NO. 07-10-00521-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
AUGUST 16, 2011
PAMELA JO BROWN, APPELLANT
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
FROM THE 320TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;
NO. 61,311-D; HONORABLE DON R. EMERSON, JUDGE
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Pamela Jo Brown entered an open plea of guilty to the charge of theft
of property under $1,500, third offense.1 She also plead true to two prior felony
convictions enhancing the punishment to a third-degree felony.2 The court assessed
1
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (West 2011) (providing theft of
property valued at less than $1,500 is a state jail felony if the defendant has two or more
prior final convictions of any grade of theft).
2
On a showing at the trial of a state jail felony that the defendant has two prior
final convictions for state jail felonies, on conviction the defendant shall be punished for
a third-degree felony. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(a)(1) (West 2011). The range of
punishment for an individual adjudged guilty of a third-degree felony is imprisonment for
punishment at eight years confinement in prison. Her court-appointed appellate counsel
has filed a motion to withdraw supported by an Anders3 brief. We will grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Besides pleading guilty in open court to the charged offense and true to the
enhancements, appellant signed a writing waiving the right to trial by jury, and the
appearance, confrontation, and cross-examination of witnesses, and consenting to oral
and written stipulations of evidence. Appellant also executed a “judicial confession”
stating she “committed each and every allegation” contained in the indictment. The
State introduced evidence of prior convictions including two thefts and those alleged by
the indictment for enhancement of punishment.
At the punishment phase, on direct examination, appellant testified “I’m guilty” of
the indicted offense. She then presented her case-in-chief. It centered on a request for
probation because of her parents’ disabilities and their resulting need of her assistance.
On cross-examination, appellant agreed she had prior convictions including theft,
forgery, possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
criminal trespass of a habitation.
After the parties closed, the court found appellant guilty and pronounced
sentence. This appeal followed.
2 to 10 years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine not exceeding
$10,000 may also be assessed. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.34(a)(b) (West 2011).
3
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967); see
In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
2
Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw supported
by an Anders brief. In counsel’s opinion, nothing in the record establishes reversible
error. The brief reviews the record and the evidence presented at the hearing. Counsel
discusses three grounds of potential error but concludes none constitutes reversible
error. Correspondence from counsel to appellant indicates counsel supplied appellant a
copy of the Anders brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw. The correspondence also
points out the right of appellant to review the record and file a pro se response and her
right to file a pro se petition for discretionary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals
should she receive an adverse decision by this court. By letter, this court also notified
appellant of her opportunity to submit a response to the Anders brief and motion to
withdraw filed by her counsel. Appellant did not file a response.
In conformity with the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court, we
will not rule on the motion to withdraw until we have independently examined the record
in each matter. Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 1997, no
pet.). If this court determines the appeal arguably has merit, we will remand it to the
trial court for appointment of new counsel. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511
(Tex.Crim.App.1991). We have reviewed the entire record to determine whether there
are any arguable grounds which might support an appeal. See Penson v. Ohio, 488
U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824
(Tex.Crim.App. 2005). We have found no such arguable grounds supporting a claim of
reversible error, and agree with counsel that the appeal is frivolous.
3
Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw4 and affirm the judgment of
the trial court.
James T. Campbell
Justice
Do not publish.
4
Counsel shall, within five days after the opinion is handed down, send his client
a copy of the opinion and judgment, along with notification of the defendant’s right to file
a pro se petition for discretionary review. Tex. R. App. P. 48.4.
4