COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00489-CR
PATRICK LAMONT JOHNSON APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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A jury convicted Appellant Patrick Lamont Johnson of the state jail felony
offense of burglary of a building and assessed his punishment at two years’
confinement. The trial court sentenced him accordingly.
Johnson’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to
withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and
motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a
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See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable
grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). We gave Johnson an
opportunity to file a pro se brief, which he did. The State declined the opportunity
to file a brief in response.
Prior to filing his pro se brief in response to his appointed counsel’s Anders
brief, this court had already denied Johnson’s two previous motions requesting
substitution of counsel. Now, despite this court’s having granted a time
extension to file his brief and Johnson’s having filed his pro se brief, he has filed
a third motion to this court requesting substitution of appellate counsel. As with
his previous two motions, Johnson cites no authority to show that he is entitled to
the assistance of a different appointed attorney. See Malcom v. State, 628
S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (discussing defendant’s
burden regarding entitlement to change of counsel).
Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this
court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See
Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State,
904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may
we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–
83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, and Johnson’s
brief. We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without
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merit; we find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal. See
Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also
Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Furthermore,
we have reviewed Johnson’s third motion requesting substitution of counsel and
find nothing in the motion that causes us to retreat from our previous two orders
denying this request.
Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny Johnson’s third
motion for substitution of counsel, and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MCCOY, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: October 25, 2012
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