AFFIRM; Opinion issued April 11, 2013
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-00624-CR
SANDRA DIAZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. M-2010-11336
OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Lang, and Evans
Opinion by Justice Francis
Sandra Diaz appeals her conviction for driving while intoxicated. After her motion to
suppress was denied, appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea. The trial court found her guilty
and assessed punishment at 150 days, probated for eighteen months, and a $900 fine. In a single
issue, appellant claims the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress. We affirm.
Around 1:30 in the morning on Wednesday, June 2, 2010, Addison police officer Scott
Marshall was driving west on Beltline Road when he saw a car with its hazard lights flashing and
the driver side door open. The car was stopped on Quorum Road, and the driver, later identified
as appellant, was standing outside the car. Marshall turned his police car onto Quorum Road
and, activating his overhead lights, pulled behind the stopped car. Although he did not see any
damage on the rear of the car, Marshall could not see the front of the car, nor could he tell if the
car had a flat tire or was leaking any fluid. He heard appellant speaking to someone but did not
see anyone in the car. Appellant looked at Marshall, got in the car, and drove off with the hazard
lights still flashing. Marshall activated his siren and began following the car. Appellant
eventually stopped the car in a nearby parking lot and was subsequently arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol. She filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result
of the traffic stop. After a hearing, the trial court denied her motion to suppress.
In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying her motion to
suppress because the traffic stop that resulted in her arrest was not a reasonable exercise of the
community caretaking function. Appellant concedes Officer Marshall was primarily motivated
by his community caretaking function but nevertheless argues Marshall’s belief that appellant
needed his help was not reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we give great deference to
the trial court’s findings of historical facts. Laney v. State, 117 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003). We review de novo mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution proscribes all unreasonable
searches and seizures. Gonzales v. State, 369 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions. Id. One such exception is known as the “community
caretaking” exception to the warrant requirement; under this exception, a police officer may stop
and assist an individual whom a reasonable person, given the totality of the circumstances, would
believe is in need of help. Wright v. State, 7 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
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The community caretaking function is totally divorced from the detection, investigation,
or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Corbin v. State, 85
S.W.3d 272, 276–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The officer must be primarily motivated by his
community caretaking function and must have a reasonable belief that the defendant needs help.
Id. at 277. In evaluating whether an officer reasonably believes a person needs help, courts may
look to a list of four non-exclusive factors: (1) the nature and level of the distress exhibited by
the individual; (2) the location of the individual; (3) whether or not the individual was alone
and/or had access to assistance other than that offered by the officer; and (4) to what extent the
individual, if not assisted, presented a danger to herself or others. Wright, 7 S.W.3d at 152.
While the first factor is generally given the greatest weight, it is not always dispositive.
Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 855. “A particular level of exhibited distress may be seen as more or
less serious depending on the presence or absence of the remaining three factors.” Corbin, 85
S.W.3d at 277. The presence of unique circumstances may swing the balance the other way.
Gonzales, 369 S.W.3d at 855.
Under the first factor, Marshall testified the car was stopped on the road, although pulled
off to the side, with the hazard lights flashing and the door open. He said he could not determine
the exact nature or level of distress appellant exhibited because shortly after he pulled behind her
car, she got in the car and left. Courts have never required an officer to know, with any degree
of certainty, the specific distress the individual may be suffering. See id. at 856. The first factor
is not dispositive, however, so we consider the other factors.
It was 1:30 in the morning, on a road with light traffic. Marshall stated that while there is
not much violent crime in that area, nonviolent crime does occur. Appellant’s car had been
stopped with the hazard lights flashing, a circumstance that typically indicates to others that the
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driver of the car is experiencing difficulties. The area has retail stores as well as some
restaurants and bars; however, it is unlikely many would be open at that hour on a Wednesday
morning. Although Marshall heard appellant talking, he could not see anyone else in the car.
Appellant’s location, the time of night, and the light traffic significantly limited her access to
other assistance. Furthermore, it appeared appellant was alone. Finally, appellant got in her car
and left with the hazard lights still flashing which would, under normal circumstances, indicate
an on-going situation or problem.
Appellant concedes Marshall was primarily motivated by his community caretaking
function. After examining the record and considering all the factors, we conclude the evidence
supports the trial court’s conclusion that Marshall reasonably believed appellant needed help
under the circumstances. Marshall’s stop of appellant’s vehicle was justified under the
community caretaking function based on the totality of the circumstances. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion to suppress. We overrule appellant’s sole
issue.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
120624F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
SANDRA DIAZ, Appellant On Appeal from the County Criminal Court
No. 6, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-12-00624-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. M-2010-11336.
Opinion delivered by Justice Francis,
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Lang and Evans participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered April 11, 2013.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
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