COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00385-CR
EDWIN HERBERT PHELPS III APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 396TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant Edwin Herbert Phelps III appeals his conviction for aggravated
sexual assault of a child, entered after the trial court revoked his deferred
adjudication community supervision, adjudicated him guilty, and sentenced him
to twenty years’ confinement.
Phelps’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation
of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. 386
U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). Phelps had the opportunity to file a pro se brief
but has not done so; the State has not filed a brief.
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this
court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State,
904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may
we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–
83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with
counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in
the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d
684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: May 16, 2013
2