Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-13-00130-CR
EX PARTE Christopher O. WOODRUFF
From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2007CR11181-W1
Honorable Sid L. Harle, Judge Presiding 1
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 28, 2013
AFFIRMED
Christopher Woodruff appeals the trial court’s order denying his application for writ of
habeas corpus. In his application for the writ and supporting brief, he alleges ineffective assistance
of counsel during his trial before the court. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
On November 4, 2009, Woodruff entered a plea of not guilty to the felony offense of
recklessly causing injury to his seventy-three year old father, Charles Woodruff 2 by pushing him.
Woodruff waived a jury and elected a trial before the court. At trial, Charles testified that
Woodruff pushed him out of the house where Woodruff resided with his mother. Woodruff
1
The Honorable Sid L. Harle presided over the trial on the merits. The Honorable Andrew W. Carruthers, Bexar
County Magistrate Judge, presided over the post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding.
2
For purposes of clarity, Charles Woodruff will be referred to as “Charles” in this opinion.
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testified that he lived in the house with his mother, who suffered from dementia. Woodruff claims
that Charles was the aggressor and fell out the door, injuring himself, when Woodruff was
defending himself.
The trial court found Woodruff guilty and assessed punishment at confinement in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a period of ten years,
suspended and probated for a term of ten years. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Woodruff’s Petition for Discretionary Review.
Woodruff subsequently filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus seeking to have his
conviction set aside based on ineffective assistance of counsel. A hearing was held on July 16,
2012, and on August 30, 2012. The trial court denied the application and this habeas proceeding
ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An applicant for habeas corpus relief “must prove his claim by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Ex parte Scott, 190
S.W.3d 672, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (per curiam). In reviewing the trial court’s order denying
habeas corpus relief, we “must view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling.” See Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. We will uphold the trial court’s ruling absent an
abuse of discretion. Id. “In conducting our review, we afford almost total deference to the [trial
court’s] determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, especially [those]
based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.” Ex parte Wilson, 171 S.W.3d 925, 928 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); accord Ex parte Nagle, 48 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2000, no pet.). We afford that same deference to the trial court’s application of the law
to the facts if the ultimate questions turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Ex parte
Wilson, 171 S.W.3d at 928.
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
To obtain habeas corpus relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must show that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and (2) “that but for [the deficiency, there is a reasonable probability] the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88,
694 (1984) (emphasis added); accord Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 900–01 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011). A simple showing that trial counsel’s “errors had some conceivable effect on the
outcome of the proceeding” is not enough to meet the Strickland standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
693; accord Ex Parte Rogers, 369 S.W.3d 858, 862–63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The defendant bears the burden of proving counsel was ineffective by a preponderance of
the evidence. Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 901; see Ex parte Rogers, 369 S.W.3d at 862.
“Because there are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case, [we] must be
highly deferential and ‘indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Ex
parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 900 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “Allegations of
ineffectiveness must be based on the record and the presumption of a sound trial strategy cannot
be overcome, absent evidence in the record of the attorney’s reasons for his conduct.” Id. at 901.
When possible, trial counsel should be given an opportunity to explain the challenged actions or
failures before being denounced as ineffective. See Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Furthermore, to support an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the record must
affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. See Menefield, 363 S.W.3d at 592–93;
Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Without affirmative evidence of
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counsel’s thought processes, we will presume sound trial strategy, and we will not conclude
counsel’s performance was deficient “unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent
attorney would have engaged in it.” Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);
accord Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142.
A. Failure to Present Evidence of the Crime Scene
Woodruff first argues his trial counsel failed to present a video recording of the crime scene
supporting his assertions that Charles hit his head on a piece of ironwork and not the sidewalk as
he testified at trial. Woodruff acknowledges his trial counsel introduced a “handful of still
photographs” of the ironwork in question, but avers that the video recording would have somehow
forced Charles “to admit the protruding metal caused the accident.” Yet, a review of the record
reveals that trial counsel not only introduced the pictures of the metal framework in question, but
he also extensively cross-examined Charles regarding specifically how he fell and the nature of
his injury, i.e., that the ironwork matched the shape of the injury on Charles’s forehead. Because
counsel questioned Charles in great detail about the ironwork and his injuries, and the photographs
admitted at trial clearly show the ironwork in question, the record fails to demonstrate that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687–88; Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (requiring the
defendant to prove objectively, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel’s
representation fell below professional standards).
B. Failure to Call Character Witnesses
Woodruff next contends that trial counsel’s failure to call witnesses to testify regarding
Charles’s abusive nature toward Woodruff constituted ineffective assistance. More specifically,
Woodruff claims that he “was attempting to put an end to any further altercation by asking the
father to leave without any violence . . . [which] is what preceded the accuser’s accidental fall and
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the injury which was caused by the ironwork.” In order to show that counsel was ineffective for
failure to call witnesses, the evidence must show that the witnesses were available and the
defendant would benefit from their testimony. See King v. State, 649 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983); Vasquez v. State, 2 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d). We
are also mindful of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ recitation that “character witnesses generally
play a very small role in deciding the main issues at trial.” Ex parte Miller, 330 S.W.3d 610, 621–
22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
During his habeas hearing, Woodruff offered his testimony and that of his friend, Lynda
James. Although in New York on the day in question, Lynda testified that she was on the phone
with Woodruff when she heard Charles “threaten to shoot [Woodruff] and kill him.” Lynda further
acknowledged that although she was concerned for Woodruff’s safety, she did not contact the San
Antonio Police Department. Lynda also testified that she wrote a letter regarding the incident, but
acknowledged that she could not be certain whether the letter was sent to trial counsel or to
Woodruff, or whether trial counsel even actually received the letter.
Woodruff testified that he told his attorney about the long history of abuse. Woodruff
acknowledged that Charles’s propensity for violence and the threats he made toward Woodruff
were placed into evidence during Charles’s cross-examination before the trial court. Woodruff
also recognized that the fact that Lynda overheard these threats was offered into evidence by his
trial counsel.
Because Woodruff’s trial counsel elicited the same or similar testimony that Woodruff now
complains was omitted, Woodruff wholly failed to carry his burden of proof in showing that the
failure to produce the character testimony in question was “so serious as to deprive [him] of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Moreover, because the
record contains no evidence of how Woodruff would have benefitted from Lynda’s testimony,
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Woodruff has failed to meet his burden to show that his counsel’s assistance was ineffective. See
Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 901.
C. Presumption of Sound Trial Strategy
The trial court record and the habeas record do not support Woodruff’s conclusion that his
counsel’s conduct was not sound trial strategy. Woodruff’s trial counsel did not testify during the
habeas hearing and the record is silent with regard to the rationale behind trial counsel’s decision
not to pursue either the video or to call Lynda as a witness. Without a record, Woodruff failed to
provide his trial attorney with an opportunity to explain his trial strategy. See Menefield, 363
S.W.3d at 593 (“Trial counsel ‘should ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions
before being denounced as ineffective.’” (quoting Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005))). We conclude that Woodruff failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient and that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, Woodruff would likely have been found
not guilty. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Bone, 77 S.W.3d at 836.
CONCLUSION
The record is silent as to counsel’s strategy or reasoning related to his failure to present the
video of the crime scene and whether Woodruff’s friend, Lynda James, should have been called to
testify. Additionally, Woodruff’s evidence fails to show that this is one of those extraordinary
situations in which the face of the record shows counsel’s challenged conduct was so outrageous
that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. See Garcia, 57 S.W.3d at 440. Woodruff
failed to satisfy Strickland’s first prong that counsel’s performance was deficient. See Lopez, 343
S.W.3d at 144. Furthermore, because we indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct is
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Woodruff failed to overcome the
presumption that counsel’s actions was not based on sound trial strategy. See id. at 142. We,
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therefore, conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Woodruff’s application
for writ of habeas corpus.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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