COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00496-CV
Charles Zakarin § From County Court at Law No. 1
§ of Tarrant County (2012-002902-1)
v.
§ March 7, 2013
World Wide Express § Per Curiam
JUDGMENT
This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that
the appeal should be dismissed. It is ordered that the appeal is dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
PER CURIAM
COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00496-CV
CHARLES ZAKARIN APPELLANT
V.
WORLD WIDE APPELLEE
EXPRESS
------------
FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
------------
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
------------
Appellant Charles Zakarin filed a notice of accelerated appeal of the trial
court’s December 10, 2012 order denying his special appearance. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7) (West 2008 & Supp. 2012). Appellee
World Wide Express then filed in the trial court a motion to set aside the order
denying appellant’s special appearance, and appellant filed an emergency
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
motion for protection in this court, seeking to suspend all actions against him
during the pendency of his accelerated appeal in this court. We granted
appellant’s motion to stay as to all proceedings except for appellee’s motion to
set aside the order denying his special appearance, noting that if the trial court
granted that order, this appeal would be moot.
On February 1, 2013, the trial court granted appellee’s motion to set aside
the order denying appellant’s special appearance. We then sent a letter
informing the parties that unless any party desiring to continue the appeal filed a
response by February 21, 2013, stating grounds for continuing the appeal, we
would dismiss the appeal as moot.
Although appellant sent a response, it does not explain how this court can
continue to exercise jurisdiction without a final judgment or an appealable
interlocutory order. Cf. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7);
Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. 2009) (“Appeals of some
interlocutory orders become moot because the orders have been rendered moot
by subsequent orders.”); Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex.
2001) (“[T]he general rule, with a few mostly statutory exceptions, is that an
appeal may be taken only from a final judgment.”). We therefore dismiss this
appeal for want of jurisdiction and lift the stay. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a),
43.2(f).
3
PER CURIAM
PANEL: MCCOY, MEIER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DELIVERED: March 7, 2013
4