IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10-00176-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellant
v.
SARAH BROOKE DUNSON,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law
Coryell County, Texas
Trial Court No. 09-58933
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sarah Brooke Dunson was charged by information with the offense of possession
of a dangerous drug. The trial court granted Dunson’s motion to suppress evidence.
We reverse and remand.
Background Facts
On January 30, 2009, at approximately 1:25 a.m., Officer Michael Gonzales
observed a person driving a convertible vehicle with the top down in twenty-five
degree weather. The driver approached a four-way stop and failed to stop at the
designated stop line. Officer Gonzales stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation.
Christina Garrett was driving the vehicle, and Dunson was a passenger. Officer
Gonzales approached Garrett and asked for her driver’s license and proof of insurance.
Officer Gonzales detected the odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. Garrett stated
that they had been at a club, but that she had not consumed any alcoholic beverages.
A portable breath test indicated the presence of alcohol on Garrett’s breath. A
check on Garrett’s driver’s license revealed that she was under the age of twenty-one,
and therefore, could be charged with driving under the influence of alcohol by minor.
TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 106.041 (Vernon 2007). Officer Gonzales did not place
Garrett under arrest, but instead called Garrett’s mother who agreed to come get her.
Before Garrett’s mother arrived, Garrett asked Officer Gonzales if Dunson could drive
the vehicle.
Officer Gonzales then made contact with Dunson to determine if she was a
suitable driver. Another officer at the scene, Officer Randolph, asked for Dunson’s
driver’s license. Dunson stated that she had an Idaho license. The Idaho license was
not located, but a check with dispatch revealed that Dunson actually had a Texas
driver’s license. Officer Gonzales became concerned that Dunson was trying to hide
something such as outstanding warrants.
Based upon the contact with Dunson, Officer Gonzales talked again to Garrett
and obtained consent to search the vehicle. The officers spoke with both Dunson and
Garrett and asked if there was anything illegal in the vehicle. Dunson admitted that she
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had Darvocet pills and that she did not have a valid prescription for the pills. The pills
were located in Dunson’s purse.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must
give great deference to the trial court's findings of historical facts as long as the record
supports the findings. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Because
the trial court is the exclusive fact finder, the appellate court reviews evidence adduced
at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling.
Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We also give deference to
the trial court's rulings on mixed questions of law and fact when those rulings turn on
an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State, supra. Where such rulings
do not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, we review the trial court's
actions de novo. Guzman v. State, supra; Davila v. State, 4 S.W.3d 844, 847-48 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 1999, no pet'n). We review questions involving legal principles and the
application of law to established facts de novo. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004). Therefore, we will examine the legality of the stop de novo.
Discussion
We evaluate the reasonableness of a traffic stop based solely on an objective
standard, and an officer's subjective intent plays no role in our determination of
whether a traffic stop was reasonable. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992). Police may validly stop a vehicle for a traffic violation so long as the stop
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would be objectively reasonable, regardless of whether the stop is a mere pretext to
investigate unrelated criminal conduct. Id.
A traffic stop that is objectively reasonable at its inception may develop into a
Fourth Amendment violation if the manner of its execution is unreasonable. Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). A traffic stop made for the purpose of issuing a
warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time
reasonably required to complete that mission. Id. An officer is not prohibited from
inquiring into matters unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop so long as the stop is
not unreasonably extended. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d at 63-65. A traffic stop may last
as long as reasonably necessary to check the driver's license and car registration and to
conduct a computer check of that information. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d at 63.
The trial court found that Officer Gonzales did not observe Garrett commit a
traffic offense and that he followed Garrett until he found probable cause to stop her.
The trial court further found that “Officer Gonzales created a justification for stopping
the vehicle and the initial stop was illegal and violated the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment Rights.”
Dunson does not dispute the initial stop. At the suppression hearing, her trial
counsel stated, “our issue doesn’t have anything to do with the stop. I believe the
testimony of the officer is sufficient to show that there was a valid reason to make the
stop . . . We don’t have an issue with the initial contact.” Trial counsel further stated he
was “not making argument that the stop wasn’t valid … we’re not arguing about the
reason for the stop.”
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We agree with Dunson’s counsel and find that the initial stop was legal and did
not violate Dunson’s Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court did not make a
determination of the reasonableness of the detention after the initial stop. Because the
trial court did not make findings on the continued detention, we do not consider
whether the continued detention was reasonable. We sustain the State’s sole issue on
appeal.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order granting Dunson’s motion to suppress and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Reversed and remanded
Opinion delivered and filed March 16, 2011
Do not publish
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