COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00301-CV
TERRANCE T. WOODS APPELLANT
V.
PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, APPELLEE
L.L.C.
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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Terrance T. Woods appeals the county court’s judgment in this forcible
detainer action in favor of Pennymac Loan Services, L.L.C. (Pennymac). Finding
no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Factual and Procedural Background
Terrance T. Woods and his wife purchased the residential property located
at 2716 Gillespie Court, Grand Prairie, Texas in November 2006. In order to
finance the purchase, Woods and his wife executed a Note and Deed of Trust in
favor of Wilmington Finance, Inc. (Wilmington) encumbering the property. The
Deed of Trust named Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as
nominee for Wilmington and as beneficiary with the authority to hold legal title to
and interest under the Deed of Trust, including the right to foreclose and sell the
property. Subsequently, MERS exercised its rights under the Deed of Trust and
sold the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to Pennymac on April 3, 2012.
Three days later, on April 6, 2012, Pennymac notified Woods and his wife in
writing that they must vacate the property. When they refused to vacate,
Pennymac instituted this forcible detainer action in justice court on April 27, 2012.
After notice and a jury trial, the justice court awarded possession of the property
to Pennymac on May 17, 2012.
Woods, who appeared pro se in the trial court and who appears pro se in
this Court, appealed the judgment of the justice court to the county court at law.
The county court heard evidence and affirmed judgment in favor of Pennymac
awarding possession to Pennymac on July 18, 2012. This appeal followed.
In two points, Woods maintains that the county court judgment must be
reversed because (1) the court failed to address Woods’s plea to the jurisdiction
and (2) Woods received insufficient notice to vacate pursuant to the federal
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Protecting Tenants from Foreclosure Act (PTFA), Pub. L. No. 111–22, 123 Stat.
1632, 1660–61 (2009) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5220 note).
Analysis
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Woods first argues that the county court erred by failing to conduct a
hearing on his pleas challenging subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter
jurisdiction is essential for a court to have authority to decide a case; it is never
presumed and cannot be waived. See Alfonso v. Skadden, 251 S.W.3d 52, 55
(Tex. 2008); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000).
“Subject matter jurisdiction requires that the party bringing the suit have standing,
that there [exist] a live controversy between the parties, and that the case be
justiciable.” State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994).
Before a court may address the merits of any case, the court must determine at
its earliest opportunity whether it has the constitutional or statutory authority to
proceed. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226
(Tex. 2004). The court must have jurisdiction over the party or the property
subject to the suit, jurisdiction over the subject matter, jurisdiction to enter the
particular judgment, and capacity to act as a court. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d at 245.
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de
novo. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. “Whether a pleader has alleged facts that
affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of
law reviewed de novo. Likewise, whether undisputed evidence of jurisdictional
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facts establishes a trial court’s jurisdiction is also a question of law.” Id.
“However, if a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional
facts, we consider relevant evidence submitted by the parties when necessary to
resolve the jurisdictional issues raised, as the trial court is required to do.” Id. at
227.
A forcible detainer action is a procedure by which the right to immediate
possession of real property is determined. See Cattin v. Highpoint Vill.
Apartments, 26 S.W.3d 737, 738–39 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. dism’d
w.o.j.); Tex. R. Civ. P. 746. It is intended to be a speedy, simple, and
inexpensive means to obtain possession without resort to an action on the title.
Scott v. Hewitt, 127 Tex. 31, 35, 90 S.W.2d 816, 818–19 (Tex. 1936).
Jurisdiction to hear forcible detainer actions is vested in justice courts, and on
appeal, to county courts for trial de novo. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.004 (West
Supp. 2012), amended by Act of May 13, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 161, §
22.002(28), 2013 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ____, ____ (West); Tex. R. Civ. P. 749.
To prevail in a forcible detainer action, the plaintiff need not prove title but only
sufficient evidence of ownership to demonstrate a superior right to immediate
possession. See Dormady v. Dinero Land & Cattle Co., 61 S.W.3d 555, 557
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). Additionally, the mere
existence of a title dispute does not deprive a justice court or county court on
appeal of jurisdiction over a forcible detainer action. See Rice v. Pinney, 51
S.W.3d 705, 713 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.). “However, if the question of
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title is so intertwined with the issue of possession, then possession may not be
adjudicated without first determining title.” Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 557. In those
cases, when possession cannot be determined until the issue of title is decided,
neither the justice court, nor the county court on appeal, has jurisdiction. Id. at
558.
In its forcible detainer action, Pennymac pled that it was the owner of the
subject property having purchased it at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale as
evidenced by a Deed from the Substitute Trustee following the foreclosure sale.
Pennymac attached a notarized copy of the Substitute Trustee’s deed to the
pleadings with a notarized statement of facts and filed copies of several notices
demanding that Woods vacate the property. Pennymac further pled that,
pursuant to state statute and provisions of the Deed of Trust, Woods was
required to surrender possession of the property to Pennymac but had failed to
vacate after proper notice. In response and in his plea to the jurisdiction, Woods
pled that Pennymac had no evidence supporting its right of possession and that
the court should dismiss or abate the forcible detainer action pending resolution
of Woods’s suit in federal court to determine title.
The record before us is limited to the clerk’s record; no reporter’s record of
either hearing has been filed. The clerk’s record contains a notarized copy of the
substitute deed of trust evidencing that Pennymac purchased the property.
Woods did not plead that the Substitute Trustee’s Deed was void, only that
Pennymac lacked evidence of right to possession. Additionally, subject matter
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jurisdiction in a forcible detainer action is not defeated simply by the fact that a
concurrent suit is pending in federal court. See Scott, 127 Tex. at 35, 90 S.W.2d
at 818–19. A forcible detainer action is cumulative of other remedies, not
exclusive. Id. In most cases, the right to immediate possession can be
determined separately from the right to title. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 710. In
fact, as previously noted, the justice court and county court on appeal lose
jurisdiction only when the issue of title and possession are so integrally linked
that the right to immediate possession cannot be determined until after the title
dispute has been decided. See Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 558–59.
The burden is on the appellant to see that a sufficient record is presented
to show error requiring reversal. See Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842,
843 (Tex. 1990). Here, the county court’s judgment reflects that the court
received and considered evidence prior to rendering its judgment. When there is
no reporter’s record made and there are no findings of fact, we presume that the
trial court heard sufficient evidence to make all necessary findings in support of
its judgment. See Schafer v. Conner, 813 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex. 1991); Vickery
v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 251 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). Based on this record, we cannot conclude that
questions of title and possession are so integrally linked that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the right to immediate possession. See
Dormady, 61 S.W.3d at 558–59. Woods’s first point is overruled.
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Protecting Tenants from Foreclosure Act
In his second point, Woods contends that Pennymac has “deemed” him a
tenant, and thus, he was entitled to ninety-day notice under the PTFA. 12
U.S.C.A. § 5220 note. Woods relies on Fontaine v. Deutsche Bank National
Trust Company, 372 S.W.3d 257 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). In
Fontaine, appellant Jarvis Fontaine appealed an adverse ruling in a forcible
detainer action on the basis that he had a valid three-year lease in the foreclosed
residential property providing him certain protections under the PTFA. Id. at
258–59. In analyzing his claim, the Dallas court examined various provisions of
the statute including that “bona fide tenants” residing in foreclosed residential real
property are entitled to at least ninety days advance notice of their obligation to
vacate the premises before they can be evicted. Id. at 260 (citing PTFA, §
702(a)-(b)). Appellee, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, argued in part
that Fontaine was not entitled to the PTFA’s protections because Fontaine had
not met his burden of establishing bona fide tenancy or lease. Id. at 260–61.
The court noted that the question of burden of proof under the statute was
unclear. Id. at 261. The court further discussed that one New York court had
presumed bona fide tenancy, thus placing the burden on the successor in
interest to prove the tenancy was not bona fide. Id. The Dallas court concluded
that, in the interest of justice, the case should be remanded to permit the trial
court “to hear evidence on the bona fide status of appellant’s lease and tenancy
and on any other elements or defenses under the PTFA.” Id.
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We find Fontaine distinguishable from the case before us. The evidence in
Fontaine established that appellant had leased the residence for a term of three
years from the property owner approximately three months prior to the property’s
foreclosure. Under the PTFA, a tenant is a person who holds a bona fide lease
entered into prior to the foreclosure that provides him or her certain rights of
occupancy after foreclosure. PTFA, § 702(a)(2)(A), 123 Stat. at 1661. Here,
Woods admitted in his own briefing that he owned the property prior to the
foreclosure sale. Therefore, Fontaine is distinguishable and not dispositive.
Moreover, because there is no reporter’s record, we must again presume the trial
court had before it and considered all necessary facts to support the trial court’s
judgment. See Schafer, 813 S.W.2d at 155. Accordingly, we overrule Woods’s
second point.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER and MCCOY, JJ.; and PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN (Senior Justice,
Retired, Sitting by Assignment)
DELIVERED: August 22, 2013
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