AFFIRM; Opinion issued january 31, 2013.
In The
Inairt iii Appiahi
Yifti! Thtrirt Lif ixa at 1a11a
No. 05-11 -01430-CR
CEDRIC HARRIS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F09-40745-L
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Murphy, and Evans
1
Opinion By Justice Murphy
Cedric Harris waived a jury trial and entered an open plea of guilty to the offense of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a knife. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a),
22.02(a)(2) (West 2011). The trial court accepted appellant’s plea, placed him on deferred-
adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years, and assessed a $1,000 fine. The trial
court also ordered appellant to serve fifty days in jail as a condition of his community supervision.
In two points of error, appellant complains about the voluntariness of his plea and ineffective
assistance of counsel. We affirm.
The Honorable Joseph Morris, Retired Justice, was a member of the Panel at the time this case was submitted. Due to his retirement from this
t
Court on December 31. 2012, he did not participate in deciding the case. He was replaced on the panel by Justice David Evans. See TEX. R. APP.
P.41.1(a).
Al)jJellaflt’S (uil(v Plea
Appe I Irni anues in his Ii rsl point of error that he was denied due process when the trial court
accepted his guilty plea without fully admonishing him or ascertaining whether he was competent
to stand trial.
No plea of guilty “shall he accepted by the trial court unless it appears that the defendant is
mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.” TEx. CoDi (‘RIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 26. 1 3(b)
(West Supp. 201 2): see also Brad e. United States. 397 U.S. 742. 718 ( I 970) (to be constitutionally
valid, a guilty plea must he voluntary, knowing. and intelligent act. “done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences”); McDaniel i. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 709
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“The conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent
violates due process.”). That is because a defendant who enters a guilty plea not only is admitting
he committed the acts as charged in the indictment hut also is waiving certain eonstitutional rights.
including the privilege against self—incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront
his accusers. Bovkin r. Alaha,na, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); Anderso,, i’. State, 182 S.W .3d 914,917
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). To determine the voluntariness of appellant’s guilty plea, we examine the
entire record and consider all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it. Martinez v. State, 981
S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (per curiam); Ducker v. State, 45 S.W.3d 791, 796 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).
Admonitions
Appellant first argues that his due process rights were violated because he was not “fully
admonished” by the trial court. Due process requires, among other things, that a defendant who
pleads guilty be fully aware of certain consequences of his plea. Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 917—18.
This constitutional standard requires the court to admonish the defendant on those direct
consequences that are punitive in nature or specifically enunciated in article 26.13(a) of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. See Ed. at 918; Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130. 136 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004); see also Thx. CoDE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(aXl)-(5). Article 26.13(a) lists five
admonitions, which may be made by the court either orally or in writing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 26.1 3(a)( I )—(5), (d). For written admonitions, the court “must receive a statement signed
by the defendant and the defendanfs attorney that he understands the admonitions and is aware of
the consequences of his plea.” IS art. 26.13(d). A court’s admonition that substantially complies
with article 26.13(a) is sufficient IS art. 26.13(c).
The presence of article 26.13 admonitions in the record creates a prima facie showing that
substantial compliance occurred and that the plea was both knowing and voluntary. Maninez, 981
S.W.2d at 197; Grays v. Slate, 888 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, no pet.). The
defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by evidence grounded in the record that he pleaded
guilty without understanding the consequences of his plea and consequently suffered harm. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(c); Grays, 888 S.W.2d at 878.
The record here shows that before the hearing during which appellant entered his open plea
of guilty, appellant and his attorney signed two documents. The first document was a judicial
confession in which appellant expressly waived certain constitutional rights and affirmed the
allegations against him were true and correct. Appellant further stated he committed the charged
offense “exactly as alleged in the indictment in this cause.” The judicial confession was sworn to,
signed by the prosecutor and trial court, and admitted into evidence at the open plea hearing.
The second document was a plea agreement in which appellant acknowledged he was
waiving his right to a jury trial and entering a plea of guilty. That document contained a section
titled “COURTS ADMONONS TO DEFENDANT’ in which the trial court delivered the
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lilicable article 26. 13(a) admonitions. The section contained additional admonitions from the
court, inc1udin tue warnin that if appellant were to receive adjudicated community supervision and
violated its conditions, he could be arrested and subjected to a hearing to adjudicate his guilt; if guilt
were adjudicated. the full range of punishment would he open to the court.
The court’s written admonitions were ftllowed by a section titled “DEFENDANT’S
STATEMENTS AND WAIVERS” in which appellant stated he was the person accused in the
charging instrument and mentally competent. He signed the document, acknowledging he
understood the charge against him, the range of punishnient for the offense, the consequences of his
guilty plea, and the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. Appellant also acknowledged that his
attorney explained to him. and that he read and understood, the court’s admonitions and warnings
regarding his rights and plea. He stated the waivers were “knowingly. freely, and voluntarily made
with full understanding of the consequences.” Above his attorney’s signature, there was a statement
that his attorney “consulted with [appellant], whom jhe] helieve[dj to he competent, concerning the
plea in this case and have advised [himi of [his] rights.” The plea agreement also was signed by the
prosecutor and the trial court and filed with the district court clerk.
The trial court held the open plea hearing on the same day the above documents were signed.
At the beginning of the hearing, the court asked appellant if he had “gone over all the papers that [he]
signed with [his] attorney” and whether he understood “all the rights that [he has] in court.”
Appellant answered “Yes” to both questions. Appellant’s attorney then stated appellant was waiving
arraignment and a trial by jury and was entering “a plea of guilty to the indictment, as charged.” The
court asked appellant if this was his plea, and appellant again answered “Yes.”
After hearing argument on the open plea, the trial court found that appellant’s plea was
“freely and voluntarily made and that [he was] competent to make that plea.” The court added that
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“due to the work of Ihisi attorney.” it was going to place appellant “on a ten-year deferred
adjudicated probation.” The court also ordered appellant to pay a $1,000 fine and spend fifty days
in the Dallas County jail, to be served five days at a time each year for the next ten years, “as a
reminder.”
Appellant contends that although the trial court’s written admonitions “would normally
suffice,” the admonitions here were not sufficient because the plea agreement did not “provide either
what offense the document relates to nor the date when the alleged offense occurred.” He further
claims that because defense counsel did not call him to testify, the record does not show that he
understood the admonitions or that defense counsel had gone over them in a meaningful way.
Appellant points to nothing in the record to show that he was confused about what offense
he was pleading guilty to, that he did not understand the court’s admonitions, or that defense counsel
had not discussed the admonitions with him. To the contrary, the record shows appellant was aware
of the charge against him and that he understood his actions and the consequences of his plea.
Appellant signed the judicial confession and plea agreement on the same day. The judicial
confession provides the cause number for the case, states the date of the offense, and details the
charge against him using the indictment language. Appellant confessed in that document that he
committed the charged offense “exactly as alleged in the indictment.” The plea agreement contains
the same cause number; although it does not state the offense to which appellant was charged,
appellant expressly acknowledged that he was the “accused in the charging instrument” and
understood the “nature of the accusation made against” him. Appellant also agreed he read and
understood his rights and the consequences of his plea and that his attorney explained to him the
court’s admonitions and warnings. Appellant’s attorney signed a representation that he consulted
with appellant about the plea and appellant’s rights.
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When, as heir, a defendant attests that he understood the nature of his plea and thai it was
voluntary, he has a heavy burden on appeal to show that his plea was involuntary. Knian i Slate.
206 S.W.3d 657. 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A defendant’s sworn representation that his guilty
plea is voluntary ‘constitute[s] a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.”)
(quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74(1977)). The trial court’s written admonitions,
coupled with appellant’s assurances in the plea agreement and at the open plea hearing concerning
his understanding of the consequences of his plea. create a prima fade showing that appellant
entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. See Martinez, 981 S.W.2d at 197; Kirk v. State, 949
S.W.2d 769,771 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d). Nothing in this record suggests appellant
entered his guilty plea without understanding the charge against him or the consequences of his
actions. See, e.g., Logan v. State, 506 S.W.2d 593. 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (noting it was
“inconceivable that the appellant, who had the advice of counsel and to whom the entire indictment
had just been read immediately preceding the admonishment, could have been misled or prejudiced
in any way”). Nor does the record show appellant was harmed or misled as a result of any missing
information on a plea document. Consequently, appellant has not carried his heavy burden of
demonstrating his guilty plea was involuntary. See Knian, 206 S.W.3d at 664; Kirk 949 S.W.2d at
771.
Mental Competence
Appellant also complains the trial court denied him due process when it accepted his guilty
plea without inquiring about his competence. A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding or a rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him. TEx.
CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46B.003(a) (West 2006).
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Appellant did not argue in the trial court, nor does he appear to argue on appeal, that he was
mentally incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea. Rather, he complains of the trial court’s
failure to “ascertain that he was competent to stand trial.” But “unless an issue is made of an
accused’s present insanity or mental competency at the time of the pleal.J (lie court need not make
inquiry or hear evidence on such issue;’ and it is not error to accept the guilty plea. Knyava v. State,
538 S.W.2d 627,628 (rex. Crim. App. 1976); Ducker, 45 S.W.3d at 796; Manoy v. State, 7 S.W.3d
771,777 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, no pet.); ‘f Montmw v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420,425 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009) (trial court need not inquire about defendant’s mental competence unless evidence is
sufficient to create bona tide doubt in trial court’s mind about defendant’s legal competence). This
is particularly true when the court had an opportunity to observe the defendant in open court, hear
him speak, observe his demeanor, and engage him in colloquy as to the voluntariness of his plea.
Kuyava, 538 S.W.2d at 628. In addition, there is no requirement that a trial court verbally inquire
about a defendant’s competence after a defendant and his attorney sign written representations of
competence. See Gonzales v. State, 899 S.W.2d 819,821 (Tex. App.—Port Worth 1995, pet refd);
Rodriguez v. State, 850 S.W.2d 603,607 (Tex. App.—E1 Paso 1993, no pet.).
The written plea documents here contain affirmative statements by both appellant and his
attorney that appellant was mentally competent and understood the charge against him. At the plea
hearing, the trial court insured appellant had discussed the plea papers with his attorney and that he
understood his rights. The trial court also had an opportunity to observe appellant during the open
plea hearing; appellant’s answers to questions posed by the trial court were polite and responsive.
The trial court, while finding appellant’s plea of guilty was voluntarily made, also found appellant
to be “competent to make that plea.” The trial court was entitled to rely on the written
representations of competence made in the plea papers, and because there is nothing in the record
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suggest appellant did not have sufficient present ability to consult meaninrful lv with his attorney
or understand the proceeding against him, it was not error br the trial court in accept the guilty plea.
We conclude the trial court did not violate appellant’s right to due process when it accepted
his guilty plea. We overrule appellant’s first point of error.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant claims in his second point of error that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel because his attorney failed to establish that appellant agreed to or understood his plea. failed
to establish thai appellant was competent, and advised him to plead guilty to an offense which had
an “inherent problem of proof” On the latter argument. he points to a statement made in the police
i-eport that the complaining witness “never saw the knife blade.” Appellant contends counsel argued
this fact only as a reason for the trial court to assess a more lenient sentence instead of challenging
the proof of the offense.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, appellant must show (1) counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing prolessional norms; and (2) a
reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687—88 (1984); Exparte Lane, 303 S.W.3d 702, 707 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009); see also Riley i’. State, 378 S.W.3d 453, 456 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A
defendant’s failure to satisfy one prong negates the need to consider the other prong. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 697; Lope.: r’.Staie. 343 S.W.3d 137, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Regarding appellant’s contentions that his trial attorney was ineffective because his attorney
did not establish he understood his plea or was competent, we have concluded the record shows
appellant entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. This conclusion is supported by
appellant’s affirmative representations in the signed plea documents that he was competent and
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understood the charge against him, his rights, and the consequences of his plea. Appellant also
affirmed at the plea hearing that his attorney reviewed the plea documents with him and that he
understood his rights. Thus, we cannot conclude these allegations raise an issue that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68748.
Regarding appellant’s contention that his attorney advised him to plead guilty instead of
“challenging the proof,” the record is insufficient to support a conclusion that appellant received
ineffective assistance of counsel on this basis. See Freeman v. State, 125 S.W.3d 505,506-07 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003). An allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel will be sustained only if ft is
firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged
ineffectiveness. See Menefleld v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591,592—93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Lopez,
343 S.W.3d at 142. Without evidence of counsel’s considerations, we will presume sound trial
strategy, and we will not conclude counsel’s performance was deficient unless the conduct was so
outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it. Lopez. 343 S.W.3d at 142; Garcia
v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436,440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
The record is silent as to counsel’s strategy or reasoning related to the State’s proof of the
aggravated assault charge. Although appellant filed a motion for new trial, he did not raise the issue
of ineffective assistance of counseL Consequently, appellant’s trial attorney has not been given an
opportunity to explain his trial strategy. See Menefleld, 363 S.W.3d at 593 (“Trial counsel ‘should
ordinarily be afforded an opportunity to explain his actions before being denounced as ineffective.”)
(quoting GorxLcpeed i’. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). Nor has appellant
shown that this is one of those extraordinary situations in which the face of the record shows
counsel’s challenged conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in
it Garcia, 57 S.W.3d at 440. Appellant pleaded guilty to an aggravated offense and received
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deterred adjmlicat ion on an open plea. We theretore conclude appellant tailed to demonstrate under
the lirsi .Siruklu,,d prong that counsel s perkwmance was deficient LoIk’. 343 SW3d at I 44. We
overrule appellant s second point of error.
Having resolved appeHant’ s points of error against him, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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/ I
M\R\ \I(JkP1l’
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tix, R. App. P. 47
11 1430RU05
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(uaart uf ipraIi
FiftI! Oitrirt of cxai at Oa1Ia.i
JUDGMENT
CEDRIC HARRIS, Appellant Appeal from the Criminal District Court No.
5 of Dallas County. Texas. (Tr,Ct.No. F09—
No. 051 1M1430-CR V. 407454:).
Opinion delivered by Justice Murphy,
THE STATE OFT EXAS. Appellee Justices Francis and Evans par1icipatin.
l3ised on the Court’s opinion of this date. ihe judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered January 3 1, 201 3.
\IAIHarris, Cedric v. State
Combined Opinion