Opinion issued May 6, 2014
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-14-00169-CV
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CARLOS L. CORREA, Appellant
V.
GREATER NORTHSIDE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 334th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2011-06673
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Carlos L. Correa, attempts to appeal from the trial court’s
October 24, 2013 order granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment. We
dismiss the appeal.
Harris County, on behalf of itself and the following county-wide taxing
authorities, the Harris County Department of Education, the Port of Houston
Authority of Harris County, the Harris County Flood Control District, the Harris
County Hospital District, City of Houston, Houston Independent School District
and the Houston Community College System (collectively, “Harris County”)
brought suit against Correa for recovery of delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, and
attorney’s fees. Appellee, Greater Northside Management District, intervened also
seeking relief against Correa for delinquent taxes, penalties, interest, attorney’s
fees, and costs. Correa filed counterclaims against Harris County and appellee.
Subsequently, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on its claims
asserting that it was entitled to relief as a matter of law. On October 24, 2013, the
trial court signed an order granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
Correa attempts to appeal this order.
Generally speaking, appellate courts only have jurisdiction over appeals
from final judgments. See Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.
2001); N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). To be
final, a judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in a case. Aldridge, 400
S.W.2d at 895. A summary judgment order is final for purposes of appeal only if it
either “actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court . . . or it
states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all
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parties.” Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 192–93. “In the absence of express language
indicating that the trial court intended to dispose of all claims and parties and
render a final judgment, an order that adjudicates only [appellee’s] claims against
[Correa] and does not adjudicate [Correa’s] counterclaim[s] is not final.” Saldaña
v. Mata, No. 04-14-00010-CV, 2014 WL 667612, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio,
Feb. 19, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d 192–93); see also
N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 679–80 (Tex. 1990) (“In
the absence of a special statute making an interlocutory order appealable, a
judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in the case, including those
presented by counterclaim or cross action, to be final and appealable.”).
Here, the trial court’s October 24, 2013 order does not mention Correa’s
counterclaims against appellee and appellee did not move for summary judgment
on Correa’s counterclaims. The order also fails to state that it is final or
appealable.1 Cf. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d at 679 (summary judgment that did not
dispose of counterclaim was not final and appealable).
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We note that on December 11, 2012 the trial court granted Harris County’s no
evidence motion for summary judgment in favor of Harris County. In its order,
the trial court stated it granted “all prayers prayed for by Plaintiffs in their Motion
for Summary Judgment.” Unlike appellee, Harris County specifically requested in
its summary judgment motion that Correa take nothing on his counterclaims
against Harris County. Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, however, seeks
no relief in regards to Correa’s counterclaims. Therefore, such claims still appear
to remain pending before the trial court. Further, it also appears that no action has
been taken on Correa’s petition for declaratory judgment filed in the underlying
trial court case.
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Further, in correspondence to the Court, Correa admits that the trial court
has not signed a final judgment and states that his notice of appeal filed on
February 24, 2014 is merely premature. “‘[T]here is nothing in Rule 27.1 or the
remainder of the Rules of Appellate Procedure that indicate, and the clear
implication is to the contrary, that a notice of appeal can be filed in anticipation of
an appeal that may be somewhere in the indefinite future.’” Dias v. Dias, No. 13-
11-00756-CV, 2012 WL 171913, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 19, 2012,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting Ganesan v. Reeves, 236 S.W.3d 816, 817 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied)); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 27.1 (prematurely filed
notice of appeal). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.1 does not require the
Court to docket and hold an appeal open until there is an appealable judgment or
order at some future date. Dias, 2012 WL 171913, at *2.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Court has no jurisdiction over
this attempted appeal. After being notified that this appeal was subject to dismissal
for want of jurisdiction, appellant did not adequately respond. See TEX. R. APP. P.
42.3(a).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a); 43.2(f).
We dismiss any pending motions as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Sharp.
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