COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00020-CR
EX PARTE DIMAS ROJAS
MARTINEZ
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order denying his
application for habeas corpus relief under article 11.072 of the code of criminal
procedure. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072, §§ 7(a), 8 (West Supp.
2013). We affirm.
Background
On June 3, 2013, appellant pled guilty to indecency with a child pursuant to
a plea bargain and, in accordance with the plea bargain, the trial court placed
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
him on five years’ deferred adjudication community supervision. As a result of
his plea, appellant was detained by the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) in July 2013. In September 2013, appellant filed an
application for writ of habeas corpus, in which he claimed that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance because, at the time of his plea, his counsel
failed to inform appellant that he would be subject to mandatory removal from the
United States. See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (West 2005).
In an affidavit attached to his application, appellant averred that his
attorney knew that he was a legal permanent resident of the United States, that
he decided to accept the plea deal because his attorney told him “it was a better
deal than previous offers,” and that only after he signed the plea documents did
his attorney tell him he should consult with an immigration lawyer “just in case
immigration . . . [came] to see” him. According to appellant, “[a]t the time of the
plea [he] was[ ]unaware[ ]that[ ]there would be such dire immigration
consequences,” and he would not have pled guilty if he had known.
The State filed with the trial court an affidavit from appellant’s trial counsel,
in which counsel averred that he was surprised when appellant accepted the
State’s plea offer, that appellant did not want to risk prison time, and that the trial
judge admonished him specifically on deportation and exclusion. According to
appellant’s counsel, he made “[n]o recommendation to [appellant] to consult [an]
immigration attorney before [the] plea because nothing could be done to assist
his status on a 3g offense.”
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The trial court also held an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s application.
At the hearing, appellant’s trial counsel testified that there was nothing an
immigration lawyer could have done for appellant in his circumstances, so he did
not refer appellant to an immigration lawyer before advising him to accept the
plea. Appellant’s counsel testified that he initialed and had appellant initial the
section of the plea admonishments that says a plea of guilty could result in
deportation from the United States; that was the only paragraph he had appellant
initial specifically. He further testified that when going over this admonishment
with appellant, he told him that “the expectation is that . . . if they [ICE] take
action, it will be a removal and there is not anything that an immigration attorney
can do to help you with that.” Appellant’s counsel admitted that he did not know
for sure whether appellant “truly understood” the admonishment, but he said he
explained it and felt comfortable that appellant understood. He also said the trial
judge explained the immigration consequences and that appellant listened.
According to appellant’s trial counsel, the only thing an immigration lawyer
could have advised appellant was that if he took the plea, he could be removed
from the country, which is what appellant’s counsel advised. He said this would
have been a good case as to punishment but that it was not a good case for
obtaining an acquittal on guilt-innocence. He said appellant understood the only
hope he had was acquittal. He also testified that there were no language
difficulties at all.
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The trial court adopted the State’s proposed memorandum, which included
the following pertinent findings of fact and conclusions of law:
12. [Counsel] believed that the State’s guilt-innocence case
was strong despite credibility issues involving the child[ ]victim’s
mother.
13. [Counsel] was aware that the applicant was a permanent
resident alien and not a United States citizen.
14. [Counsel] was aware that criminal defense attorneys have
an obligation to advise their clients regarding the potential
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.
15. [Counsel’s] normal practice is to refer non-citizen clients to
an immigration attorney when needed.
16. [Counsel] did not refer the applicant to an immigration
attorney because the immigration consequences were clear – the
applicant would be deported if convicted of a 3g offense.
17. [Counsel] did not believe that an immigration attorney
could provide the applicant any more information regarding his
potential deportation consequences.
18. The applicant understood that acquittal was his only hope
of avoiding immigration consequences.
19. Due to the applicant’s understanding that acquittal was his
only hope of avoiding immigration consequences, [counsel] did not
extensively discuss the immigration consequences of entering a
guilty plea.
....
22. The State made an original plea bargain offer of seven
years’ confinement.
23. Shortly before trial, the State made a new plea bargain
offer of two years’ confinement or five years’ deferred adjudication
community supervision.
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24. [Counsel] understood that both plea bargain offers had
immigration consequences for the applicant.
25. The State did not make an immigration-safe plea bargain
offer.
26. There is no evidence that the State would have offered,
considered or accepted a plea bargain agreement for an offense not
resulting in the same immigration consequences.
27. The applicant accepted the State’s five years’ deferred
adjudication community supervision plea bargain offer because he
was concerned with going to prison.
28. [Counsel] was surprised that the applicant accepted the
plea bargain offer, but believes that his decision was wise given the
applicant’s slight chance of acquittal.
29. [Counsel] discussed the immigration consequences with
the applicant before he entered his guilty plea.
30. The trial court’s written plea admonishments contained the
following warning regarding the risk of deportation:
Citizenship: If you are not a citizen of the United States of
America, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for this offense may
result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country, or
the denial of naturalization under federal law.
31. [Counsel] reviewed this admonishment with the applicant,
and had him initial it.
32. [Counsel] further explained to the applicant that, due to
being charged with a 3g offense, he should expect removal
proceeding as an immigration consequence.
....
43. The applicant was fully advised by [counsel] and by the
trial judge regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty plea
before he entered his guilty plea.
44. [Counsel] fully apprised the applicant of his legal options.
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45. [Counsel’s] writ hearing testimony and his affidavit
attestations are credible.
46. [Counsel] provided the applicant with adequate
representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
....
51. The applicant received effective assistance of counsel.
....
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
....
13. [Counsel] fully advised the applicant regarding the risk of
deportation, as required by Padilla v. Kentucky, including that he
should expect removal proceedings as an immigration consequence
of his guilty plea.
14. [Counsel] provided the applicant with adequate
representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
15. The trial judge specifically advised the applicant that he
would have immigration consequences from his guilty plea.
16. The applicant was made aware that a guilty plea would
result in deportation from the United States.
....
28. The applicant received effective assistance of trial
counsel.
[Citations omitted.]
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s denial of the relief requested in an application for
a writ of habeas corpus under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kniatt v.
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State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1052
(2006). This means we view the record in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling and afford great deference to its findings and conclusions,
especially when they involve determinations of credibility and demeanor.
Ex parte Mello, 355 S.W.3d 827, 832 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d)
(op. on PDR).
Analysis
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that
counsel’s “advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the
ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel” and that the Strickland test for
ineffectiveness applies to a claim that counsel’s advice regarding the immigration
consequences following a guilty plea was deficient. 559 U.S. 356, 366, 130 S.
Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010). The court held that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional
norms supports the view that counsel must advise [a] client regarding the risk of
deportation.” Id. at 367, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. In Padilla, as in this case, the
relevant statutes were “succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal
consequence”; thus, the Supreme Court concluded that Padilla’s counsel had an
equally clear duty to give Padilla correct advice regarding the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea. Id. at 368–69, 130 S. Ct. at 1483.
Here, the trial court found appellant’s counsel to be credible, in particular
his testimony that he advised appellant before the guilty plea that a trial and
acquittal would be the only way to avoid immigration consequences. Thus, the
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trial court’s conclusion that appellant was made aware that deportation would
result from his guilty plea is supported by the record. See Ex parte Obi, No. 01-
12-01003-CR, 2013 WL 4520936, at *5 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 27,
2013, no pet. h.). We conclude and hold that the trial judge did not abuse her
discretion by determining that counsel’s performance was not deficient under
Strickland. See id.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s order denying appellant’s application for habeas
relief under article 11.072 of the code of criminal procedure.
/s/ Terrie Livingston
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; GARDNER and WALKER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: March 20, 2014
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