability claim are:
(1) Actual or constructive knowledge of a condition on the premises by the
owner or occupier;
(2) That the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm;
(3) That the owner or occupier did not exercise reasonable care to reduce
or eliminate the risk; and
(4) That the owner or occupier's failure to use such care proximately caused
the plaintiff's injury.
CMH Homes, Inc., 15 S.W.3d at 99.
III. DISCUSSION
By her first sub-issue, Rendon contends that the trial court failed to review the
evidence in the light most favorable to her. Rendon does not further develop this
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argument or identify any evidence in support of her contention. Rather, she discusses
the evidence that she contends raises a fact issue on each of the elements. By her
second sub-issue, Rendon contends that the evidence raised a fact issue as to whether
Target knew or should have known of a dangerous condition. We address these sub-
issues together.
To prevail on her claim, Rendon had to prove, among other things, that Target had
actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. See id. A slip-and-fall plaintiff
satisfies the notice element by establishing that (1) the defendant placed a substance on
the floor, (2) the defendant actually knew that a substance was on the floor, or (3) it is
more likely than not that the condition existed long enough to give the premises owner a
reasonable opportunity to discover it. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812,
814 (Tex. 2002) (holding that the mere proximity of an employee to the site of an accident
does not raise a fact issue regarding constructive notice of a dangerous condition).
Here, Rendon presented no evidence that Target placed any substance on the
floor or that it actually knew of a dangerous condition on the floor. She also presented no
evidence that a dangerous condition existed long enough to give Target a reasonable
opportunity to discover it. She did not see any Target employees in the area where she
fell. Rendon’s only proffered evidence that the floor was “slippery” is that it looked “shiny.”
She admitted that when she fell, she did not feel any moisture. She stated that she did
not know if her shoes were wet. Although Villarreal saw a plastic cap on the floor after
the fall, Rendon did not know whether the cap had anything to do with her fall. Even if
Rendon slipped on the cap, she presented no evidence regarding how long the cap may
have been on the floor. Rendon’s argument is simply that there must have been
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something on the floor that caused her to slip because “you don’t slip if—if—if the floor is
normal[.]” Rendon argues in her brief that “[a] reasonable inference can be made that a
foreign object or substance knocked [her] off stride and caused her to slip and fall and
hurt herself.”
Circumstantial evidence may be used to establish any material fact, but it must
transcend mere suspicion. Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Tex. 2001). When
circumstances are consistent with any possibility, and nothing shows that one is more
probable than the other, no fact can be inferred. Wright v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 73
S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Evidence so slight that
any inference is purely a guess is no evidence at all. Id. at 557 (citing Lozano, 52 S.W.3d
at 148).
As to Target’s actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition,
Rendon points to Regalado’s testimony that Target does not have specific schedules for
inspecting or cleaning the floors. A plaintiff must present some evidence of how long a
hazard existed to impose liability on the premises owner. Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816; see
also Wal-Mart Stores v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998) (holding that when
circumstantial evidence is used to prove constructive knowledge, the evidence must show
that it is more likely than not that the dangerous condition existed long enough to give the
premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it). Here, Rendon’s assertion that
there must have been a foreign object or substance on the floor that caused her to fall is
no more than mere speculation. In addition, she has not presented any evidence that it
is more likely than not that a dangerous condition existed long enough to give Target a
reasonable opportunity to discover it. See Reece, 81 S.W.3d at 816; Gonzalez, 968
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S.W.2d at 936. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Rendon, we conclude
that she did not produce summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material
fact to support either the knowledge or the unreasonably dangerous condition elements
of her claim. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted Target’s no-evidence motion for
summary judgment. We overrule Rendon’s first and second sub-issues.4
By her third sub-issue, Rendon argues that there was more than a scintilla of
evidence to raise a fact issue on spoliation of evidence, which would have precluded
summary judgment. In her response to Target’s no-evidence motion, Rendon argued
that, because Regalado gave inconsistent statements as to the existence of a videotape
of the accident, more than a scintilla of evidence raising a fact issue on spoliation existed,
precluding summary judgment.
By granting Target’s no-evidence motion, the trial court implicitly rejected Rendon’s
request for a finding of spoliation. See Clark v. Randall’s Food, 317 S.W.3d 351, 356
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). We therefore review whether the trial
court abused its discretion by denying a finding of spoliation. Id. If the trial court did
abuse its discretion by denying the spoliation finding, then summary judgment was
improper. Id.
The act of spoliation refers to destruction of evidence relevant to a case. Id. The
inquiry as to whether a spoliation sanction or presumption is justified requires a court to
consider (1) whether there was a duty to preserve evidence, (2) whether the alleged
4 Because the trial court properly granted summary judgment on no-evidence grounds as to these
two elements, we need not discuss Rendon’s arguments as to the remaining elements. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 47.1.
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spoliator breached that duty; and (3) whether the spoliation prejudiced the non-spoliator's
ability to present its case or defense. Id.
In her response to Target’s no-evidence motion, Rendon pointed to the following
inconsistencies, which she argued raised a fact issue on spoliation and precluded
summary judgment: (1) when she reported the accident, Regalado told her there was
“probably” a video of the accident, but later gave deposition testimony that no video
existed; (2) in the electronic incident report, Regalado reported it was “unknown” whether
there was a video of the accident, but later stated that no video existed; and (3)
photographs show that the accident occurred in the aisle with women’s clothes, not in the
infants and boys section.
We are unpersuaded that these alleged inconsistencies precluded summary
judgment. Regalado stated that he was “100 percent certain” that there was no video
coverage of the accident because he was responsible for camera placement and no
cameras were directed at the area. He admitted he may have told Rendon that he would
look for a video, but denied that he told her that a video “probably” existed because he
knew it did not exist. He did not discuss with her that no video existed because it would
have been inappropriate to discuss Target’s camera strategy with a customer. With
regard to why he stated it was “unknown” whether video existed on the electronic report,
Regalado said he did not know why he made that statement, but was certain there was
no video coverage. As to the discrepancy between whether the accident occurred in the
infants and boys section (as Regalado stated in his deposition testimony) or in the intimate
apparel section (as stated in the electronic report), Rendon provided no evidence of
spoliation with respect to either location.
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Rendon presented no evidence that any video of the accident existed. We do not
find the allegedly inconsistent testimony sufficient to rise to a scintilla of evidence that
would support a spoliation finding and preclude summary judgment. See Cresthaven
Nursing Residence v. Freeman, 134 S.W.3d 214, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no
pet.). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to find spoliation.
See Clark, 317 S.W.3d at 360. We overrule Rendon’s third sub-issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,
Justice
Delivered and filed the
15th day of May, 2014.
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