IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10-00152-CR
ALEJANDRO GARCIA,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 85th District Court
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court No. 08-00711-CRF-85
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Alejandro Garcia, was charged by indictment with aggravated
robbery, a first-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)-(b) (West 2011).
Garcia pleaded guilty to the charged offense, and, after a jury trial on punishment, he
was sentenced to twenty-four years’ incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice—Institutional Division (“TDCJ”). By one issue, Garcia argues that his trial
counsel was ineffective because trial counsel asserted that Garcia should receive
probation when, in fact, Garcia was not eligible. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Without the benefit of an agreement with the State, Garcia pleaded guilty to the
charged offense of aggravated robbery. See id. During the punishment hearing, the jury
heard evidence linking Garcia to the alleged robbery of Sajid Butt at Nick’s One Stop
Food Store in Bryan, Texas, and implicating him in several other robberies transpiring
at different locations in Bryan around the same time as the alleged robbery.1 Garcia
testified on his own behalf and admitted to having participated in the robbery alleged
in the indictment; however, he denied the other robberies in which he was implicated.
Later, Garcia acknowledged that he had previously received a five-year sentence for
felony driving while intoxicated (“DWI”), which was a “third DWI [that] got
enhanced.” Garcia denied being sentenced to prison but stated that he “paroled out” in
Brazos County. This admission stunned Garcia’s trial counsel. Nevertheless, Garcia’s
trial counsel tried to de-emphasize the effects of Garcia’s admission by questioning
Garcia about what he did after the alleged robbery transpired. Garcia testified that he
went to look for his co-conspirator in the robbery, David Segovia. When he could not
find Segovia, Garcia went to visit family in Laredo, Texas. Garcia’s family convinced
him to turn himself in rather than flee to Mexico. Garcia turned himself in because his
“mama raised [him] better than that. She advised [him] that [he] had to face up to what
[he] did.” Garcia’s trial counsel then questioned Garcia about several accomplishments
he achieved while in prison, including the receipt of his GED; the completion of anger
1 In open court, Ashley Elliott, formerly a receptionist at the America’s Best Value Inn (“Inn”) in
Bryan, identified Garcia as one of the individuals who robbed the Inn on December 13, 2007, a few days
prior to the aggravated robbery in this case. Elliott also identified Garcia as one of the assailants from a
photographic lineup conducted shortly after the December 13, 2007 robbery took place.
Garcia v. State Page 2
management, parenting, job-skills, Alcoholics Anonymous, and substance-abuse
classes; and the receipt of a certificate of recognition for the “World Bible
Correspondence Course.”
On cross-examination, however, Garcia admitted to lying to family members
about going to the hospital for an alleged gun-shot wound received around the same
time as the aggravated robbery in this case and to law enforcement about the incident in
this case. Garcia also acknowledged that he has a drinking problem; that he has been
arrested and convicted for DWI several times; that he has been convicted of possession
of fifty to 2,000 pounds of marihuana, which was apparently reduced to a class A
misdemeanor offense, in Houston, Texas; and that he has been convicted of the
misdemeanor offense of failing to stop and give information after causing an accident in
Portland, Texas.
On re-direct examination, Garcia’s trial counsel once again asked Garcia about
his prior felony conviction; the following exchange occurred:
[Garcia’s trial counsel]: Okay. Now, when you and I were discussing
whether you’d ever been convicted of a felony
or not, did you misunderstand my question or
not—not know what I was talking about?
[Garcia]: Like I said, probably. I mean, I had—I had
gotten my five-year sentence on that, but I had
paroled out already so . . .
Q: Okay. Now—
A: I would also like to add that I had already told
my previous lawyer before you the same thing.
Garcia v. State Page 3
Q: Did you believe somehow that because you
hadn’t actually been to the penitentiary it
wasn’t a felony conviction?
A: Like I said, I had never really been to the
penitentiary, been locked up this long so I
don’t really—don’t . . .
Q: Okay. Alejandro, you could have denied that
you’d ever had that conviction, couldn’t you?
A: Yes. Yes, sir.
Q: Instead you told the truth; is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Have you told the truth about everything else
you’ve testified to?
A: Yes, sir.
Later, the State introduced a certified copy of Garcia’s application for probation
in which he certified, under penalty of perjury, that he had not been previously
convicted of a felony and was, therefore, eligible for probation. Garcia admitted that he
did not read the document and only signed it because a representative from Garcia’s
trial counsel’s office told him to sign it. Garcia noted that he was not trying to be
deceptive when he signed the application for probation. However, Garcia stated that he
told his first attorney about the felony DWI conviction but that he did not tell his
current trial counsel. Garcia assumed that his current trial counsel “got the paperwork
from my other attorney . . . .” Finally, Garcia testified that he observed voir dire, heard
counsel explain that one is eligible for probation if he has never been convicted of a
felony, and understood what that meant.
Garcia v. State Page 4
During closing argument, Garcia’s trial counsel stated that:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, through the years I’ve had some
embarrassing things happen to me in the courtroom. I was very
chagrined and very embarrassed to find out that my client—the first time I
found that out was today when he was on the witness stand that he had a
prior felony conviction; therefore, he’s ineligible for probation after I spent
so much of my time and your time talking to you about that.
....
Obviously[,] if we’d known or if I had known what the situation was, I
wouldn’t have done it like that. What I would urge you to do is whatever
hostility or misgivings that scenario gives you, I’d urge you to blame me
for not doing a better job of communicating with my client. Don’t hold it
against him.
....
Fortunately[,] in this case[,] no one sustained a bodily injury as a
result of Alejandro’s participation in this crime. I would submit to you
that based on that, the range should move somewhere to 25 to 50 years.
The jury ultimately assessed punishment at twenty-four years’ incarceration in
the TDCJ and imposed a $5,000 fine. This appeal ensued.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, and article 1.051 of the
code of criminal procedure guarantee an accused the right to reasonably effective
assistance of counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.051 (West Supp. 2010); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Ex parte Gonzales, 945 S.W.2d 830,
835 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Garcia must
show that: (1) trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
Garcia v. State Page 5
reasonableness, based on the prevailing professional norms; and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s deficient performance, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-95, 104 S. Ct. at
2064-69; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Whether this test
has been met is to be judged on appeal by the totality of the representation, not by
isolated acts or omissions. Rodriguez v. State, 899 S.W.2d 658, 665 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995). Garcia has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a
preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999) (citing Cannon v. State, 668 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
Our review of counsel’s representation is highly deferential, and we will find
ineffective assistance only if Garcia overcomes the strong presumption that his
counsel’s conduct fell within the range of reasonable professional assistance. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The right to “reasonably effective assistance of counsel” does
not guarantee errorless counsel or counsel whose competency is judged by perfect
hindsight. Saylor v. State, 660 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Moreover, the
acts and omissions that form the basis of Garcia’s claims of ineffective assistance must
be supported by the record. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. A silent record which provides
no explanation for counsel’s actions usually will not overcome the strong presumption
of reasonable assistance. Id. at 813-14. To warrant reversal without affording counsel
an opportunity to explain his actions, “the challenged conduct must be ‘so outrageous
that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521,
Garcia v. State Page 6
533 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005)).
III. ANALYSIS
By his only issue on appeal, Garcia asserts that trial counsel was deficient for
failing to investigate his prior offenses and for indicating to the jury that Garcia was
eligible for probation when, in fact, Garcia was not eligible due to a prior felony
conviction for DWI. Garcia alleges that counsel’s errors eroded Garcia’s credibility
before the jury and likely resulted in a higher sentence. Garcia also notes that his trial
counsel’s errors forced him to perjure himself in front of the jury.
At the outset of our analysis, we note that the record on direct appeal is silent as
to Garcia’s trial counsel’s strategy; ordinarily, a silent record is insufficient to establish
the dual prongs of Strickland. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813-14 (stating that “in the vast
majority of cases, the undeveloped record on direct appeal will be insufficient for an
appellant to satisfy the dual prongs of Strickland”); see also Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828,
835 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
Nevertheless, assuming without deciding that trial counsel’s representation of Garcia
fell below the standard of reasonable professional assistance, as articulated in Strickland,
we cannot say that Garcia has adequately demonstrated that, but for trial counsel’s
purported errors, he would have received a reduced sentence. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687-95, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-69; see also Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 737. The justifications for this
conclusion are threefold.
Garcia v. State Page 7
First, Garcia was sentenced at the lower end of the punishment range
corresponding to first-degree aggravated robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§
12.32(a) (West 2011) (stating that the punishment range for first-degree felonies is “for
life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years”), 29.03(b) (providing
that, upon conviction for the offense of aggravated robbery, a defendant is subject to the
punishment range corresponding to first-degree felonies). Therefore, trial counsel’s
alleged errors do not appear to have inflamed the jury to enhance Garcia’s punishment.
Second, the record contains evidence of Garcia’s numerous prior criminal convictions
and instances where Garcia lied to family members and law enforcement; thus, Garcia’s
argument that trial counsel’s errors resulted in a critical lessening of Garcia’s credibility
appears to be overstated given the state of the record.2 Third, the record reflects that
neither the State nor defense counsel were aware of Garcia’s prior felony DWI
conviction and that, during closing argument, Garcia’s trial counsel admitted that
Garcia was not eligible for probation, stated that Garcia and his trial counsel had a
miscommunication about Garcia’s eligibility for probation, and requested that the jury
not hold the error against Garcia.3 These statements, coupled with the facts that Garcia
voluntarily turned himself in to law enforcement and his many accomplishments while
incarcerated, could have conceivably rehabilitated Garcia’s credibility so as to not leave
2Garcia testified that during the first hour of his interview with police, he denied any
involvement in the incident in question, though he later admitted to participating in the alleged
aggravated robbery in this case.
3Moreover, the record indicates that Garcia’s trial counsel investigated Garcia’s criminal history
and inquired about Garcia’s drinking problem and prior DWIs.
Garcia v. State Page 8
the jury with the impression that Garcia was deceptive in making his mistaken
probation request. Regardless, other than inviting this Court to engage in conjecture
and speculation, Garcia does not adequately explain how trial counsel’s purported
errors resulted in an increased sentence. See Ex parte Cash, 178 S.W.3d 816, 818-19 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005) (holding that a defendant cannot satisfy the second prong of Strickland
“based on pure conjecture and speculation”) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693 (stating
that it is not enough for a defendant to show that counsel’s errors has some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding)); see also Mack v. State, No. 06-06-00222-CR,
2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 3765, at **5-6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 17, 2007, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication).4 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that
Garcia failed to prove the second prong of Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-95,
104 S. Ct. at 2064-69; see also Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 737. As a result, we cannot say that
Garcia satisfied his burden of proving his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See
4 With regard to the second prong of Strickland, the Mack court noted the following:
Second, comparing the evidence against Mack with the sentence that resulted,
harm does not appear. The State presented evidence of “numerous thefts, resisting
arrest, evading arrest, criminal trespass, felony drugs, felony indecency with a child,
bond jumping, skipping out, basically a life of crime, as much of a career criminal as
you’re going to find.” The state asked the jury to assess the maximum sentence of twenty
years; Mack urged the minimum of two years’, or, at most, five years’ confinement. The
jury assessed Mack’s punishment at ten years’ confinement, a sentence in the middle of
the range, closer to Mack’s suggested sentence, and well below the maximum possible
sentence. We would only be speculating to suggest that the result would have been any
different in the absence of the State’s objectionable conduct. Mack may not meet his
burden through conjecture and speculation. Mack has not established that counsel’s
representation so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
result was unjust.
Mack v. State, No. 06-06-00222-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 3765, at **5-6 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 17,
2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (internal citation omitted).
Garcia v. State Page 9
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; see also Cannon, 668 S.W.2d at 403. Accordingly, we overrule
Garcia’s issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Garcia’s sole issue on appeal, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed July 20, 2011
Do not publish
[CR25]
Garcia v. State Page 10