COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00501-CR
CORY LEE KNIGHT APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 213TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 AND ORDER
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Appellant Cory Lee Knight appeals his conviction for failure to comply with
the registration requirements for sexual offenders. We affirm.
On November 17, 2011, Appellant was indicted for the third-degree felony
offense of failure to comply with the registration requirements for sexual
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
offenders. 2 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.102(a), (b)(2) (West 2006).
Appellant pleaded guilty without benefit of a plea-bargain agreement. 3 As part of
his guilty plea, the trial court gave him written plea admonishments, which
included a judicial confession: “I have read the indictment . . . filed in this case
and I committed each and every act alleged therein . . . . I am guilty of the
instant offense as well as all lesser included offenses . . . . I swear to the truth of
all of the foregoing.” Appellant also signed (1) a statement that his plea was
“knowingly, freely, and voluntarily entered” and (2) an application for community
supervision. The trial court requested a presentence-investigation report (“the
PSI”) and postponed determining Appellant’s guilt and sentence until after the
report was available. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 9 (West
Supp. 2012).
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on September 17, 2012. At the
hearing and as part of the PSI, Appellant explained that he had tried to comply
with the reporting requirements, but was prevented from doing so because the
registration authorities would not return his calls or give him accurate information
about reporting. The trial court found Appellant guilty and sentenced him to ten
years’ confinement; however, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence
2
Appellant had been convicted of “indecent liberties with child” on
November 13, 2002, in Onslow County, North Carolina.
3
The State offered Appellant a five-year term of confinement in exchange
for his guilty plea, but it appears Appellant refused this offer.
2
and placed him on community supervision for ten years. See id. art. 42.12, § 3.
One of the terms of community supervision required Appellant to wear an ankle
monitor. See id. art. 42.12, §11(a)(17). The trial court warned Appellant, “Do
not, sir, repeat your same mistake. Whatever you have to do, you make sure
you register, and you register at the appropriate time. Read the instructions and
follow them carefully. You are an intelligent man,[4] and I expect you to act like
one.”
On September 20 (three days after the sentencing hearing), the State filed
a petition to revoke Appellant’s community supervision because he had cut off
his ankle monitor and had failed to report to his community-supervision officer as
scheduled. On October 12, Appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial
court’s September 17 judgment.
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel, accompanied by a brief in support of that motion. In the
brief, counsel states that in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous and
without merit. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional
evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for
relief. Appellant filed a pro-se response to the Anders brief. The State
responded that it agrees with Appellant’s attorney that the appeal is frivolous.
4
Appellant was a senior in college at the time of the sentencing hearing
and hoped to obtain a doctoral degree in economics.
3
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the grounds that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
have a supervisory obligation to undertake an examination of the proceedings.
See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). In this
evaluation, we consider the record, the arguments raised in the Anders brief, and
issues Appellant points out in his pro-se briefs. See United States v. Wagner,
158 F.3d 901, 902 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding). We are not required to address the merits
of each issue Appellant raises in his pro-se briefing because to do so would
deprive Appellant “of the meaningful assistance of counsel.” Bledsoe v. State,
178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Only after our independent review
is complete may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio,
488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, Appellant’s pro-se
brief, and the State’s response. We agree with appellate counsel that this appeal
is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that might
arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28; see also
Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment. See
Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).
4
PER CURIAM
PANEL: GABRIEL, WALKER, and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: July 3, 2013
5