NUMBER 13-12-00551-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
REYNALDO MALDONADO, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 156th District Court of
Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Garza
Appellant, Reynaldo Maldonado, was sentenced to two years’ incarceration in a
state-jail facility for violating the conditions of his community supervision. By a single
issue, Maldonado argues that his sentence does not meet the Texas Penal Code’s
objectives of deterrence and rehabilitation and does not account for the differences in
rehabilitative possibilities among individual defendants. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2010, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to two state-jail
offenses: burglary of a building and theft. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1),
(c)(1) (West 2011); id. § 31.03(a), (e)(4)(A) (West Supp. 2011). The trial court found
Maldonado guilty and, pursuant to a plea bargain, sentenced him to two years’
confinement in a state-jail facility for each offense. The trial court subsequently
suspended the sentences and placed Maldonado on community supervision for a period
of three years.
On June 20, 2012, the State filed motions to revoke Maldonado’s community
supervision because Maldonado violated the conditions of his community supervision.
On the burglary offense, the State alleged that appellant violated the conditions of his
community supervision by failing to report, failing to pay restitution and supervisory fees,
and failing to attend a therapy program. On the theft offense, the State alleged
appellant failed to report and failed to submit to random urinalysis. At the evidentiary
hearing, Maldonado pleaded “true” to the allegations. The trial court adjudicated
Maldonado guilty, revoked his community supervision, and assessed his punishment at
two years’ incarceration in a state-jail facility and imposed a $2,000 fine. This appeal
followed.
II. FUNDAMENTAL ERROR IN PUNISHMENT
By his sole issue, Maldonado asserts that the “trial court abused its discretion by
sentencing [him] to two years’ incarceration because that punishment violates the
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objectives of the system of prohibitions, penalties, and correctional measures in the
[Texas] Penal Code.” The State responds that appellant failed to preserve any issue for
review because he did not object to his sentence in the trial court. We agree with the
State.
A. Preservation of Error
Appellant made no objection to his sentence either at the time of sentencing or in
any post-trial motion. To preserve his complaint for our review, Maldonado was
required to show that he made a timely objection to the trial court, stated the specific
grounds for the objection, and obtained a ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see Blue v.
State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). By failing to specifically
object in the trial court or in a post-trial motion, appellant has waived any error for our
review. See Trevino v. State, 174 S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2005, pet. ref’d) (“Because the sentence imposed is within the punishment range and is
not illegal, we conclude that the rights [appellant] asserts for the first time on appeal are
not so fundamental as to have relieved him of the necessity of a timely, specific trial
objection.”).
Appellant argues that a failure to consider the full range of punishment can be
raised for the first time on appeal and cites this Court’s opinion in Hernandez v. State for
the proposition that “a defendant may complain for the first time on appeal about a trial
court’s refusal (i.e., lack of impartiality) to consider the full range of punishment—so
long as the trial judge’s conduct is so egregious as to deem the judge biased on the
matter of punishment.” See Hernandez v. State, 109 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi, 2008, no pet.). In Hernandez, the appellant succeeded in establishing a
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lack of impartiality where the trial court summarily doubled his prior sentence. See id. at
184–85. Maldonado has not established that the trial court failed to consider the full
range of punishment. Further, he does not demonstrate in the instant case that the trial
court's conduct was so egregious as to indicate bias in the matter of punishment.
Therefore, appellant's failure to object is not excused by Hernandez, and appellant does
not raise any other exceptions to the rule that might apply.
B. Penal Code Goals
Even if Maldonado had preserved error, we review a sentence imposed by a trial
court for abuse of discretion. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984). As a general rule, a sentence within the proper range of punishment will not be
disturbed on appeal. Id.; see also Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006) (explaining that, absent rare exceptions, a punishment that falls within
the legislatively-prescribed range is unassailable on appeal).
Maldonado concedes that his sentence was within the statutorily authorized
range for his offense. The permissible punishment range for a state-jail felony is 180
days to two years in state jail and a fine not to exceed $10,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.35 (West Supp. 2011). Maldonado cites no authority to support the
proposition that a sentence within the statutorily authorized range for any given offense
is so contrary to the purposes set out in section 1.02(1) of the penal code so as to
constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court. See id. § 1.02(1) (West 2011)
(stating that the objectives of the code are to insure the public safety through
deterrence, rehabilitation and punishment). Texas courts have consistently held that as
long as the punishment assessed falls within the statutory range, the punishment is not
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excessive, cruel, or unusual. See Jordan v. State, 495 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1973); Trevino, 174 S.W.3d at 928. Accordingly, appellant’s sole issue is
overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
________________________
DORI CONTRERAS GARZA,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
20th day of June, 2013.
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