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In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-11-00211-CR
______________________________
BRIAN CHADWICK MARTIN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 8th Judicial District Court
Hopkins County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1122187
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Brian Chadwick Martin has filed a notice of appeal. We have now received the certification of Martin’s right of appeal as required by Tex. R. App. P. 25.2. That certification states that Martin waived his right of appeal.
Unless a certification, showing that a defendant has the right of appeal, is in the record, we must dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). Because the trial court’s certification affirmatively shows that Martin has waived his right of appeal, and because the record before us does not reflect that the certification is incorrect, see Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), we must dismiss the appeal.
Martin has also filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. The motion is signed by Martin and by his counsel in compliance with Rule 42.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a). As authorized by Rule 42.2, we grant the motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2.
We dismiss the appeal.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice
Date Submitted: January 4, 2012
Date Decided: January 5, 2012
Do Not Publish
0; Q One last question. If Sheila Manning says that she gave you the complete report that I've marked as Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, which is the colored copied one. If she said she gave you that complete report and that you signed, initialled it and gave it back to her, you have no reason to disagree with that would you?
A I have no reason to disagree that she might have given it to me and I initialled it, but I don't ever remember reading over it.
The failure of one party to read a contract, or any of the materials appertaining to it, however, does not equate with a failure of the other party to disclose the information contained within the four corners of that contract. Absent a showing Cendant misrepresented the information disclosed in written form, Falconer was obligated to protect himself by reading the contract. He cannot now be excused from the consequences of failing to meet that obligation. See Gillis, 694 S.W.2d at 147; Amouri, 20 S.W.3d at 169.
Conclusion
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Falconer, we conclude there is no evidence showing Cendant failed to disclose any information in an attempt to fraudulently induce Falconer to contract. On the contrary, the evidence conclusively establishes Cendant disclosed all matters material to Falconer's claims. Because there is no evidence to support the jury's findings, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that Falconer take nothing.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: March 31, 2004
Date Decided: May 4, 2004