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In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-09-00100-CR
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GEORGE LESLIE SANDERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 196th Judicial District Court
Hunt County, Texas
Trial Court No. 25025
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter
MEMORANDUM OPINION
George Leslie Sanders appeals from his convictions on three charges of delivery of methamphetamine. Sanders filed a single brief with this Court, in which he raises issues common to all of his appeals.[1] Sanders argues he was denied due process by allegedly false misrepresentations made by the State’s witness with the goal of inflaming the jury. He also alleges the trial court abused its discretion in denying motions for mistrial, and in allowing the State to question him about previous convictions used for enhancement during punishment.
We addressed these issues in detail in our opinion of this date on Sanders’ appeal in cause number 06-09-00098-CR. For the reasons stated therein, we likewise conclude that error has not been shown in this case.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: February 24, 2010
Date Decided: February 26, 2010
Do Not Publish
[1]Sanders appeals from three convictions for delivery of methamphetamine, cause numbers 06-09-00098-CR through 06-09-00100-CR.
ecute and file an agreed order dismissing all claims in [cause number 30,319, the will contest], with prejudice." This general provision would have the effect of Judy relinquishing her claim that Will Two should be probated, leaving the estate to pass by the terms of Will One or, in the alternative, to pass through intestate succession in accordance with Robert's amended application. It appears that it would also have the effect of Robert withdrawing his application to probate Wills One and Three. Judy separately agreed to relinquish any claim in the estate or against her father in exchange for the land in question. So, this constitutes a specific agreement between at least two of the parties to not probate Will Two.
Reading the MSA, we see that there is an agreement not to probate a will. In fact, it could be said that there are several agreements not to probate a will; it is just unclear which will, if any, would be probated ultimately. The uncertainties, however, are more relevant to the second element of the family settlement doctrine—that the agreement also provide an alternate plan of distribution of estate property.
(2) The MSA Does Not Provide an Alternative Distribution Scheme
The law allows for an implied plan of distribution within a family settlement agreement. But courts will not readily imply such a plan for the parties:
[I]t must appear that an [implied] agreement for the disposition of the property was so clearly within the contemplation of [the parties] that they deemed it unnecessary to express it and, therefore, omitted to do so.
Morris, 577 S.W.2d at 757. The parties can even agree to not probate a will and to allow the estate to pass through the intestacy statutes. See Cook v. Hamer, 158 Tex. 164, 167, 309 S.W.2d 54, 56 (1958); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 708 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In such situations, the parties, essentially, agreed to let the law redistribute the estate.
Here, we must determine whether the putative beneficiaries' agreements in the MSA constitute a sufficiently clear plan to distribute the estate. Since the MSA's provisions could be read to provide for distribution in accordance with the terms of Will One, in accordance with intestate succession, or solely in accordance with agreements contemplated yet nonexistent among the parties, the MSA leaves open a number of possible, but unclear, ways the estate might be distributed if the MSA were enforced. We examine those possibilities.
Probate of Will One. Since Judy was the only child with a clearly contrary position at the time of the MSA and since Robert did come to an agreement with her, it could be said that her separate agreement to relinquish her claims against the estate and against Robert would lead to the conclusion that the estate would pass as it would have absent Judy's contest, under the terms of Will One. While this reading of the MSA and interpretation of an alternate plan of distribution would be the most straightforward, it is undermined by the clear references in the MSA that a future agreement was contemplated, yet not ever reached, among Robert, Steve, and Jane. Additionally, Jane's signature limiting her agreement to only the agreement made with Judy appears to reserve her right to enter her own, different, agreement with her father, even if such would conflict with the MSA. All parties agree that no such contemplated agreement was ever reached. We must conclude that the parties, in the MSA, did not agree to distribute Patricia's estate in a manner consistent with Will One.
Intestate Succession. If there is no will to be probated, then it could be said that the estate would pass through intestate succession. This method of distribution could be a logical reading of the MSA, since all parties agree to dismiss their claims in the will contest action. But we cannot imply such an agreement to distribute the estate in this manner. Such a plan was "not so clearly within the contemplation of [the parties] that they deemed it unnecessary to express it." Estate of Morris, 577 S.W.2d at 757. In fact, the parties did not contemplate distribution through intestate succession. First, the MSA clearly references other, future, agreements to be made. Also, we note that Jane later filed her own application to probate Will Two. Finally, Judy urged at oral argument before this Court that one of the wills will eventually be probated.
Distribution by Future Agreement Only. Perhaps, the most sound reading of the MSA would be that the parties contemplated probating no will, but would instead resolve the dispute by a future agreement. Of course, even if this were the case, all parties now agree that the remaining anticipated agreement was never reached, leaving, in fact, absolutely no plan of distribution.
In sum, since the MSA leaves these uncertainties, we conclude that it fails to satisfy the rather stringent requirements of the family settlement doctrine that an agreement provide an alternate plan for distributing estate property.
We sustain Robert's first point of error. The MSA is unenforceable as a matter of law. Due to the disposition of that issue, it is unnecessary to address the remaining points of error.
Accordingly, we reverse and render judgment that Judy take nothing by her action to enforce the MSA and to be paid her attorney's fees in that action.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: March 17, 2005
Date Decided: August 18, 2005