COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00310-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.E.L.
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FROM THE 393RD DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her daughter, A.E.L. The trial court found by clear and convincing
evidence that Mother had engaged in conduct that had endangered the physical
or emotional well-being of A.E.L. and that Mother had knowingly placed or
knowingly allowed A.E.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings that had
endangered her physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(1)(D), (E) (West Supp. 2013). The trial court further found that
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in A.E.L.’s best interest. See id.
§ 161.001(2).
Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the motion, counsel avers
that he has conducted a professional evaluation of the record and, after a
thorough review of the applicable law, has reached the conclusion that there are
no arguable grounds to be advanced to support an appeal of this cause and that
the appeal is frivolous. Mother was given the opportunity to file a pro se brief, but
she has not done so. The Department of Family and Protective Services sent us
a letter stating that it was waiving the opportunity to file a response.
Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California
by presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there
are no reversible grounds on appeal and referencing any grounds that might
arguably support the appeal. See 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400
(1967); In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)
(holding that Anders procedures apply in parental rights termination cases), disp.
on merits, No. 02–01–00349–CV, 2003 WL 2006583 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
May 1, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).
In our duties as a reviewing court, we must conduct an independent
evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining
that the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991); K.M., 2003 WL 2006583, at *2. Only then may we grant
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counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S.
Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and appellate counsel’s
brief. We agree with appellate counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and
without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the
appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In
re E.M.M., No. 02-12-00259-CV, 2012 WL 6632785, at *6, *9 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Dec. 21, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). Therefore, we grant appellate
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s order terminating
Mother’s parental rights to A.E.L.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, DAUPHINOT, and GARDNER, JJ.
DELIVERED: January 16, 2014
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