NO. 07-11-0457-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
JUNE 18, 2012
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In re JACKI KING,
Relator
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FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 99,466-B; HON. RONALD ENNS, PRESIDING
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Memorandum Opinion
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Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Jacki King (King) appeals from an order dismissing her suit for a writ of
mandamus filed against the Potter County Sheriff, Brian Thomas (Thomas). She
sought the writ to compel the sheriff to revoke certificates of registration issued to
Carmel Azzopardi (Azzopardi) per the Dangerous Wild Animal Act found in chapter 822,
subchapter E of the Texas Health and Safety Code. Those certificates purportedly
allowed Azzopardi to keep dangerous wild animals on his property. Because Azzopardi
allegedly violated aspects of that Act, the sheriff, as the official designated to enforce it,
was obligated to revoke the certificates. In dismissing the suit, the trial court concluded
that it lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding. That is, it sustained the sheriff‟s plea to
the court‟s jurisdiction wherein he contended that King lacked standing and that the
dispute was not ripe. King disagreed with the trial court‟s ruling and appealed. We
affirm.
In Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. 1984), the Texas Supreme Court had
before it an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus. The
proceeding had been dismissed because the relator lacked standing to sue. Id. at 324.
Though the court ultimately concluded that standing existed, it nonetheless held that “for
any person to maintain a suit it is necessary that he have standing to litigate the matters
in issue” and that standing “consists of some interest peculiar to the person individually
and not as a member of the general public.” Id. Moreover, this “general rule of standing
is applied in all cases absent a statutory exception to the contrary,” according to the
court. Id. (emphasis added). Given this directive, we cannot but reject King‟s premise
that she need not show such an interest peculiar to herself to prosecute her petition of
mandamus.
As for her peculiar interest, it consists of her living in the same county as
Azzopardi and being subject to potential harm if he does not comply with the
aforementioned wildlife act. So too does she suggest that though she lives several
miles from him, she is in “imminent threat of harm from the dangerous wild animals
housed by Azzopardi because he is not in compliance with the provisions and Thomas
is not revoking the certificates to ensure the level of safety intended by the Legislature.”
Yet, how she is in “imminent” threat of injury goes unexplained. Nor does she describe
being injured or how her injury is likely to occur if Azzopardi fails to comply with any
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particular aspect of the statute. And, to the extent that she does mention something
about two animal attacks having occurred, they were attacks upon Azzopardi, not her.
So, what we have here is “injury [] couched in terms of potentialities or events
that „may‟ happen.” See Texas Disposal Sys. v. Texas Com’n Environ. Quality, 259
S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2008 no pet.) (finding that the complainant lacked
standing because its injuries were couched in terms of potentialities or events lacking
indication that they were likely to occur). And, King‟s potential injuries are dependent
upon circumstances (i.e. animals escaping) which she has not shown are likely to occur.
This is not the stuff of an interest peculiar to her and not as a member of the general
public. Consequently, we, too, hold that she lacked standing to prosecute her suit for
mandamus relief and overrule her issue.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
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