Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-14-00054-CR
Marcus Anthony ROBINSON,
Appellant
v.
The
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 379th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2011CR0413
Honorable Ron Rangel, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Delivered and Filed: January 14, 2015
AFFIRMED
After having been found competent to stand trial, Marcus Anthony Robinson was convicted
of murder. In one issue on appeal, Robinson argues the jury’s competency finding was against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We affirm.
DISCUSSION
Before the trial on the merits, a jury trial was held to determine whether Robinson was
competent to stand trial. At the competency trial, Robinson presented testimony from three family
members. The first witness was Robinson’s grandmother, Melrose Goode. She testified that
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Robinson had lived with her most of his life. While he was in school, he was placed in a class with
slow learners. According to Melrose, in the last few months before the murder, Robinson would
talk and smile to himself. Melrose testified that Robinson had become very paranoid, saying
someone was after him. At one point, he left Melrose’s home, saying that he was afraid to stay
with her, and went to stay with his uncle. According to Melrose, during Robinson’s first year of
incarceration awaiting trial, Robinson would talk to her during visits. However, after the first year,
Robinson stopped talking altogether and even refused to see her when she came to visit him.
Melrose testified that Robinson did not appear to her to be taking care of his physical appearance
or hygiene. When asked whether she thought he understands what is going on, Melrose replied, “I
don’t think so, but I don’t know.”
The second witness to testify was Robinson’s uncle, Gary Goode. Gary testified that at one
point, Robinson stayed with him at his house. According to Gary, Robinson was very paranoid
and would take the mattresses off the bed and lie under them to protect himself. At some point,
Gary sent Robinson back to live with Melrose.
The final family witness to testify was Gary’s wife, Monica Coburn. According to Monica,
Robinson acted paranoid when he was living with them. Monica testified that it seemed like
everything scared Robinson. Robinson slept under the bed because he said he felt safer there.
Monica testified that Robinson talked to himself, and his ramblings grew more intense as he got
older. Monica explained that Robinson’s mother is a paranoid schizophrenic. Monica testified that
she began seeing the same signs in Robinson. According to Monica, while Robinson was living at
her home, he began to destroy things. However, Monica admitted that while Robinson was living
with at her home, she was able to have conversations with him, and he could understand what was
going on around him.
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The State presented one witness, Dr. Brian Skop, a forensic psychologist, who performed
four competency evaluations on Robinson. The first time Dr. Skop evaluated Robinson was at the
detention center on March 28, 2011. Dr. Skop testified that on that occasion, Robinson interacted
normally with him. Robinson was very communicative and relayed a clear history. According to
Dr. Skop, Robinson talked about his background, his thoughts were clear, and there was no
indication of hallucinations. Robinson was able to communicate effectively. Dr. Skop testified that
Robinson had no psychiatric history and his medical records indicated no psychological history.
Dr. Skop testified that Robinson said he had not had any serious medical problems. Robinson told
Dr. Skop that he had been working and had maintained a relationship. Robinson also said he had
been in special education in school and had left school in the 11th grade.
According to Dr. Skop, Robinson was groomed, cooperative, maintained good eye contact,
and did not have any unusual mannerisms. Robinson’s speech was normal, but he reported that he
was anxious and depressed about his situation. Dr. Skop testified that Robinson’s thought
processes and content were logical and well-connected, though Robinson’s intelligence was in the
low average range. Dr. Skop and Robinson discussed the case pending against Robinson, and
according to Dr. Skop, Robinson exhibited a rational understanding of the proceedings against
him. They also discussed legal strategies and options that would be available to Robinson. Dr.
Skop testified that Robinson seemed to have a basic understanding of the concepts and was able
to discuss them. Further, Robinson exhibited the capacity to behave appropriately in a court room.
At that time, Dr. Skop diagnosed Robinson with “an adjustment disorder which is basically a
maladaptive emotional response to stress.” Dr. Skop believed he was competent to stand trial.
The second evaluation was November 6, 2012. Before Dr. Skop met with Robinson, he
was told by the defense attorney that Robinson had been uncommunicative with him. When Dr.
Skop went to see Robinson, Robinson refused to come to the medical department, so Dr. Skop met
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with him in the jail unit. At that time, Robinson responded to Dr. Skop’s voice, but did not interact.
Dr. Skop testified that although Robinson was dramatically different, he did not talk to himself or
appear to be responding to internal stimuli. Dr. Skop reviewed Robinson’s medical records and
found that he had become mute. Robinson had been seen by a couple of psychiatrists who
concluded his mutism was intermittent and voluntary. There were times when Robinson spoke
with individuals.
At that time, Dr. Skop spoke with one of the psychiatrists who had seen Robinson. That
psychiatrist said Robinson was still able to respond to verbal instructions. Because of Robinson’s
behavior, the jail psychiatrists believed Robinson was malingering and was fabricating his mutism.
Dr. Skop did not change his diagnosis.
Dr. Skop met with Robinson a third time on August 30, 2013. The evaluation was much
the same, except Robinson did come to the medical department. Also Dr. Skop had spoken with
Melrose, Robinson’s grandmother. Melrose told Dr. Skop things about Robinson that were similar
to her court testimony. According to Dr. Skop, on this third occasion, Robinson was better
groomed, and he was interactive, looking at Dr. Skop, smiling, shaking hands, and nodding in
answer to some questions. But, Robinson would still not speak. Dr. Skop learned Robinson had
been involved in a fight and afterward was talking freely with officers until he was informed a
social worker with Mental Health was present. Robinson then refused to answer questions. Dr.
Skop testified that this event suggested Robinson’s speaking was under his voluntary control. Dr.
Skop testified that there were other notes in Robinson’s detention center record that indicated
Robinson had been involved in other incidents and had spoken. Dr. Skop’s diagnosis was
unchanged.
The last time Dr. Skop met with Robinson was on the day Dr. Skop testified. According to
Dr. Skop, Robinson initially made eye contact but would not respond verbally to questions. Dr.
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Skop testified that based on all that has occurred since his first visit with Robinson, Dr. Skop
believed Robinson was competent to stand trial. Dr. Skop stated he “didn’t really have a basis to
conclude that there’s something else going on besides that [Robinson]’s intermittently choosing to
speak and not speak.” Dr. Skop did testify that it is possible to have intermittent mutism without
it being faked.
After hearing all the evidence, the jury found Robinson competent to stand trial. Another
jury then heard evidence in the trial on the merits and found Robinson guilty of murder.
“An appellate court measures the propriety of the competency verdict based on the
evidence before the jury at the time of the verdict under the relevant legal standard set out in article
46B.003(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” Musgrove v. State, 422 S.W.3d 13, 15 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref’d). Article 46B.003(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
provides the following:
A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have:
(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding; or
(2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the
person.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a) (West 2006). Article 46B.003(b) further provides
that “[a] defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial
unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. art. 46B.003(b).
Evidence relevant to these issues includes whether a defendant can (1) understand
the charges against him and the potential consequences of the pending criminal
proceedings; (2) disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; (3)
engage in a reasoned choice of legal strategies and options; (4) understand the
adversarial nature of criminal proceedings; (5) exhibit appropriate courtroom
behavior; and (6) testify.
Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). “A defendant’s competency to stand
trial is a question of fact to be determined by the competency jury.” Id. at 287. Thus, the jury had
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to decide if Robinson, who was presumed to be competent, proved his incompetency by a
preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 286-87. On appeal, we measure “the propriety of the
competency verdict based on the evidence before the jury at the time of the verdict under the
relevant legal standard set out in article 46B.003(a).” Morris, 301 S.W.3d at 291; see also
Musgrove, 422 S.W.3d at 15 (quoting Morris, 301 S.W.3d at 291).
Robinson argues that he proved he was incompetent to stand trial by a preponderance of
the evidence because the evidence showed his mother suffered from schizophrenia and he was
showing signs of schizophrenia himself. He contends that the evidence showed he was becoming
severely mentally ill, and that his mutism rendered him incompetent to stand trial because he was
unable to assist in his defense.
The State, on the other hand, argues Robinson did not meet his burden because he did not
prove his mutism was involuntary. In other words, according to the State, Robinson was choosing
not to assist his counsel in his defense. Further, the State urges that the evidence did not show
Robinson suffered from severe mental illness and, even if he did, a mental illness does not
necessarily render him incompetent to stand trial. We agree with the State.
Although there was some evidence from Robinson’s family members that he appeared to
exhibit symptoms of schizophrenia, there was no evidence that he had ever been diagnosed with
schizophrenia or any other severe mental illness. Neither the jail psychiatrists nor Dr. Skop
diagnosed Robinson with schizophrenia or other severe mental illness. And, based on his personal
evaluations and review of jail records, Dr. Skop was of the opinion that Robinson was competent
to stand trial. Furthermore, even if the evidence did show Robinson suffered from schizophrenia
or other severe mental illness, such a diagnosis does not necessarily mean he was incompetent to
stand trial. See Townsend v. State, 949 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ).
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Robinson also contends that the fact that he was mute rendered him incompetent to stand
trial because he was unable to assist in his defense. The evidence failed to show, however, that his
mutism was involuntary. Dr. Skop did testify that it is possible to have intermittent mutism without
it being faked; nevertheless, the evidence demonstrated that Robinson’s mutism was voluntary.
The evidence showed that during Dr. Skop’s first evaluation of Robinson, Robinson engaged in
normal interaction, communicating effectively and relaying a clear history. Robinson was able to
discuss with Dr. Skop the legal proceedings pending against him. Dr. Skop testified that at the
second evaluation, although Robinson was mute, detention center records showed that, according
to two jail psychiatrists, Robinson’s mutism was intermittent and voluntary. Dr. Skop further
testified that on the third occasion, although Robinson was still mute, he did interact by gesturing
and nodding. Dr. Skop also learned that Robinson had been involved in a fight and afterward had
been speaking freely until he learned a social worker was present. Further, Dr. Skop testified that
there had been other reported incidents indicating Robinson had been speaking. According to Dr.
Skop, on the fourth occasion, although Robinson was again mute, he did make eye contact. All of
these observations led Dr. Skop to conclude that Robinson’s mutism was voluntary—i.e., he was
choosing not to communicate with his defense counsel to help with his defense.
Because Robinson did not meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was incompetent to stand trial, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Karen Angelini, Justice
Do not publish
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