Reverse and Remand; Opinion Filed July 24, 2013.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-00292-CV
RODNEY R. ELKINS & CO., Appellant
V.
UNO IMMANIVONG, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-11-5262-C
OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Evans
Opinion by Justice Evans
This is an appeal from a county court order dismissing Rodney R. Elkins & Co.’s lawsuit
against Uno Immanivong for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant contends the county
court, sitting in its appellate capacity, had jurisdiction over the case because the amount in
controversy did not exceed $10,000 when the action was filed in the justice of the peace court.
Appellant also complains he was denied the opportunity to be heard on the motion to dismiss
before it was granted by the court. We conclude that the county court erred in dismissing the
suit because the amount of damages specifically pleaded in the justice court were within its
jurisdictional limits and there was no evidence the allegations were fraudulently made to confer
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal order and remand the cause to the county
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellant sued appellee in justice court to recover $8,416.26 in unpaid legal fees,
interest, and necessary attorney’s fees in an unspecified amount. The justice court granted
appellant’s motion for summary judgment and rendered a final judgment in its favor for
$13,550.27. Appellee appealed the judgment to the county court. Appellee then filed a motion
in county court to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction arguing that when appellant filed its
original petition in justice court, it was clear the amount of attorney’s fees would be over
$1,583.74 and, thus, the amount in controversy exceeded the justice court’s $10,000
jurisdictional limit. The county court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss after a hearing at
which appellant did not appear; it appeared one and one-half hours later. The court later denied
appellant’s motion to set aside the dismissal order. This appeal ensued.
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de
novo. See Tex. Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004) (plea to
the jurisdiction); U. Lawrence Boze’ & Assoc., P.C. v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 368 S.W.3d
17, 23 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction). Where, as here, the jurisdictional challenge is based on the amount in
controversy, the plaintiff’s pleadings are generally determinative unless the defendant
specifically alleges and proves the amount was pleaded merely as a sham for the purpose of
wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction or can readily establish that the amount in controversy does not
fall within the court’s jurisdictional limits. See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547,
554–55 (Tex. 2000); Hoffman v. Cleburne Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 22 S.W.154, 155 (Tex. 1893);
Delk v. City of Dallas, 560 S.W.2d 519, 520 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1977, no writ). When the
petition does not affirmatively demonstrate the absence of jurisdiction, the petition should be
liberally construed in favor of jurisdiction. Garza v. Chavarria, 155 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.). Moreover, if the original petition is within the jurisdictional
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limits, but an amendment increases the amount in controversy above the court’s jurisdictional
limits, the court continues to have jurisdiction if the additional amount accrued because of the
passage of time. Continental Coffee Products Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996).
Pursuant to statute, the justice court has original jurisdiction of civil matters in which
exclusive jurisdiction is not in the district or county court and in which the amount in
controversy is not more than $10,000 exclusive of interest. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 27.031(a)(1) (West Supp. 2012). When a case originally filed in justice court is appealed to the
county court, the county court’s appellate jurisdiction is restricted to the jurisdictional limits of
the justice court, because a county court has no jurisdiction over the appeal unless the justice
court had jurisdiction. Crumpton v. Stevens, 936 S.W.2d 473, 476 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1996, no writ); see Childress Oil Co. v. Wood, 111 Tex. 165, 166, 230 S.W. 143 (1921) (“If the
Justice Court is without jurisdiction there can be no jurisdiction in the County Court. While the
case is tried de novo in the County Court, its power is not original. The case is there only in
virtue of the appeal. With this true, its power to determine it on the appeal cannot exist if the
original tribunal had no power to consider it.”).
In this case, appellant’s pleadings in the justice court sought damages in the amount of
$8,416.26 plus interest and “reasonable and necessary attorney fees.”1 There is nothing in the
record to indicate that appellant specifically pleaded an amount that was outside the
jurisdictional amount of the justice court and, therefore, the appellate jurisdiction of the county
court. In fact, at least one court has held that when a plaintiff pleads damages in an amount that
is within the jurisdictional limit plus reasonable attorney’s fees in an unspecified amount, the
court has jurisdiction. See Whitley v. Morning, 814 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1991,
1
The amount of interest is expressly excluded for purposes of calculating the amount of controversy for
jurisdictional purposes. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 27.031(a)(1).
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no writ) (pleading seeking $4,500 in damages plus “reasonable attorney’s fees” did not exceed
court’s jurisdictional limit of $5,000).
On appeal and in the court below, appellee has argued it was “unrealistic and
disingenuous” for appellant to presume the attorney’s fees in this case would be limited to
$1,583.74—the difference between the $10,000 jurisdiction limit and $8,419.26 in actual
damages pleaded, exclusive of interest. There is nothing in the record indicating the amount of
attorney’s fees that had accrued at the time the petition was filed. Appellee contends, however,
there was too much legal work to do to complete the case for $1,583.74. But appellee has cited
no case, and we have found none, that would require plaintiff to estimate the amount of future
attorney’s fees required to bring the case to conclusion for purposes of calculating the amount in
controversy. As appellant points out, such an estimate depends on many factors including
whether the defendant answers the petition. In fact, the pleading of attorney’s fees on appeal to
county court in an amount greater than original jurisdiction does not deprive the county court of
jurisdiction. See Crumpton, 936 S.W.2d at 477. Such fees are considered additional damages as
a result of the passage of time. Id.
Because appellee failed to prove appellant’s pleading allegations as to the amount in
controversy were merely a sham for the purpose of wrongfully obtaining jurisdiction or that the
amount in controversy did not fall within the court’s jurisdictional limits when filed, the county
court erred in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
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Our resolution of appellant’s first issue makes it unnecessary to address its second issue.
We reverse the dismissal order and remand the cause to the county court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
120292F.P05
/David Evans/
DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
RODNEY R. ELKINS & CO., Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at Law
No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-12-00292-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. CC-11-5262-C.
Opinion delivered by Justice Evans,
UNO IMMANIVONG, Appellee Justices Lang and Myers participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order dismissing this
case for lack of jurisdiction is REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
It is ORDERED that appellant Rodney R. Elkins & Co. recover its costs of this appeal
from appellee Uno Immanivong.
Judgment entered this 24th day of July, 2013.
/David Evans/
DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE
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