COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00049-CV
THOMAS S. DIFFLEY APPELLANT
V.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. APPELLEES
AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.
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FROM THE 348TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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On February 14, 2014, appellant Thomas S. Diffley filed a notice of appeal
in this court attempting to appeal the trial court’s February 4, 2014 order granting
summary judgment in favor of appellees JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. and
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. The order did not dispose of
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Diffley’s claims asserted against the other defendants in the case. On February
14, 2014, we sent a letter to the parties expressing our concern that we may not
have jurisdiction over this appeal because the summary judgment does not
appear to be a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order. We stated that
unless Diffley or any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a response
showing grounds for continuing the appeal, the appeal could be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 44.3.
In response to our letter, Diffley filed a motion for continuance, but it does
not show grounds for continuing the appeal. Because the summary judgment at
issue is not a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we deny
Diffley’s motion for continuance and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191,
195 (Tex. 2001) (reasoning that a judgment or order is final for purposes of
appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims before the court).
/s/ Lee Gabriel
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: March 20, 2014
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