NUMBER 13-13-00181-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
BELINDA VALLEJO, APPELLANT
v.
CAMERON COUNTY, APPELLEE.
On appeal from the 103th District Court
of Cameron County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Perkes
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
Appellant, Belinda Vallejo appeals an order granting Cameron County’s plea to
the jurisdiction. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
By written order signed on February 22, 2013, the trial court sustained the
County’s plea and dismissed the cause. On March 22, 2013, appellant filed her notice
of appeal.
On April 8, 2013, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that it appeared the
appeal was not timely perfected. Appellant was advised that, if the defect was not
corrected within ten days from the date of receipt of this Court’s letter, the appeal would
be dismissed. To date, no response has been received from appellant.
Section 51.014(a)(8) of the civil practice and remedies code permits an
interlocutory appeal from an order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a
governmental unit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon
2008). Appeals from interlocutory orders, when allowed by statute, are accelerated
appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 28.1. In order to perfect an accelerated appeal of an
interlocutory order, the party is required to file a notice of appeal “within 20 days after
the judgment or order is signed.” Id. at R. 26.1(b). The filing of a motion for new trial,
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law, or any other post-judgment motion,
except for a motion for extension of time filed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
26.3, “will not extend the time to perfect an accelerated appeal.” Id. at R. 26.3, 28.1(b).
The trial court’s order was signed on February 22, 2013. Under the civil practice
and remedies code, the order was subject to an accelerated interlocutory appeal. See
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8). Accordingly, appellant was required
to file her notice of accelerated appeal within twenty days of the trial court’s February
22, 2013 order. The record does not reflect that appellant filed a motion for extension of
time under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3. See id. at R. 26.3; see also
Houser v. McElveen, 243 S.W.3d 646, 646-47 (Tex. 2008) (stating that a notice of
appeal should be considered timely if filed within fifteen days after the filing deadline
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and accompanied by a motion for extension of time with a reasonable explanation for
the delay).
We are to construe the rules of appellate procedure reasonably and liberally so
that the right to appeal is not lost by imposing requirements not absolutely necessary to
effectuate the purpose of a rule. See Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 616-17 (Tex.
1997). Nevertheless, we are prohibited from enlarging the scope of our jurisdiction by
enlarging the time for perfecting an appeal in a civil case in a manner not provided for
by rule. See TEX. R. APP. P. 2; In re T.W., 89 S.W.3d 641, 642 (Tex. App.–Amarillo
2002, no pet.).
The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file,
appellant’s failure to timely perfect her appeal, and appellant’s failure to respond to this
Court’s notice, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF
JURISDICTION. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a)(c).
PER CURIAM
Delivered and filed the
30th day of May, 2013.
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