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In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-11-00042-CV
______________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF N.S., R.S., AND C.S., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 402nd Judicial District Court
Wood County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2008-229
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On May 10, 2011, we mailed a letter to appellant’s counsel, Wm. Brandon Baade, requesting that he show this Court how we had jurisdiction over this appeal regarding a potential defect in that this appeared to be an appeal from an order of both civil and criminal contempt. In Texas, there is no appeal from an order holding a person in contempt. In re C.N., 313 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.); Pandozy v. Beaty, 254 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (citing Ex parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1985)); Ex parte Cardwell, 416 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex. 1967). Relief is available for an incarcerated individual only through application for a writ of habeas corpus. Hernandez v. Hernandez, 318 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.); Grimes v. Grimes, 706 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ dism’d) (citing Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 259 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956)).
In that letter, we directed counsel to show this Court how we had jurisdiction and informed him that if no response was received by May 20, 2011, the appeal would be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. It is now June 6, 2011, and no response has been received.
We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice
Date Submitted: June 6, 2011
Date Decided: June 7, 2011
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Original Mandamus Proceeding
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jamie Lee Bledsoe has petitioned this Court for mandamus relief, naming as respondents the Harrison County District Attorney, Joe Black, and the Harrison County District Clerk, Sherry “Griff.”[1] No other respondents are effectively named or described.[2]
This Court has limited mandamus jurisdiction; we may issue a writ of mandamus only against a judge of a district or county court in our district. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(b) (Vernon 2004). That jurisdiction does not extend to other parties, such as district attorneys or district clerks, unless such mandamus relief would be necessary to enforce our jurisdiction. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(a) (Vernon 2004); see also In re Brown, No. 06-10-00158-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7215 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 2, 2010, orig. proceeding); In re Washington, 7 S.W.3d 181, 182–83 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding); In re Coronado, 980 S.W.2d 691, 692–93 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding).
Bledsoe has failed to show himself entitled to mandamus relief.[3] We find no circumstances presented which would make writs of mandamus issued against either the Harrison County District Attorney or the Harrison County District Clerk necessary to enforce our jurisdiction. Bledsoe has neither named nor described a respondent over whom we have mandamus jurisdiction, nor demonstrated an abuse of discretion regarding a ministerial duty.
We dismiss Bledsoe’s petition for writ of mandamus for lack of jurisdiction.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: January 20, 2011
Date Decided: January 21, 2011
Do Not Publish
[1]The style of Bledsoe’s petition names Black as respondent; in the body of his petition, Bledsoe identifies both Black and Griff as respondents. We take judicial notice that (a) the former Harrison County District Clerk was Sherry Griffis, not “Griff”, and (b) as of January 1, 2011, the Harrison County District Attorney is Coke Solomon and the Harrison County District Clerk is Melinda Craig.
[2]It appears that Bledsoe is complaining that he has “received no response from respondent regarding Relator’s request for transmittal of a copy of the application for Judgment Nunc Pro tunc any answer filed or a certificate reciting the date it was filed.” Although Bledsoe has attached to his petition a file-marked copy of the State’s response to his application for judgment nunc pro tunc, the copy of the application for judgment nunc pro tunc he has presented to this Court is not file marked. In his prayer, Bledsoe asks (1) that we find an abuse of discretion in denying Bledsoe time credit; (2) that we order transmittal of a copy of Bledsoe’s application for judgment nunc pro tunc, any answer filed to this Court, along with a “certificate reciting the date upon which that finding was made to the 6th Court of Appeals”; and (3) that we “inspect the nunc pro tunc,” and “reevaluate the length of flat time afforded.” Bledsoe goes on to ask we “update and correct the figures which are sent to the Department of Criminal Justice.” Given that Bledsoe has provided a copy of his application for judgment nunc pro tunc and the State’s response, at least two of the documents he seeks are in his possession. We are not clear what Bledsoe means by “certificate reciting the date upon which that finding was made to the 6th Court of Appeals.”
[3]The standard for mandamus relief articulated by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals requires the relator to establish that: (1) there is no adequate remedy at law to redress the alleged harm; and (2) only a ministerial act, not a discretionary or judicial decision, is being sought. State ex. rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Due to the nature of this remedy, it is Bledsoe’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to the mandamus relief. Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks.”).