IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10-00452-CV
No. 10-10-00453-CV
No. 10-10-00454-CV
In the Interest of
L.A.M., Jr., J.L.L., W.H., J.M.L. and A.A.L., Children,
From the 12th District Court
Madison County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 09-11990-012-09, 09-11991-278-09 and 09-11992-012-09
ORDER
Maurice L. is the biological father of J.M.L. and was also the permanent managing conservator of L.A.M., Jr., J.L.L., W.H., and A.A.L. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed three suits for protection of the children, and the cases were tried to one jury. Based upon the jury verdict, the trial court entered a final order terminating Maurice’s parental rights to J.M.L. and naming the Department as permanent managing conservator of all the children.[1]
Maurice filed a motion for new trial and a statement of points or issues to be presented on appeal as required by Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405 (b) (West 2008). The trial court held a hearing and found each point to be frivolous. The trial court did not allow Maurice a copy of the complete reporter’s record.
In each cause number, Maurice argues in his third issue that he is entitled to a full record on appeal based upon his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Maurice raised his ineffective assistance claim in his statement of points on appeal. An indigent parent is entitled to a full record on appeal when raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, even when the claim is not raised in the statement of appellate points. See In re B.G., 317 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. 2010). A claim of ineffective assistance cannot be adequately presented in the absence of a full record and an indigent parent would be denied due process without a full reporter’s record. See In re B.G., 317 S.W.3d at 256-7. We sustain Maurice’s third issue on appeal. We need not address Maurice’s remaining issues on appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
We order the court reporter in this case to prepare a full record from the trial, and we further order the parties to proceed to file new briefs once the record is filed.
PER CURIAM
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Order issued and filed July 6, 2011
Publish
[1] Maurice is the only party to this appeal.
:200%;font-family: "CG Times";color:black'>In addition to applying the 1704.153 eligibility requirement to individuals applying to act as a licensed bail bondsperson, the Board applies this requirement to individuals seeking to act as agents of a licensed bail bondsperson. Johnson County Bail Bond Board Local Rule 10.1 defines “agent” as: “any person hired by a licensee who meets and negotiates with the public for the purpose of selling bail bonds, and presents bonds to the Sheriff’s Office for approval.” Further, Rule 10.1 states: “To qualify for a license as an agent, an applicant must show that he/she meets all requirements of the Act and these Rules ....”
Each county bail bond board has the authority to exercise the powers incidental or necessary to implement the Bail Bond Act. Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 1704.101 (Vernon 2004). Although a board cannot impose additional requirements on individuals who seek to obtain a license as a bail bond surety or as an agent for a corporate surety, it is appropriate, in furtherance of the Act, to impose eligibility requirements for agents or employees of licensed bail bondspersons because requirements for these individuals do not exist in the Act. Dallas County Bail Bond Bd. v. Stein, 771 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied).
The Board’s definition of “agent,” the requirement for agents to obtain a license, and the prohibition against felons obtaining an agent’s license are similar to the rules adopted by the Dallas County Bail Bond Board. In reviewing the Dallas rules, the Dallas Court of Appeals found the Dallas Bail Bond Board did not exceed its rulemaking authority in implementing rules governing agents. Id. The court stated: “the Board merely foreclosed the possibility that an individual who is ineligible for a license under the Act could circumvent this requirement by operating a bonding business as an agent of a licensee.” Id. Likewise, we find the Johnson County Bail Bond Board did not exceed its rulemaking authority and did not violate section 1704.153 of the Bail Bond Act by implementing rules governing agents of licensed bail bondspersons.
We are also persuaded by the Board’s arguments as they relate to Section 1704.302. Nothing in this section sets forth eligibility requirements to obtain a license under the Bail Bond Act. Subsections 1704.302(b) and (c) act solely to prohibit individuals, other than employees or agents, from receiving compensation for referring business to a licensed bail bondsperson and to prohibit individuals from obtaining employment with a licensed bail bondsperson for a period of ten years after a felony conviction. Smith misinterprets the statute in arguing that subsections 1704.302(b) and (c) modify the eligibility requirements found in section 1704.153. Where language in a statute is unambiguous, a reviewing court must rely on the plain and common meaning of the statute. See St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp. v. Abgor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997). The clear wording of this statute indicates section 1704.302 does not apply to the licensing of agents. Therefore, we overrule Smith’s first issue. Because of our disposition of Smith’s first issue we need not address his second issue concerning the denial of his motion for partial summary judgment.
GRANDFATHER CLAUSE
Because we have determined that Texas Occupations Code subsections 1704.302(b) and (c) do not apply in this case, it is irrelevant whether these provisions operate as a grandfather clause, and we need not rule on issues three and four.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Finally, Smith argues that Johnson Bail Bond Board Local Rule 10.1 violates his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. However, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals has previously addressed this issue in a case involving Smith and an identical rule of a bail bond board. Smith v. Wise County Bail Bond Bd., No. 02-00-00318-CV (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 12, 2001, no pet. h.). We agree with that analysis and hold that Rule 10.1 does not violate Smith’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment.
BILL VANCE
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed December 14, 2005
[CV06]