A FF1 RNI: Opinion ssued December 4. 201 2.
in The
Qttnirt 01 App rats
Fift1! Di5trirt tf Irxas at Ja1La
No. O5-12-00430-CV
KAUFMAN COUNTY, Appellant
V.
ClIRISTOPII lR LECGI’I’T, Appellee
On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court
Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 81109-422
OPINION
Before Justices Morris, Francis, and Murphy
Opinion By Justice Murphy
Kaufluan County appeals the trial Court’s interlocutory order denying its plea to the
jurisdiction in Christopher Lcggett’s suit for personal injuries. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Leggett sued the County after sustaining injuries when Sergeant Richard Gaddis, a Kaufman
County sheriff’s deputy. “rear-ended” Leggett’s motorcycle with his patrol car during a traffic stop.
The collision occurred the morning of October 24. 2OO. Gaddis was on his way to work, driving
an unmarked patrol car on Highway 175, At one point, Gaddis looked in his rear-view mirror and
saw two or three cars swerving to get out of the way of a motorcycle that was coming up from
behind. Leggett was the (Iriver of the motorcycle. According to Gaddis, Leggett was “driving crazy”
and ‘‘11 ing up” on ( addis. who was driving a speed consistent with the flow of traflic. (iaddis
t. -i im ikd I jti i di i 104 1 ij lol I Ixici th in 70 mi ls pu houi
As I eggett passed, Gaddis turned on his emergency lights to get Leggett’s attention; Gaddis
believed “[sjomebody needs to slow this guy down.” The emergency lights on Gaddis’s unmarked
police vehicle were located in the front headlights and flashed on and off when activated. Gaddis’s
vehicle also had a red and blue shining light located inside the vehicle just above the rear—view
mirror. [lix vehicle did not have a siren or other markings that would identify it as a police unit.
When he turned on his emergency lights, Gaddis did not believe Leggett saw them or knew Gaddis
was behind him because Leggett “was driving so fast.” Gaddis then sped up, going as fast as 107
miles per hour, to catch up with Leggett. Gaddis also called for assistance from another law-
enforcement agency.
Around the same time, Leggett looked back and saw that Gaddis was trying to pull him over.
Leggett noticed Gaddis was approaching him “at a htirly high rate of speed’ and “gaining on [him]
very fast.” Leggelt realized he needed to stop and signaled to Gaddis with his hand that he was
pulling over. Leggett slowed down in the right-hand lane and moved off the road onto the shoulder
at the same time, “[j]ust like your normal traffic stop.” As Leggett was coming to a stop and putting
his kick-stand down, Leggett heard “screaming tires” and saw Gaddis “barreling” toward him.
Leggett tried to mOVC oUt of the way, but he did not have enough time. Gaddis’s vehicle hit the rear
of Leggett’s motorcycle. Leggett was thrown off his motorcycle and landed face down in a ditch.
Gaddis’s vehicle left skid marks measuring ninety-eight feet.
Leggett tiled suit against the County, seeking damages for injuries he sustained in the
collision. He did not seek damage to his motorcycle because the County resolved that claim.
Leggett alleged Gaddis’s conduct of traveling at an excessive rate of speed before colliding with
I cegett’s motorcycle was “not only negliuent” but also “extremely daimerous. reckless and grossly
negligent.’ lie further ailcued ( taddiss conduct violated internal policies for the operation of a
patrol unit and was such that no objectively reasonable police olhccr could have believed such
conduct was lawful.
The County filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing the trial court did not have jurisdiction
of the case because the Texas lort Claims Act’s (TTCA) statutory exception for emergencies
applied, overriding any waiver of its governmental immunity from suit. In response, Leggett argued
the statutory exception did not apply because the evidence (I) showed Gaddis was engaged in a
routine traffic siop, not an emergency situation, and (2) raised a fact issue as to whether Gaddis’s
actions were reckless. In support. Leggett attached excerpts from his and Gaddis’s depositions as
well as a document containing portions of the County’s policies and procedures related to the
operation of police vehicles and pursuits. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, during which
Leggett and two other witnesses testified. Other documents, including photographs of the scene,
affidavits of a witness and the investigating othcer, and the complete transcript of Leggett’s and
Gaddis’s depositions, were admitted as evidence. Afier allowing the parties to submit post-hearing
letter briefs, the trial court signed an order denying the County’s plea without specifying the basis
for the denial, The County filed this interlocutory appeal. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 51.014(a)(8) (West 2008).
LEGAL STANDARDS
Immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subj ect-matter jurisdiction and is properly asserted
in a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t ofParks & Wildlik v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225—26
(Tex. 2004). Whether a court has subj ect-matterjurisdiction and whether a plaintiffhas alleged facts
that affirmatively demonstrate a trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction are questions of law. Id. at
—3—
22(: I’erc i’. Citi’ ,f 1)ullas. ISO S.W.3d 906, 909 (Tex. App. I )all.is 2005, no pet.). We therefore
review de novo a trial courts nil ing on a )unsdictional plea. Miranda, I 33 S.W.3d at 226; (‘liv of
t)allt,s v. uIuriu”c 344 S.W.3d 549. 553 (Tex. App. Dallas 2011, no pet.).
A governmental unit’s jurisdictional plea can be based on the pleadings or on evidence.
Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226; Bland Indep. Sch. 1)1st. V. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000).
When a plea to the urisdietion challenges the pleadings, we look to whether the plaintilihas alleged
facts that aflirmatively demonstrate the trial courts jurisdiction to hear the case. Miranda, 133
S.W.3d at 226 (citing Tex. Ass ‘a o/Bus. v. Tex. Air Contra! Ba’.. 852 S.W.2d 440,446 (‘Fex. 1993)).
We liberally construe the plaintifts pleadings in favor ol jurisdiction, and we look to the plaintiff’s
intent, accepting as true the facts alleged, Id. at 226, 228.
When a plea challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we must consider relevant
evidence submitted by the parties to resolve the jurisdictional issues. Id. at 227; Hughes, 344
S.W.3d at 553. In reviewing such a plea, we take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant,
indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the non—movant’s favor. Miranda,
1 33 S.W.3d at 22728. This standard mirrors our summary-judgment standard under Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure I 66a(c) and places the burden on the governmental unit, as movant, to meet the
standard of proof to support its contention the trial court lacks subject-matterjurisdiction. ld. at 228.
Once the governmental unit asserts and provides evidentiaty support for its plea, the plaintiff is then
required to show only that a disputed fact issue exists. lcL; City of Dallas i Heard, 252 S.W.3d 98,
102 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). If the evidence creates a fact question on the
jurisdictional issue, the trial court cannot grant the plea; rather the fact issue is for the fact finder to
resolve. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227—28. if the relevant evidence fails to raise a fact question or
is undisputed on the jurisdictional issues, the trial court rules on the plea as a matter of law. Id. at
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