NO. 07-10-0335-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL E
AUGUST 19, 2011
BRANDON MICHAEL PENNINGTON, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 43,164-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE, J., and BOYD, S.J.1
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Brandon Michael Pennington, appeals from a judgment revoking his
deferred adjudication community supervision, adjudicating him guilty of the offense of
intentionally and knowingly possessing a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in
an amount of 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams by aggregate weight and
1
John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov't
Code Ann. § 75.002(a)(1) (West 2005).
sentencing him to fifty years confinement.2 Appellant's attorney filed a brief in
compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493
(1967), and certifies there are no non-frivolous issues to appeal. Agreeing with
appointed counsel's conclusion that the record fails to show any arguably meritorious
issue that could support the appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
In December 2000, Appellant was indicted for possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of 200 grams or more but less than 400
grams by aggregate weight. In June 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant
pleaded guilty as charged in the indictment, and received deferred adjudication
community supervision for a period of ten years and a $10,000.00 fine. Appellant's
deferred adjudication was conditioned on his compliance with the specified terms and
conditions of the trial court's Order Deferring Adjudication And Placing [Appellant] On
Community Supervision.
In April 2010, the State filed a Motion to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt on
Original Charge alleging three violations of the terms of Appellant's deferred
adjudication community supervision. In July 2010, the State filed an Amended Motion
to Proceed with Adjudication of Guilt on Original Charge (Motion) adding two additional
violations of the terms of Appellant's deferred adjudication community supervision. This
Motion was heard by the trial court in July 2010. At the hearing, the State waived two
allegations and Appellant pled "true" to the remaining three allegations. Thereafter, the
2
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.114(d) (West 2010). This offense is a first degree
felony punishable by imprisonment for any term of not more than life or ninety-nine years or less
than five years and a fine not to exceed $10,000.00. Tex. Penal Code § 12.32 (West 2011).
2
trial court heard evidence from three deputies of the Potter County Sheriff's Office,
Appellant's Probation Officer and Appellant.
Based on Appellant's pleas of "true" and the evidence provided at the hearing,
the trial court revoked Appellant's community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of
possession of a controlled substance as alleged in the December 2000 indictment and
assessed his punishment at fifty years confinement. The trial court certified Appellant's
right to appeal, and he timely filed a notice of appeal.
Thereafter, Appellant's appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw
certifying that he has conducted a conscientious examination of the record and, in his
opinion, the record reflects no potentially plausible basis to support an appeal. Anders,
386 U.S. at 744-45; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008).
Counsel candidly discusses why, under controlling authorities, the appeal is frivolous.
See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978). Counsel has also
demonstrated that he has complied with the requirements of Anders and In re Schulman
by (1) providing a copy of the brief to Appellant, (2) notifying him of his right to file a pro
se response if he desired to do so, and (3) informing him of his right to file a pro se
petition for discretionary review. In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408.3 Appellant did file
3
Notwithstanding that Appellant was informed of his right to file a pro se petition for discretionary
review upon execution of the Trial Court's Certification of Defendant's Right of Appeal, counsel
must comply with Rule 48.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure which provides that
counsel shall within five days after this opinion is handed down, send Appellant a copy of the
opinion and judgment together with notification of his right to file a pro se petition for
discretionary review. Tex. R. App. P. 48.4; See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.22 & 411
n.35.
3
a pro se response to his counsel's brief.4 The State filed no response to either
Appellant's brief or pro se response.
By his Anders brief, counsel raises two arguable issues. Counsel questions (1)
whether Appellant's trial counsel was ineffective because he permitted Appellant to
plead "true" to three of the State's allegations and (2) whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider the State's Motion. Counsel then candidly reviews each
arguable issue and explains why no reversible error is presented.
When we have an Anders brief by counsel and a pro se response by an
appellant, we have two choices. We may determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous
and issue an opinion explaining that we have reviewed the record and find no reversible
error; Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (citing Anders,
386 U.S. at 744), or, we may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and
remand the cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief
issues. Id. (citing Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)). "Only
after the issues have been briefed by new counsel may a court of appeals address the
merits of the issues." 178 S.W.3d at 827.
We have reviewed counsel's arguments and we have independently examined
the entire record to determine whether there are any non-frivolous issues which might
4
By his pro se response, Appellant raises four issues. He questions (1) whether his counsel
was ineffective, (2) whether the trial court should have sua sponte ordered that Appellant
undergo a competency examination; (3) whether his sentence is excessive, (4) whether the
testimony offered by deputies of the Potter County Sheriff's Department was biased and
hearsay and (5) whether the trial court should have held a suppression hearing.
4
support the appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 S.Ct.
346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409; Stafford v. State, 813
S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). We have found no such issues. See Gainous
v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex.Crim.App. 1969). After reviewing the record,
counsel's brief and Appellant's pro se response, we find nothing in the record that might
arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 826-27 (holding that it is
constitutional error for an appellate court to address nonmeritorious arguments raised in
a pro se response to an Anders brief).
Here, the record provides no reason to doubt that Appellant freely, knowingly,
and voluntarily entered his plea of "true" to three allegations contained in the State's
Motion. A plea of "true" to even one allegation in the State's Motion is sufficient to
support a judgment revoking community supervision. Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127,
128 (Tex.Crim.App. 1979); Lewis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 205, 209 (Tex.App.--San Antonio
2006, pet. denied).
In addition, we note that the judgment adjudicating guilt contains language
ordering the Appellant to pay court costs in accordance with an attached Bill of Costs,
which includes attorney's fees of $1,200.00.5 Court costs and the assessment of
attorney's fees pursuant to article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as
reflected in a certified bill of costs, are effective regardless of whether or not they were
orally pronounced in open court or specifically stated in the judgment. Armstrong v.
5
The Clerk's Record includes a Judgment Adjudicating Guilt, signed August 2, 2010, which references
"Court Costs: see attached," immediately followed by a Bill of Costs, dated August 6, 2010, which
includes attorney's fees in the sum of $1,200.00.
5
State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 766-67 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). The assessment of attorney's
fees must, however, be supported by sufficient evidence. Without record evidence
demonstrating a defendant's financial ability to offset the costs of legal services, a trial
court errs if it orders reimbursement of court-appointed attorney's fees. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 25.05(g) (West Supp. 2010); Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552
(Tex.Crim.App. 2010). Here, the record contains no evidence and no determination by
the trial court that Appellant has financial resources enabling him to pay such fees.
Accordingly, the District Clerk is ordered to amend the Bill of Costs by deleting the
obligation to pay attorney's fees in the amount of $1,200.00. See Haney v. State, No.
07-09-0205-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7229, at *2 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Sept 1, 2010, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (modifying judgment by deleting order to
pay attorney's fees before affirming conviction in frivolous appeal under Anders).
Accordingly, counsel's motion to withdraw is granted and the trial court's
judgment is affirmed as modified by the amended Bill of Costs.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.
6