COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00288-CR
JEFFREY BOYCE JONES APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 432ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Jeffrey Boyce Jones appeals his felony convictions for two
counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a
child by contact. Appellant pled guilty to all three counts pursuant to an open
plea, and the trial judge assessed his punishment at thirty-five years’
confinement for each aggravated sexual assault count and twenty years’
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
confinement for the indecency with a child count, all to run concurrently. We
affirm.
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel
avers that, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief
and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California, by presenting a
professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable
grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967); see In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We gave appellant
an opportunity to file a pro se brief, but he has not done so. Likewise, the State
has not filed a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
are obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record.
See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only
then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with
counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in
the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d
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684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: September 19, 2013
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