United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 30, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
_____________________ Clerk
No. 02-21286
Summary Calendar
_____________________
JIMMY COATS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,
also known as Goodyear Chemical,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(USDC No.: H-01-CV-1322)
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Jimmy Coats (“Coats”) filed an action against The
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (“Goodyear”), alleging that he was
discharged from his employment with Goodyear in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The parties consented to
proceed before a magistrate judge, who granted summary judgment for
Goodyear. In a comprehensive opinion, the magistrate judge
concluded that Coats failed to produce evidence sufficient to raise
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he has an impairment
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities
and thus is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
On appeal, Coats argues that he has established a genuine fact
issue that he is impaired in the major life activities of working,
sitting, standing, and lifting. He thus contends that the district
court erred by concluding that he failed to establish a prima facie
case.**
Coats began working for Goodyear in 1986. He injured his back
on the job in November 1997 and was placed on disability leave for
two months. His personal physician released him to return to work
in February 1998, with no physical restrictions. In January 1999,
Coats’s personal physician found that he was suffering from back
strain and restricted him to minimal bending and lifting no more
than twenty pounds for four weeks. Coats had surgery in November
1999 to relieve his back pain. His personal physician released him
to return to work without restrictions on January 3, 2000.
Goodyear medical personnel conducted a functional capacity
evaluation of Coats later that month, and concluded that he could
return to work with the following restrictions: no overhead
lifting; no frequent lifting of more than seventy-five pounds; no
bicycle riding longer than ten minutes; no walking of more than a
mile at a time; carrying limited to occasional lifting of fifty
**
In his statement of the issues, Coats includes the issue
whether Goodyear regarded Coats as having a disability. He
abandoned that issue, however, by failing to brief it. See, e.g.,
Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).
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pounds; and frequent changes of posture while sitting or standing.
In March 2000, following the functional capacity evaluation,
Coats’s personal physician released him to return to work, with
certain restrictions. Coats’s physician referred to the functional
capacity evaluation for the restrictions on lifting, and designated
the following additional restrictions: pushing, pulling, and
carrying limited to forty to sixty pounds; sitting and standing
limited to four to six hours; and the total work day limited to
eight hours.
Coats returned to his job as a fireman at Goodyear, which
allowed him to work an eight-hour shift. He lost that position
under a new labor agreement adopted in December 2000, because he
had the least seniority among the firemen. Coats was placed on
medical layoff on December 21, 2000, because there were no jobs
available to him, with his restrictions, under the terms of the
labor agreement. He remained eligible for reinstatement for
twenty-four months, provided he could bump a less senior employee
from a bargaining unit position which he could perform with his
restrictions. Coats began work as a supervisor at BP Security &
Investigations in March 2001.
Based upon our consideration of the briefs and the pertinent
authorities, as well as our de novo review of the summary judgment
evidence, we conclude that the magistrate judge correctly held that
Coats has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as
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to whether he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. He has
not shown that his physical restrictions and his inability to work
more than eight hours per day substantially limit a major life
activity. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
197 (2002) (“to be substantially limited in performing manual
tasks, an individual must have an impairment that prevents or
severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of
central importance to most people’s daily lives”); Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (even assuming that
working is a major life activity, plaintiff must show inability to
work in a “broad range of jobs”). Restated, Coats has not
presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether his restrictions prevent or severely restrict
him from engaging in activities that are of central importance to
most people’s daily lives or that prevent him from working in a
broad range of jobs. Instead, the undisputed evidence is that he
was able to work at Goodyear as a fireman, with his restrictions,
until he lost that position under the terms of the new labor
agreement, and that he thereafter began working for a new employer.
Accordingly, the summary judgment is
A F F I R M E D.
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