NO. 07-11-00189-CV; 07-11-00190-CV; 07-11-0191-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
NOVEMBER 15, 2011
IN THE INTEREST OF J.S., J.H. & J.H., CHILDREN
FROM THE 320TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 74,752-D, 79,585-D, 78,212-D; HONORABLE DON R. EMERSON, JUDGE
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following termination of their parental rights, appellants, Barbara Wesley and
Caleb Huggins, filed notices of appeal through their appointed trial counsel. However,
within the time for perfecting appeal, counsel filed amended notices of appeal that
included affidavits of indigence for both Wesley and Huggins. The clerk’s records in
each of these causes reflect that trial counsel was permitted to withdraw from
representation of appellants on appeal. Thus, both appellants have timely filed notices
of appeal and affidavits of indigence, but do not appear to be represented by counsel on
appeal. As such, this Court abated these appeals and remanded these causes to the
trial court to determine if appellants are indigent, and whether attorneys ad litem should
be appointed to represent them on appeal.
On remand, the trial court held a hearing on October 25, 2011. According to the
record of this hearing, after being duly notified of the hearing at their last known
address, neither Wesley nor Huggins were present for the hearing. As such, the trial
court found that the parties’ failure to appear precluded it from determining whether the
parties are indigent. These appeals were reinstated by this Court on November 1.
Previously, appellants’ briefs were due on or before August 18. When no briefs
were received by this Court by that date, the Court sent notice to appellants that their
briefs were past due, and that failure to file the briefs on or before September 19, may
result in dismissal of the appeals without further notice. Due to some confusion
regarding appellants’ last known addresses, these notices were sent to two different
addresses contained in the record as potentially being appellants’ last known
addresses. Both notices to Huggins were returned to the Court as undeliverable. Only
one of the notices to Wesley was returned as undeliverable, so we presume that the
other correspondence was received by Wesley. Neither appellant responded to our
notices in any manner. Additionally, the record of the hearing held on remand
establishes that appellants were properly notified of the hearing at their last known
address, but failed to appear.
For the foregoing reasons, we now dismiss these appeals for want of prosecution
and failure to comply with a notice from the Clerk of this Court requiring a response or
other action in a specified time. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c).
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
2