COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00040-CR
STACEY KEVIN HOLBERT APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 372ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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A grand jury indicted appellant Stacey Kevin Holbert on July 15, 2008, for
theft of property valued between $20,000 and $100,000—a third-degree felony.
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(5) (West Supp. 2012). Pursuant to a plea
bargain, Holbert pleaded guilty, and in accordance with the terms of the plea-
bargain agreement, the trial court placed him on deferred adjudication community
supervision for six years.
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
The State petitioned the trial court to revoke Holbert’s community
supervision and to adjudicate him guilty on December 2, 2011, asserting that
Holbert had violated multiple conditions of his community supervision. At the
revocation hearing, Holbert pleaded ―not true‖ to the petition’s allegations, but the
State presented evidence of them, and the trial court found them to be true.
Thus, the trial court convicted Holbert and sentenced him to five years’
confinement. The trial court also ordered him to pay restitution. Holbert brought
this appeal.
Holbert’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In his brief, counsel avers that
this appeal is wholly frivolous and that there are no arguable grounds for appeal.
Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by
presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there
are no arguable grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400
(1967); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(orig. proceeding) (analyzing the effect of Anders). Holbert had an opportunity to
file a pro se brief but did not. The State has not filed a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
must undertake an independent examination of the record. See Stafford v. State,
813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Alexander v. State, 301 S.W.3d
361, 363 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). Only then may we grant
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counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109
S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988). We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s
brief. We agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without
merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also
Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: June 20, 2013
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