COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00201-CR
MILLARD EARL VENCILL APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF PARKER COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
A jury found Appellant Millard Earl Vencill guilty of misdemeanor driving
while intoxicated and recommended a probated sentence of 180 days’
imprisonment. Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal, and we abated for a
hearing in the trial court to determine whether Appellant was indigent for
purposes of obtaining a free record and appointment of appellate counsel. The
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
trial court determined that Appellant was not indigent, and Appellant, proceeding
pro se, thereafter filed an original and a supplemental brief that collectively
contain sixteen points. We affirm.
II. Background2
Appellant was charged by information with driving while intoxicated.
According to Appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress and brief in support, which
were filed on Appellant’s behalf by his retained counsel, a private citizen effected
Appellant’s initial detention after watching Appellant, at 10:15 a.m., cross over a
yellow highway dividing line, follow another vehicle too closely, and cross onto
the shoulder of the highway. When Appellant stopped his vehicle at the traffic
light near the Parker County Courthouse, the witness exited his vehicle,
approached Appellant’s vehicle, and took Appellant’s car keys. A Weatherford
police officer responded, administered three field sobriety tests, and arrested
Appellant for driving while intoxicated. Trial was before a jury, and the jury found
Appellant guilty and recommended a probated 180-day sentence with a fine of
$750. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly.
The trial court subsequently permitted Appellant’s retained counsel to
withdraw, and Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. After being informed that
2
As discussed below, there is no reporter’s record of the trial or any pretrial
hearings relating to this appeal. Thus, our recitation of the circumstances of
Appellant’s arrest and conviction is based on information contained in the clerk’s
record. There is, however, a reporter’s record of the abatement hearing in which
Appellant attempted to establish his indigence.
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Appellant had not paid or made arrangements to pay the estimated $2,400 cost
for the reporter’s record and permitting Appellant an opportunity to respond or
make arrangements, we abated this appeal for a hearing in the trial court to
determine whether Appellant desired to prosecute this appeal, whether he is
indigent for purposes of obtaining a free record, and whether he should have
counsel appointed to represent him on appeal.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which only Appellant
testified. Furthermore, the only exhibit was Appellant’s Affidavit of Indigency and
Application for Court Appointed Attorney. Appellant testified that he is not
married, is not employed, and does not have dependents or children under the
age of eighteen. He also testified that he is disabled, that his total monthly
income is the $1,750 he receives from the Social Security Administration, and
that his monthly expenses total $1,667 plus gasoline for his vehicle. Appellant
testified that he does not maintain bank accounts and deals only with cash and
that he has approximately $100,000 equity in his home, which is his homestead.
Otherwise, Appellant testified that he owns a 1976 boat worth $500; a 1960
tractor worth $500; a 1970 trailer worth $500; a 1964 Chevelle worth $500; a
1964 Chevrolet worth $500; a 1964 truck worth $100; and various items of
personal property such as jewelry, household furniture, appliances, tools, and
clothing worth a total of $2,500. Appellant also testified that he owns a 2005
Chevrolet 1500 truck. However, the value of the 2005 Chevrolet truck was
inaudible to the court reporter and is also not listed on Appellant’s affidavit of
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indigency. Thus, excluding the equity in his homestead, Appellant’s testimony
established that he owns personal property he valued at $5,100 plus the value of
the 2005 Chevrolet truck. According to Appellant’s affidavit of indigency, an
unnamed attorney quoted him $5,000 to represent him on appeal.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court determined, based in large
part on the equity Appellant has in his homestead, that Appellant is not indigent.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court stated that Appellant
was not entitled to a free record or the appointment of counsel at government
expense. This court then set a new deadline for preparation of the reporter’s
record and notified Appellant of that new deadline. Because Appellant did not
pay for or make arrangements to pay for the reporter’s record by the new
deadline, we informed Appellant by letter that the court would consider and
decide only those issues or points that do not require a reporter’s record for a
decision. See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c). Appellant subsequently filed an original
and a supplemental brief, and the State filed a responsive brief.
III. Indigency Determination
In his sixteenth point, Appellant contends that the trial court ―was not ruling
within the scope of his judicial requirements of justice‖ because ―there was a
preponderance of evidence given by [Appellant] that there was no money
available to pay the court reporter or for a[n appellate] attorney.‖ We construe
Appellant’s sixteenth point to argue that the trial court abused its discretion by
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determining that Appellant is not indigent for purposes of his entitlement to a free
record and appointment of appellate counsel.
A. Applicable Law
Although the factors to be considered are the same, determining indigency
for purposes of obtaining a free record and for purposes of appointing counsel
are discrete inquiries. McFatridge v. State, 309 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (citing Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
For a free copy of the record, a defendant is indigent if he is unable to ―pay or
give security for the appellate record.‖ Tex. R. App. P. 20.2. For appointment of
appellate counsel, a defendant is indigent if he is ―not financially able to employ
counsel.‖ Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(b) (West Supp. 2011). ―A
defendant can be found indigent for one purpose without being found indigent for
the other.‖ McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 6.
Determination of indigency is made on a case-by-case basis and involves
a two-part process: (1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing of
indigency, and (2) if the defendant satisfies that burden, the burden then shifts to
the State to show the defendant is not, in fact, indigent. Id.; Tuck v. State, 215
S.W.3d 411, 414–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Then,
unless there is some basis in the record to find the defendant’s
prima facie showing to be inaccurate or untrue, the trial court should
accept it as sufficient to find him indigent. After a defendant
establishes a prima facie showing of indigency, an appellate court
can uphold a trial court’s determination of non-indigence only if the
record contains evidence supporting such a determination. In
Whitehead, we recognized that the two-step process outlined above
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. . . applies when determining whether a person is indigent for
purposes of appointed counsel. A reviewing court should uphold a
trial court’s ruling denying indigent status only if it finds that the trial
court, having utilized this two-step process, reasonably believed the
defendant was not indigent.
McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 6 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also
Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 874.
To determine if a defendant is indigent, the trial court may consider the
defendant’s income, source of income, assets, property owned, outstanding
obligations, necessary expenses, the number and ages of dependents, and
spousal income that is available to the defendant, as well as the defendant’s
affidavit of indigency, sworn testimony, and proper financial documentation. Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(m)–(n) (West Supp. 2011); McFatridge, 309
S.W.3d at 5–6; Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 877–78. ―The ability of the defendant
to borrow funds is something that may be taken into account in considering how
the defendant’s assets and property relate to the ability to pay.‖ Whitehead, 130
S.W.3d at 878 (citing Goffney v. Lowry, 554 S.W.2d 157, 159 (Tex. 1977)).
However, ―a defendant should not be required to borrow money that can never
be repaid except by depriving the defendant of the necessities of life.‖ Id. While
the appellate court gives deference to the trial court’s ruling, the trial court’s
discretion is neither ―unfettered‖ nor ―unbridled,‖ and the trial court must have a
reasonable articulable basis if it discounts or disregards the appellant’s evidence.
Id. at 875–76.
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B. Discussion
In McFatridge, the court of criminal appeals held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that McFatridge was not indigent. See 309
S.W.3d at 8–9. There, McFatridge’s monthly income was $550, and her monthly
expenses totaled $484. Id. at 3. However, she owned $3,000 worth of antiques
and nonexempt real property valued at $6,670. Id. at 8. The court first deducted
the $3,000 estimated cost of the reporter’s record and noted that McFatridge
―would have at least $6,670 worth of assets left over to devote to the cost of an
appellate attorney.‖ Id. at 9. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s
determinations that McFatridge was not indigent for purposes of obtaining a free
record or for the appointment of appellate counsel. Id.
The record in this case contains evidence that the court reporter estimated
the cost of the appellate record to be $2,400 and that an unnamed attorney
would charge Appellant $5,000 for the appeal. Appellant’s testimony established
that, excluding the equity in his homestead, he had $6,100 plus the value of the
2005 Chevrolet truck worth of personal property at the time of the indigency
hearing. After first deducting the estimated $2,400 cost for the reporter’s record,
Appellant would have $3,700 plus the value of the 2005 Chevrolet truck to use
toward the retention of appellate counsel. In addition, Appellant had
approximately $100,000 of equity in his homestead that might have been used as
collateral for a loan to cover the costs of the appeal. See Whitehead, 130
S.W.3d at 878 (stating that a defendant’s ability to obtain a loan is a valid
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consideration for indigency purposes and noting that Whitehead had, among
other things, ―$10,000 worth of equity in her home‖).
Using the two-part process outlined by the court of criminal appeals for
determinations of indigency, we hold that credible evidence supports the trial
court’s determination that Appellant is not indigent for purposes of a free record
and that the trial court could have reasonably believed based on that evidence
that Appellant was not indigent for purposes of appointment of appellate counsel.
See McFatridge, 309 S.W.3d at 9; Whitehead, 130 S.W.3d at 878–79. We
therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either instance,
and we overrule Appellant’s sixteenth point.
IV. Remaining Points
In his fifteen remaining points, Appellant contends that his arrest by the
private citizen was improper, that the arresting officer discriminated against him
because he is disabled, that his attorney provided ineffective assistance in
several ways, that the trial court admitted evidence that should have been
suppressed, that his conviction was supported only by the opinion testimony of
one witness, that he should not have been convicted of driving while intoxicated
because he was taking medication prescribed by his doctor, and that there was a
computer glitch when the jury lists were being prepared. Each of these points
depend upon the existence of a reporter’s record either for their merit or to
determine whether they were preserved for appellate review. Because Appellant
did not pay for or make arrangements to pay for a reporter’s record, we cannot
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review Appellant’s first fifteen points and therefore overrule them. See Tex. R.
App. P. 37.3(c); Akin v. State, No. 02-08-00062-CR, 2009 WL 806902, at *1
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 26, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding points requiring reporter’s record not preserved for appeal
by failure to pay for reporter’s record).
V. Conclusion
Having overruled each of Appellant’s points, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: February 9, 2012
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