Jason Christopher Weeks v. State

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                             

                                       NUMBER 13-08-00272-CR

 

                                 COURT OF APPEALS

 

                     THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 

                         CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

 

JASON CHRISTOPHER WEEKS,                                          APPELLANT,

 

                                                             v.

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                            APPELLEE.

____________________________________________________________

 

                            On Appeal from the 36th District Court

                                      of Aransas County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

 

                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION

 

                          Before Justices Garza, Vela, and Perkes

                            Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela

 


 

            Appellant, Jason Christopher Weeks, was charged by indictment with one count of state jail felony theft.  See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 31.03 (Vernon Supp. 2010).  A jury found appellant guilty as charged in the indictment and assessed a punishment of twenty-three months of imprisonment in state jail without a fine.  The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, ordered appellant to pay $150 in restitution, and ordered that appellant be given jail time credit for time spent in custody.  This appeal followed.  We affirm the judgment.

I.  Anders Brief

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, stating that, based upon her review of the record, “there are no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated” and “the appeal is wholly without merit.”  Although counsel’s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal.  See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

            In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no errors in the trial court’s judgment.  Counsel has informed this Court that she has:  (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on appellant, and (3) informed appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response.[1]  See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23.  More than an adequate period of time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se brief in this matter.  See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

II. Independent Review

 

            Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous.  Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988).  We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal.  See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. Motion to Withdraw

 

            In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney[2] has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant.  See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant.  To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)).  We grant her motion to withdraw.  Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise appellant of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.[3]  See Tex. R. App. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

 

 

 

                                               

                                                                                    ROSE VELA

                                                                                    Justice

 

Do not publish.  Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

 

Delivered and filed this

17th day of March, 2011.



[1] The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered.  Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.”  In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–Waco 1997, no pet.)).

 

[2] At the inception of this appeal, appellant was represented by the Honorable Tamara L. Cochran-May.  After Cochran-May filed a motion to withdraw as appellant’s counsel, this Court abated the appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court for determination of this motion.  See Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Enriquez v. State, 999 S.W.2d 906, 907-08 (Tex. App.–Waco 1999, no pet.).  The trial court found that the motion to withdraw was supported by good cause, allowed Cochran-May to withdraw, and appointed the Honorable Deeanne Galvan, who currently represents appellant on appeal.  Because the trial court has granted Cochran-May’s motion to withdraw, we dismiss her motion to withdraw, which was previously carried with the case, as moot.

 

[3] No substitute counsel will be appointed.  Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review.  Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this court.  See Tex. R. App. P. 68.2.  Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with this court, after which it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  See id. R. 68.3; 68.7.  Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.  See id. R. 68.4.