AFFIR1vI; and Opinion issued April 5, 2013.
In The
Qourt of ppea1
Jfiftlj trict of exa at tatta
No. 05-12-01 196-CR
CHRISTOPHER LELANI) LEE, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 10
1)allas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. MAO9-22461-L
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, O’Neill, and Lewis
Opinion by Justice O’Neill
Christopher Leland Lee appeals his convict ion for assault involving family violence. In a
single issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction, We
affirm the trial court’s judgment. The background of the case and the evidence admitted at trial
are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts. We issue this
memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to he
applied in the case is well settled.
FAcTs
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded not guilty to assault involving family violence.
During the hearing, Julia Hubbard testified appellant was a “jealous and very controlling” person
and that she was alrai(l of him because he was a former police officer. Hubbard testified she and
appellant dated and lived together in 2009. Appellant paid all the bills and required Hubbard to
put any money she made waitressing at clubs into his bank account. Hubbard moved out of
appellant’s apartment in September 2009. At that time, appellant had agreed to allow Hubbard
to continue using a car he purchased as long as she made payments to him. On October 6, 2009,
I lubbard went to appellant’s apartment while he was at work and retrieved most of her
belongings. Later that day, she learned her car was gone. While reporting the car missing to the
police, she told an officer about the arrangements with appellant for use of the car and that she
was afraid of appellant because he had been very abuse. When the officer asked Hubbard for
details and dates, Hubbard stated on May 2, 2009. she and appellant argued while driving home
from an “after-hours club where you have to bring your own bottle.” When they arrived in the
parking garage at the apartment, she walked toward the elevator without waiting for appellant.
Appellant threw a bottle of Vodka at her, hitting her hip and cutting her foot from the shattered
glass. Hubbard testified she bled and has a scar from the assault. She did not call the police
because she was afraid of appellant.
Appellant denied he assaulted Hubbard. Appellant testified the May incident never
happened, and their relationship deteriorated due to her “being caught lying, untruths,”
Appellant said Hubbard never handed over her money to him, she had access to his debit and
credit cards while they were together, and he was surprised when Hubbard moved out because he
was at work and she took some of his belongings with her. On October 6, 2009, appellant called
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a tow service and had them tow the car because Hubbard had missed three PaYments. Prior to
having the car towed, appellant called Hubbard and asked for the payments, but she replied,
“you’re not getting anything.” Appellant testified that Hubbard said if he paid her $500 cash, she
would “dismiss the case.” Appellant gave Hubbard the $500. Appellant contacted hubbard
when the case was not dismissed and she asked for more money.
During cross—examination, appellant admitted he sometimes went to after-hours clubs
with Hubbard and they usually took their own alcohol. Appellant testified he would never throw
a bottle of Vodka at Hubbard. He did not recall whether he went to an after-hours club with her
on May 2, 2009 or whether they argued that day.
The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at 1 50 (lays’ confinement
in the county jail, probated for twelve months, and a $350 fine.
APPLICABLE LAW
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894—95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). We are required to defer to
the jury’s credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the
witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326.
The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Julia Mayer by striking her torso with a bottle
and by cutting her feet with broken glass. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (West
2011). “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
Id. § 1.07(a)(8) (West Supp. 2012). The State also was required to prove beyond a reasonable
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doubt that appellant had a dating relationship with Mayer and she was a member of appellant’s
family and household. Ste Tnx. FAl. Coon ANN. § 71,0021, 71.005 (West 2008 & Supp.
2012).
Discuss ION
Appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient because (1) Mayer never told the
police about the alleged assault until after appellant repossessed his vehicle from her; (2)
Mayer’s testimony was unbelievable; (3) Mayer told appellant she would dismiss the case if he
gave her $500. hut she demanded more money after appellant gave her $500; and (4) Mayer
waited until October 2009 to make the complaint about an assault that allegedly occurred in May
2009. The State responds that there is sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction for
family-violence assault.
Conflicting evidence was presented at trial. Hubbard testified that appellant assaulted her
by hitting her with a Vodka bottle and cutting her foot from the shattered glass. Hubbard said
she bled and had a scar from the assault. Appellant testified the incident never occurred and that
he would never throw a bottle at Hubbard. It was the trial judge’s role, as the fact-finder in this
case, to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence. See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The trial judge was free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence
presented by either side. See Dewberrv v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational
trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed assault
involving family violence. Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894—95; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895. Thus, the
evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. We resolve appellant’s sole issue against him.
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We affirm the trial Court’ S judgment.
fvlfd{AELJ O’NLL
JUSTICE g
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Do Not Publish
TEx, R. APP, P.47
121 196F,U05
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QCourt of 1ppta(
fiftfj Oitritt of Eexa at Oafta
JUDGMENT
CHRISTOPHER LELAND LEE. Appeal from the County Criminal Court
Appellant No. 10 of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct,No.
MAO9-2246 I -L.
No. 05-12-01 196-CR Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neill,
Justices Moseley and Lewis participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered April 5, 2013.
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MICHAEL J. O’NEILL
JUSTICE
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