NUMBER 13-10-00493-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
FRANCISCO EMMANUEL DOMINGUEZ, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 357th District Court
of Cameron County, Texas.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes
Dissenting Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
A review of the record reveals the following timeline:
On June 16, 2008, Dominguez was arrested under the juvenile justice
code.
That same day, as per Lieutenant Castañeda’s testimony, attorney “Trey
Garza” arrived at the Harlingen Police Department, declared himself
attorney for Dominguez, and stated that no one was to talk to Dominguez.
According to testimony, on June 16, 2008 Officers took Dominguez before
Magistrate Sallie Gonzalez in an attempt to interrogate him, but
Dominguez refused to speak with them. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
51.095 (West 2008).
A hearing was held to determine whether Dominguez should be transferred
to the criminal court system.1 See id. § 54.02 (West 2008). Dominguez
testified in the motion to suppress hearing that he was declared an adult at
this proceeding and was represented by a juvenile court-appointed
attorney.
On August 11, 2008, Dominguez was transferred to the adult
Carrizales-Rucker Detention Center.
Lieutenant Castañeda received a call from an unidentified source advising
him that Dominguez was certified as an adult and was being transferred to
the Carrizales-Rucker facility.
Lieutenant Castañeda and Officers Rolph and Escalon removed
Dominguez from his cell after 10 p.m.
Lieutenant Castañeda did not ask Dominguez if he was represented by an
attorney because he was notified by an unnamed source that Dominguez
was not represented. Lieutenant Castañeda proceeded to read
Dominguez his Miranda rights and interrogate Dominguez along with the
other officers.
Lieutenant Castañeda testified at the suppression hearing that Dominguez
told them that he wanted to talk to them before, but his attorney would not
allow it. However, Dominguez testified that he told law enforcement
officers that he did not want to be questioned, but they persisted.
1
I am unable to the exact date of this hearing from the record. At the suppression hearing,
defense counsel argued to the trial court that the transfer hearing was held on August 8, 2008, the State
elicited testimony from Officer Rolph confirming that Dominguez had “waived his hearing on a discretionary
transfer to become certified as an adult,” and Dominguez testified that his adult certification hearing was “on
the 12th.”
2
According to Dominguez’s testimony, he signed his self-incriminating
statement approximately two to three hours after law enforcement officers
arrived at the adult facility at 12:45 a.m.
On August 27, 2008, the juvenile court signed an order waiving jurisdiction
and transferring the cause to the criminal district court. See id.
Based on these facts, I would hold that the trial court committed harmful error in
denying Dominguez’s motion to suppress the August 12, 2008 statement because the
officers obtained Dominguez’s statement improperly under the juvenile justice code.
I. JURISDICTION AND WAIVER
As a matter of procedure, this Court is not precluded from addressing an issue not
briefed or raised by Dominguez. When a defendant appeals his conviction, courts of
appeals have the jurisdiction to address any error in that case. Pfeiffer v. State, 363
S.W.3d 594, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked by the
timely filing of a notice of appeal. Id. Once our jurisdiction is invoked, our function to
review is limited only by our own discretion or valid restrictive statute. See Carter v.
State, 656 S.W.2d 468, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (en banc) (holding that “[a]fter
jurisdiction attaches to a particular cause, a broad scope of review and revision has been
asserted by appellate courts of this State—one that is still recognized, acknowledged
and confirmed by the Legislature”). Furthermore, “‘[t]here is a fundamental proposition
pertaining to appellate functions of the [j]udicial [d]epartment: A constitutional grant of
appellate jurisdiction treats a right of appeal in criminal cases ‘as a remedy to revise the
whole case upon the law and facts, as exhibited in the record [.]’” Pfeiffer, 363 S.W.3d
at 599 (quoting Carter, 656 S.W.2d at 468). Therefore, when a defendant appeals his
conviction, courts of appeals have the jurisdiction to address any error, see Pfeiffer, 363
3
S.W.3d at 599; even those which “prompt sua sponte appellate attention” because the
error involved constitutes a violation of established rules. Pena v. State, 191 S.W.3d
133, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). I would hold that the error in this case is one that our
Court’s discretion cannot ignore and one that we must address sua sponte, in light of the
age of the defendant at the time, the facts of the case, the magnitude of the offense, and
the potential harm that ignoring it may cause.2
II. ANALYSIS
Juveniles and adult criminal defendants are not treated equal in Texas “until the
former is certified as an adult and comes within the purview of the adult criminal system.”
Vasquez v. State, 739 S.W.2d 37, 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc). For purposes
of the juvenile code, a “child” is a person who is older than ten, but younger than 17
years of age. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2) (West 2008). “Until the moment
transfer is ordered, the juvenile is cloaked with the trappings of a non-criminal
proceeding with attendant safeguards such as greater protections in the areas of
confession law and notice requirements.” Vasquez, 739 S.W.2d at 43.3
Some of the governing statutory safeguards include the rules regarding waiver of
rights and admissibility of a child’s statement. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.09–.095
2
The waiver cases cited by the majority from our sister courts in Houston and Dallas deal with
unrelated issues and are thus unpersuasive. The Ponce case involved a child committing the crime of
perjury, which does not preclude prosecution; and in Geter, the appellant challenged the manner and
means of waiving his rights before a magistrate under section 51.09 of the family code. See Ponce v.
State, 985 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Geter v. State, No.
05-95-00775-CR, 1996 WL 459767, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 31, 1996, no pet.) (not designated for
publication). Neither of these cases applies here.
3
The Vasquez decision by Judge McCormick is an interpretation of the juvenile justice code as
well as rigorous analysis of pertinent case law and constitutional principles. References to Vasquez are
hardly “dicta” as the majority contends.
4
(West 2008). For example, a child may not waive any federal or state constitutional
rights without the consent of the child and his attorney, unless he received proper
warnings from a magistrate without the presence of law enforcement. Compare id. §§
51.09–.095 with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 (West 2003).
Here, Dominguez’s transfer order was not signed until August 27, 2008—two
weeks after law enforcement obtained his written confession at the Carrizales-Rucker
facility. Because a juvenile court holds exclusive original jurisdiction over these
matters, I would hold that a written transfer order under section 54.02 is jurisdictionally
mandatory because it effectively waives the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and transfers it
from a juvenile proceeding to an adult proceeding. But see Evans v. State, 61 S.W.3d
688, 690 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (holding that a lack of written transfer
order between two adult criminal district courts was a procedural matter rather than a
jurisdictional one).
The record is unclear as to when Dominguez was certified as an adult. The
majority assumes from testimony that Dominguez was certified prior to his
self-incriminating statement. Without more details, I cannot join this assumption
because dates are too critical to this issue. After his physical transfer to the
Carrizales-Rucker facility on August 11, 2008, law enforcement visited Dominguez later
that night into the early morning of the next day. The majority assumes, based on
testimony, that a proper transfer order was in place on August 11, 2008, when
Dominguez was moved to the adult facility. However, without being afforded the
underlying juvenile record in this case, we must conclude that Dominguez’s final transfer
5
under section 54.02 was effective on August 27, 2008, not August 11, 2008.4 The mere
physical transfer of Dominguez from a juvenile facility to an adult facility, without a
signed, corresponding written transfer order, is inadequate for me to conclude that the
juvenile cloak had been lifted in this case at the time he made his statement.5 Vasquez,
739 S.W.2d at 43. I am baffled by the majority’s position that Dominguez’s physical
transfer to an adult-detention facility without the proper, signed transfer order was
enough to remove his “juvenile cloak,” particularly when it appears from the record that
the officers who conducted Dominguez’s interrogation were acting on information told to
them from unknown or undisclosed sources. This assertion is unreasonable because it
effectively skirts and defies the Legislature’s intent to hold juvenile defendants under a
more protected justice system separate and apart from adult criminals.6 Therefore, I
would hold, based on the record, that until August 27, 2008, Dominguez was (1) a child,
4
It is worth noting that the transfer order included in Dominguez’s record is defective. The transfer
order fails to comply with the statutory requisites of section 54.02. The pertinent statutes states that if a
juvenile court waives jurisdiction:
it shall state specifically in the order its reasons for waiver and certify its action, including
the written order and findings of the court, and shall transfer the person to the appropriate
court for criminal proceedings and cause the results of the diagnostic study of the person
ordered under Subsection (d), including psychological information, to be transferred to the
appropriate criminal prosecutor.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02 (h).
5
I would hold that cases like Rushing v. State, 50 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001), aff’d 85
S.W.3d 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), are inapplicable to the instant case because they deal with late filings
of transfer orders and not the effective dates of the orders. Here, a transfer order was not effective until
August 27, 2008. The filing date of the order is irrelevant in this case.
6
The majority’s interpretation of section 54.02 would be nonsensical and would create
inconsistencies in the law. See Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 414–15 (Tex. 2011) (holding that “it
is the Legislature's prerogative to enact statutes; it is the judiciary's responsibility to interpret those statutes
according to the language the Legislature used, absent a context indicating a different meaning or the
result of the plain meaning of the language yielding absurd or nonsensical results”).
6
see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2)7; (2) represented by counsel, see id. § 51.10(b)(1);
and (3) should have been afforded the procedural safeguards for juvenile defendants,
see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.09–095. Dominguez should not have been allowed to
waive his Fifth Amendment right and sign his statement without his attorney or a
magistrate present under the juvenile code. See id.
The juvenile justice code was enacted by our legislature to meet several public
policy goals and “pervasive themes,” such as (1) to provide for the protection of the
public and public safety; and (2) to provide for the care, the protection, and the
wholesome moral, mental, and physical development of children coming within its
provisions. Id. § 51.01 (West 2008); Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789, 795 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1989) (en banc); see In re D.Z., 869 S.W.2d 561, 566–67 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1993, writ denied). In order to further these intended goals and themes, law
enforcement must comply with these statutes when dealing with juvenile defendants.
That did not happen here. See generally id.
Accordingly, I conclude that law enforcement authorities in this case improperly
obtained Dominguez’s confession in the early morning hours of August 12, 2008, and in
light of this impropriety, I would hold that the trial court committed error by denying
Dominguez’s pre-trial motion to suppress. See Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681,
684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). This error allowed the jury to place weight on Dominguez’s
improperly-obtained statement, and if I were to hold it harmless, it will encourage the
7
Dominguez’s age by itself does not automatically remove him from the enhanced protections of
the juvenile justice code. See Vasquez, 739 S.W.2d at 43 (noting that a child is not “arrested” for purposes
of criminal action until a juvenile transfer order is entered).
7
State to repeat this impropriety with impunity. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Wilson v.
State, 938 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc). Because I cannot
determine beyond a reasonable doubt that this erroneous admission of evidence did not
contribute to Dominguez’s conviction or punishment, I would reverse the conviction and
remand for a new trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d
106, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
__________________________
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
26th day of July, 2012.
8
Francisco Emmanuel Dominguez v. State
Combined Opinion