COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-11-00419-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF D.C.J.,
A CHILD
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FROM THE 16TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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In terminating Appellant J.R.J.’s parental rights to his son D.C.J., the trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant
knowingly placed or allowed D.C.J. to remain in conditions or surroundings
which endangered his physical or emotional well-being;
engaged in conduct or knowingly placed D.C.J. with persons who engaged
in conduct which endangered his physical or emotional well-being;
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
constructively abandoned D.C.J., who has been in the temporary
managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective
Services (TDFPS) for not less than six months, and TDFPS made
reasonable efforts to return D.C.J. to Appellant, Appellant did not regularly
visit or maintain significant contact with D.C.J., and Appellant
demonstrated an inability to provide D.C.J. with a safe environment; and
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of D.C.J.,
who has been in the temporary managing conservatorship of TDFPS for
not less than nine months as a result of his removal from Appellant for
abuse or neglect.2
The trial court also found that termination of the parent-child relationship
between Appellant and D.C.J. is in D.C.J.’s best interest.3
We decline to revisit our prior order rejecting TDFPS’s assertion that we
lack jurisdiction to entertain this appeal, given the timely-filed notice of appeal
and Appellant’s February 14, 2012 telephonic statement to his appellate counsel
confirming that he desires this appeal.4
In two points, Appellant complains that the evidence is not legally sufficient
to support the trial court’s endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E).5
2
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D)–(E), (N)–(O) (West Supp.
2011).
3
See id. § 161.001(2).
4
See Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(b), 26.1(b); In re Smith, 263 S.W.3d 93, 95 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding); Lab Corp. of Am. v. Mid-Town
Surgical Ctr., Inc., 16 S.W.3d 527, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.); see
also In re J.R.J., 357 S.W.3d 153, 155–57 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, orig.
proceeding) (holding that trial court abused its discretion by ordering Appellant’s
appellate counsel not to file a notice of appeal).
5
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D)–(E).
2
Along with a best interest finding, a finding of only one ground alleged under
section 161.001(1) is sufficient to support a judgment of termination.6 Because
Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s findings under subsections (N) and
(O) or the finding that termination is in D.C.J.’s best interest, we overrule his two
points and affirm the trial court’s judgment.7
PER CURIAM
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MCCOY, JJ.
DELIVERED: July 5, 2012
6
In re E.M.N., 221 S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
7
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(N)–(O), (2); In re A.V., 113
S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re K.W., 335 S.W.3d 767, 769 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2011, no pet.).
3