United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 21, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 02-30652
Summary Calendar
KLEINERT C. BROWN, Succession,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; ANN VENEMAN,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE; FARM SERVICES AGENCY;
WILLIE COOPER; HARRY MOCK, JR.; ROBERT BRADLEY,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CV-696
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Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The Succession of Kleinert C. Brown (“Brown”) appeals from the
summary judgment dismissal of claims against the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA), and individual defendants Harry
Mock, Jr., Robert Bradley, and Willie Cooper. Brown sought review
of a USDA decision denying an application for disaster benefits
related to catfish farming operations under the Crop Loss Disaster
Assistance Program (CLDAP). The complaint also sought monetary
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-30652
-2-
damages from the individual defendants for their alleged actions in
connection with the USDA’s denial.
Brown first argues that the Louisiana Farm Service Agency
(Louisiana FSA) exceeded its authority in overruling a
determination of the Franklin Parish County Committee. Brown
raised this issue in proceedings before the National Appeals
Division of the USDA, which determined that the Louisiana FSA did
not exceed its authority. This court “will affirm the agency’s
interpretation unless, in light of the language and purpose of the
regulation, it is unreasonable.” Sid Peterson Memorial Hospital v.
Thompson, 274 F.3d 301, 308 (5th Cir. 2001). Brown has failed to
show that the USDA’s interpretation of regulations governing the
CLDAP is unreasonable. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1477.102, 1477.109(c).
Brown also argues that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment on his claim that his due process rights were
violated in not having the opportunity to participate in the
meeting of the Louisiana FSA committee. “Absent an identifiable
property interest, the [a]ppellants cannot argue they were denied
due process.” Wilson v. United States Dep’t of Agriculture,
991 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir. 1993). “The mere fact that a
government program exists does not give a person a property
interest in participating in the program.” Id.
Brown argues in conclusory fashion, and without citation to
supporting authority, that he acquired a vested property interest
in CLDAP benefits by virtue of the decision of the Franklin Parish
No. 02-30652
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County Committee, and thus has failed to demonstrate that he had an
identifiable property interest subject to due process protection.
Brown has failed to brief any argument pertaining to the
dismissal of claims against the individual defendants. This court
will not raise and discuss legal issues that the appellant has
failed to assert. When an appellant fails to identify any error in
the district court’s analysis, it is the same as if the appellant
had not appealed that judgment. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County
Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.