COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00038-CR
NO. 02-12-00039-CR
EDGAR ALFREDO MATA APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 AND ORDER
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Appellant Edgar Alfredo Mata appeals his convictions for burglary of a
habitation with intent to commit sexual assault. We affirm.
On March 24, 2011, in two indictments, a grand jury indicted Appellant for
the first-degree felony offenses of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
sexual assault, involving two different victims. 2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
30.02 (West 2011). One indictment included a deadly-weapon notice alleging
that Appellant had used a knife in the commission of that burglary. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g(a)(2) (West Supp. 2012). Appellant
pleaded guilty to both indictments without benefit of a plea-bargain agreement.
As part of his guilty pleas, the trial court gave him written plea admonishments,
which included judicial confessions wherein he swore: “I have read the
indictment . . . filed in this case and I committed each and every act alleged
therein . . . . I am guilty of the instant offense as well as all lesser included
offenses . . . . ” Appellant also signed (1) statements that his pleas were
“knowingly, freely, and voluntarily entered” and (2) applications for community
supervision. The trial court accepted Appellant’s guilty pleas, requested
presentence-investigation reports, and postponed determining Appellant’s
sentences until after the reports were available. See id. art. 42.12, § 9.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on January 20, 2012. Appellant
called several witnesses in an attempt to secure a community supervision
sentence. A sex-offender counselor testified that Appellant would benefit from
therapeutic treatment for his “significant mental health problems” and that lack of
such treatment would “increase[] his community risk.” The counselor did admit,
2
As first-degree felonies, the available punishment range was confinement
for life or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 5 years. Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 12.32(a) (West 2011).
2
however, that Appellant was not completely truthful when talking with the
counselor, which could have affected the counselor’s conclusions. Three of
Appellant’s female friends testified that they had never known Appellant to be
aggressive or inappropriate. Appellant’s mother testified that Appellant was not
abusive and had attention-deficit disorder. Appellant’s father testified that
Appellant was respectful but believed Appellant needed treatment.
After both the State and Appellant’s counsel made closing arguments, the
State requested a “significant sentence,” i.e., “up towards . . . in between 30 and
50 years.” The trial court found that the evidence supported Appellant’s guilty
pleas, found the deadly-weapon notice true, and sentenced Appellant to two 20-
year terms of confinement, to be served concurrently. Appellant filed notices of
appeal from the trial court’s judgments.
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel
states that in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous and without merit.
Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of the
record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. Appellant
filed objections to counsel’s Anders brief. The State did not submit a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the grounds that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we
have a supervisory obligation to undertake an examination of the proceedings.
3
See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). In this
evaluation, we consider the record, the arguments raised in the Anders brief, and
any issues Appellant raises. See United States v. Wagner, 158 F.3d 901, 902
(5th Cir. 1998); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(orig. proceeding). We are not required to address the merits of each issue
Appellant raises in his pro-se briefing because to do so would deprive Appellant
“of the meaningful assistance of counsel.” Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,
827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Only after our independent review is completed may
we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–
83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and Appellant’s
pro-se objections. We agree with appellate counsel that this appeal is wholly
frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably
support the appeal. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28; see also Meza v.
State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgments. See Tex. R.
App. P. 43.2(a).
PER CURIAM
PANEL: GABRIEL, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: June 20, 2013
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