Reverse and Remand; Opinion Filed June 12, 2013.
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-00248-CV
EX PARTE LUAN LE A/K/A JOHN DOE
On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. X11-1135-R
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Myers, and Evans
Opinion by Justice Myers
Luan Le a/k/a John Doe, appeals the denial of his petition for expunction. Appellant
presents two issues on appeal contending (1) the trial court violated appellant’s right to due
process by scheduling the hearing with only twenty-four hours’ notice and then denied appellant
the opportunity to present evidence; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying
appellant’s petition for expunction and by making unsupported factual findings in favor of the
State without permitting appellant the opportunity to present evidence. We reverse the trial
court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was arrested and indicted in 2010 for two offenses of aggravated sexual assault
of a child. The State later dismissed the indictments. On August 22, 2011, appellant filed a
petition for expunction alleging the indictments had been dismissed because the presentment of
the indictments was made as a result of “mistake, false information, or other similar reason
indicating an absence of probable cause at the time of the dismissal to believe the person
committed the offense or because it was void.” Appellant also stated he had been released and
that the charge had not resulted in a final conviction, was no longer pending, and there was no
court-ordered community supervision. Appellant also alleged he had not been convicted of a
felony in the five years preceding the arrest. The State generally denied appellant’s allegations.
On January 26, 2012, the State filed a motion for protective order and to quash
appellant’s requested discovery. Attached as evidence to that motion was the State’s motion in
the criminal cases to dismiss the indictments against appellant. The motion to dismiss explained
that the evidence in the State’s possession included six months of video from the school the
complainant attended and where appellant worked, but the district attorney’s office could not
review the evidence because the video recorder had broken and was being returned to the
manufacturer for repair. The State explained that because of the delay caused by the broken
equipment, the district attorney would dismiss the cases until the office completed a thorough
investigation of the evidence. The motion to dismiss also stated that the district attorney’s office
“expressly reserves the right to refile these cases once the investigation is complete.”
On January 27, 2012, appellant filed a motion for continuance alleging his counsel had
received notice the previous day that the trial court would hold a hearing on January 27 to make
a final ruling on the petition for expunction. Appellant argued that the single-days’ notice
violated the forty-five-days’ notice requirement of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 and left
him unable to subpoena his witnesses or otherwise coordinate their appearance in court.
At the hearing on January 27, 2012, the trial court summarily denied appellant’s motion
for continuance. The court then stated there would be no evidentiary hearing on the petition for
expunction because the face of appellant’s petition and the State’s response showed appellant did
not meet the statutory requirements for expunction. Appellant objected that the denial of the
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hearing denied him due process. The State’s attorney then told the court, “The State’s
investigation is still active and ongoing which is the reason why we originally opposed the
expunction.” Appellant stated that if the State put on evidence that the investigation was
ongoing, then he wanted to call a witness on that issue because he did not believe the State’s
investigation was ongoing. The State’s attorney stated she would swear as an officer of the court
that the district attorney’s investigation was active and ongoing. The court asked the State’s
attorney if it was correct that she stated “the other day” in the presence of appellant’s lawyer that
she “had just reinterviewed the witness,” and she stated that was correct. Appellant asked to
cross-examine the State’s attorney “since she interjected herself as a witness,” and the trial court
denied that request. Appellant asked “to make an offer of proof in that regard,” and the court
denied that request.
That same day, the trial court signed an order denying expunction. In the order, the court
stated that “having heard the argument of counsel” the court was “of the opinion that Petitioner is
not entitled to an expunction of his arrest records.” The court also stated in the order that it
found: (a) the limitations period for the offenses had not expired; (b) at the time of the dismissal,
there was probable cause to believe appellant committed the alleged offenses; (c) the indictments
were dismissed because the State was not ready for trial and not because the indictments were
presented due to mistake, false information, or other similar reason indicating a lack of probable
cause; and (d) the investigation of the offenses was still an active investigation.
EXPUNCTION OF RECORDS
In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
petition for expunction on the basis of unsupported fact findings without affording appellant an
opportunity to present evidence. An expunction proceeding is civil in nature, and the petitioner
has the burden of proving compliance with the statutory requirements. Collin Cnty. Criminal
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Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Dobson, 167 S.W.3d 625, 626 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Ex
parte Jackson, 132 S.W.3d 713, 715 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). We review a trial
court’s ruling on a petition for expunction under an abuse of discretion standard. Ex parte
Wilson, 224 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Ex parte Jackson, 132
S.W.3d at 715. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to guiding rules and
principles or if its actions are arbitrary or unreasonable. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.,
701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). The trial court errs if it rules on a petition for expunction
without a hearing where one is required. Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d at 863.
Section 55.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a person arrested for
commission of a felony is entitled to have the records and files of the arrest expunged if the
following conditions exist:
(A) . . . the indictment or information has been dismissed or quashed, and:
(i) the limitations period expired before the date on which a petition for
expunction was filed . . . ; or
(ii) the court finds that the indictment was dismissed or quashed . . .
because the presentment had been made because of mistake, false
information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause
at the time of the dismissal to believe the person committed the offense or
because it was void;
(B) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted in a final
conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court-ordered community
supervision under Article 42.12 for any offense . . . ; and
(C) the person has not been convicted of a felony in the five years preceding the
date of the arrest.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2) (amended 2011). 1
1
Act of May 31, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1103, § 17(b), 2009 Tex. Gen. Laws 3010, 3019–20, amended by Act of May 27, 2011, 82d
Leg., R.S., ch. 690, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1651, 1651–53, and Act of May 27, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 894, § 3, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 2274,
2274–75 (current version codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 55.01(a)(2) (West Supp. 2012)). The 2011 amendments changed some of
the elements for expunction (e.g., the requirement that the petitioner not have been convicted in the previous five years was deleted). However,
none of those changes affects the outcome of this case. The amendments apply “to an expunction of arrest records and files for any criminal
offense that occurred before, on, or after the effective date of this Act.” 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 690, § 7, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1651, 1655; 82d Leg.,
R.S., ch. 894, § 3, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 2274, 2276. We read this language to mean that the amendments apply only to petitions for expunction
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Article 55.02, section 2(c) requires the trial court to set the matter for a hearing no sooner
than thirty days after the filing of the petition. Id. art. 55.02, § 2(c) (West. Supp. 2012).
However, an expunction proceeding does not necessarily require a formal hearing. A trial court
may rule on an expunction petition without permitting live testimony if the court has all the
information necessary to resolve the issues raised by the petition. Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d
at 863. That available information would include the pleadings, summary judgment proof, and
judicial notice of facts. Id.
In this case, the trial court did not permit the parties to present evidence at the hearing,
and there was no summary judgment proof. The trial court stated at the hearing that the denial of
the petition for expunction was based “on the face of the petition and the State’s reply.” The
written order denying the petition states the court “heard the argument of counsel,” but the order
does not mention the court heard or considered any evidence. Therefore, any evidence on which
the trial court based its ruling had to come from the pleadings and judicial notice. Before courts
can take judicial notice of facts, those facts cannot be seriously subject to debate and must be
easily ascertainable. Id.; see TEX. R. EVID. 201(b).
At the hearing, the trial court stated it denied expunction because “on the face of your
petition and the State’s reply, you do not . . . meet the statutory requirements for an expunction.”
Appellant pleaded the statutory requirements, and the State’s reply consisted of only a general
denial. If appellant had proved the elements he pleaded, he would have been entitled to
expunction, so the trial court’s stated reason at the hearing does not support the denial of
expunction without permitting appellant the opportunity to present evidence.
filed on or after the effective date regardless of when the criminal offense occurred. Ex parte Mason, No. 05-11-00046-CV, 2013 WL 1456632,
at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 9, 2013, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). Appellant filed his petition for expunction before the amendments’ effective
date. Accordingly, we do not apply the 2011 amendments.
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In the order denying expunction, the trial court found “the limitations period for the
offenses involved in this expunction proceeding ha[d] not expired.” Aggravated sexual assault
of a child does not have a limitations period. See CRIM. PROC. art. 12.01, § 1(B) (West Supp.
2012). However, the lack of expiration of limitations does not affect appellant’s right to
expunction if he can prove the dismissal of the indictments was due to lack of probable cause to
believe he committed the offenses. See id. art. 55.01(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (elements of expiration of
limitations and lack of probable cause separated by “or”).
The trial court also found that at the time of the dismissal of the indictments, there was
probable cause to believe appellant committed the alleged offenses. On appeal, the State asserts
that this finding was supported by the State’s telling the court and appellant’s counsel during an
informal discovery conference “that the State’s criminal investigation was ongoing, that the child
victim had been re-interviewed, and that the victim re-identified appellant as his abuser.” There
is no record of the statements at the discovery conference. These statements were not easily
ascertainable, and they appeared to be seriously subject to debate. Thus, they were not facts of
which the trial court could take judicial notice. Moreover, the only support for these statements
in the record is the State’s attorney’s statements at the non-evidentiary hearing that the State’s
investigation was ongoing and the State had re-interviewed the complaining witness. The record
contains no support for the statement in the State’s brief, “the victim re-identified appellant as his
abuser.” Without support in the record for that statement, the record does not support the trial
court’s finding there was probable cause at the time of the dismissals to believe appellant
committed the alleged offenses. The State’s attorney’s statement that the complainant had been
re-interviewed, standing alone, does not support the trial court’s finding that there was probable
cause to believe when the indictments were dismissed that appellant committed the offenses.
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The trial court also found “the indictments were dismissed because the State was not
ready for trial and not because the indictments were presented due [to] mistake, false
information, or other similar reason indicating a lack of probable cause.” The State’s motion to
dismiss the indictments may tend to show the dismissals were not “because of mistake, false
information, or other similar reason indicating absence of probable cause,” but the motion to
dismiss was not in evidence before the court. No evidence was admitted at the hearing, and the
only copy of the motion to dismiss in the record was an unsworn and uncertified copy attached to
the State’s motion to quash discovery. No one requested the trial court to take judicial notice of
the motion to dismiss, and nothing in the record indicates the trial court took judicial notice.
Moreover, the contents of an unauthenticated or uncertified record from another court is not the
type of evidence of which the court can take judicial notice. 2 See Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d
at 863 (“Judicial records . . . from a domestic court other than the court being asked to take
judicial notice, have not been deemed so easily ascertainable that no proof is required; they are to
be established by introducing into evidence authenticated or certified copies, respectively, of
those records.”).
The State argues on appeal that the trial court’s finding that probable cause existed when
the indictments were dismissed was supported by affidavits attached to appellant’s motion for
continuance. In these affidavits, witnesses describe evidence on which the State’s case was
based. However, these affidavits were not offered into evidence on the petition for expunction,
they were not mentioned at the hearing, and nothing in the record shows the trial court
considered them in denying the petition for expunction. Nothing in the record shows the trial
2
The petition for expunction was filed in the 265th District Court, and the motion to dismiss the indictments was filed in Dallas County
Criminal District Court No. 3.
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court considered any evidence that would support finding “there was probable cause to believe
the petitioner committed the offenses alleged.”
The trial court also found that denial of the petition for expunction was appropriate
because the State dismissed the indictments for the reasons that the State was not ready for trial
and the investigation was still ongoing. However, these are not appropriate reasons to deny an
expunction when the petitioner has met the requirements for an expunction under article 55.01.
Article 55.02, section 4(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a partial expunction in
this situation:
If the state establishes that the person who is the subject of an expunction order is
still subject to conviction for an offense arising out of the transaction for which
the person was arrested because the statute of limitations has not run and there is
reasonable cause to believe that the state may proceed against the person for the
offense, the court may provide in its expunction order that the law enforcement
agency and the prosecuting attorney responsible for investigating the offense may
retain any records and files that are necessary to the investigation.
CRIM. PROC. art. 55.02, § 4(a). If appellant had proved his entitlement to expunction under
article 55.01, the fact that the State still intended to re-indict and prosecute him would not permit
the trial court to deny appellant at least a partial expunction.
Based on the record before us, the trial court did not have all the information before it
necessary to rule on appellant’s petition for expunction. Accordingly, the court erred by denying
the petition for expunction without an evidentiary hearing and without permitting appellant an
opportunity to prove his entitlement to expunction. See Ex parte Wilson, 224 S.W.3d at 863–64
(“[N]o evidentiary hearing was held. Because the trial court’s ruling rested necessarily on its
taking judicial notice of unspecified court records from another court, dispensing with an
evidentiary hearing on Wilson’s petition was error.” (Footnote omitted.)). We sustain
appellant’s second issue.
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We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
120248F.P05 JUSTICE
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
EX PARTE LUAN LE A/K/A JOHN DOE On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. X11-1135-R.
No. 05-12-00248-CV V. Opinion delivered by Justice Myers.
Justices Lang and Evans participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings
.
It is ORDERED that appellant LUAN LE A/K/A JOHN DOE recover his costs of this
appeal from appellee DALLAS COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE.
.
Judgment entered this 12th day of June, 2013.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
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