NUMBER 13-13-00573-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE J. R., A CHILD
On appeal from the 156th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
This is an accelerated appeal of the trial court’s judgment granting the Department
of Family and Protective Services’ petition to terminate the parental rights of appellant
J.T. over her minor son J.R.1 The trial court found that there was clear and convincing
evidence of four of the statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the
1 We refer to appellant and her son by their initials in order to protect their privacy. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 9.8(b).
best interests of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(1)(D), (E), (I), (O),
161.001(2) (West 2008). We affirm.
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief in the style of
Anders v. California stating that, after a thorough review of the record, he found no non-
frivolous issues to advance on appeal. See 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The Anders
procedures were once limited to civil cases, but the Texas Supreme Court extended them
to civil proceedings when it permitted appointed appellate counsel to file an Anders brief
in an appeal of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &
Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 55–6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (citing
In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998)). “In permitting appellate counsel to file
an Anders brief, the supreme court recognized that counsel, though appointed to
represent the appellant, had no duty to pursue a frivolous matter on appeal.” Id. at 56.
This Court, following other Texas appellate courts, has applied the Anders procedures to
appeals of orders terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. (concluding that “when
appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental termination appeal and
concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, counsel may file an Anders-
type brief” and collecting cases from other Texas appellate courts that came to the same
holding).
To that end, appellant’s brief meets the requirements of Anders because it
presents a professional evaluation of why there are no arguable grounds to advance on
appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas,
an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds
2
none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set
out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991). Counsel has informed this Court that he has: (1) examined the record
and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and
counsel’s motion to withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed appellant of her right to
review the record and to file a pro se brief. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813
S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an
adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se brief.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80 (1988); Porter, 105 S.W.3d at 55. We have reviewed the entire record, including
counsel’s appellate brief, and we have found no reversible error. See Bledsoe v. State,
178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by
indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the
record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court terminating appellant’s parental rights.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney requests this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex.
3
App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.)) (“[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must
withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the
appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.” (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw. Within five days of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a
copy of this Court’s opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise her of her to right to
file a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court.2 See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66,
68 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also In re Schulman, 252
S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
/s/ Nora L. Longoria
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Delivered and filed the
6th day of March, 2014.
2 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
by the Texas Supreme Court, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for review or file a pro se
petition for review. Any petition for review must be filed within forty-five days after the date of either this
opinion or the last ruling by this Court on all timely-filed motions for rehearing or en banc reconsideration.
TEX. R. APP. P. 53.7(a). Any petition for review must comply with the requirements of Rule 53.2 of the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. R. 53.2.
4