Opinion iSSflC(l November 1. 2012.
In The
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No. 051 1-00901-CV
$8,300.00 IN U.S. CURRENCY, Appellant
V.
TIlE STTE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from (Lw 382nd Judicial District court
Rockw all County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 8-09-8
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O’Neill, FitzGerald, and Lang-Miers
Opinion By Justice O’Neill
In this civil forfeiture appeal, Aladin Martinez challenges the legal and fhctual sufficiency
of the evidence to support the trial court’s judgment. We affirm.
Factual Background
On July 8, 2009, Detective Bobby Burks pulled over a black Mercedes SUV for failing to
signal a lane change and following too closely to another vehicle. Martinez was driving the SUV
and Jose Guzman was the passenger.
After approaching the vehicle and initiating contact with Martinez, Detective Burks smelled
the distinct odor of burnt marijuana. Guzman told Detective Burks they had been in Arkansas
visiting thmily members hr two days. Martinez, however, told Detective i3urks a different story
during the stop. Martinez told him they went to Arkansas for a party and only stayed a couple of
hours. Martinez provided yet another story at trial. He testified he told i)eteetive [lurks he wanted
to take a birthday road trip. A man by the name of Daniel had loaned him the Mercedes SUV to test
drive for several days because he was interested in purchasing a classic car.’ Martinez claimed he
stopped to have the oil changed dunn the road trip, and a mechanic told him the car had mechanical
problems. Based on this information, he decided to drive back home.
As part of his investigation. Detective Bunks asked if the car contained any large amounts of
currency. Martinez said no, but later admitted during trial that he knew $.3OO in cash was hidden
in the car at the time of the stop. He claimed he lied because he was nervous.
Based on the smell of marijuana, [)etective Burks thought something illegal was going on
and decided to search the vehicle. He noticed the SUV was in disarray, and wooden screws holding
the glove compartment together. Based on his training and experience, he did not think it made
sense for a Mercedes to he in that condition.
I-Ic observed marijuana shakes, stems, and seeds throughout the vehicle, including underneath
the cargo area and the carpet. As he continued his search, he noticed the smell of raw marijuana
coming from the rear of the vehicle, which made him think marijuana was transported in the vehicle.
He did not, however, find any marijuana inside the vehicle during his search.
Detective Burks also testified regarding the condition of the dashboard. During his search,
he observed fresh fingerprints underneath the dashboard area of the SIJV. The plastic grommets that
normally hold the glove compartment were missing and replaced with wooden screws. He described
Records showed the car was registered to L)aniel Beceffa.
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It as a good place to hide narcotics and considered it a hidden compartment.
Underneath the compartment and the dashboard, i)etective i-3urks fbund an envelope, ru1)ber
banded, with money inside. Detective Burks clarified the money was not in the hidden compartment
hut pushed up in an area underneath the dashboard. Although he could see the envelope, he had to
bang the dash ibr it to fill. F-Ic testified that money “stuffed up in a dash is very unusual.” lhe
envelope contained Iburteen Si 0 bills, two hundred fiwty—three $20 bills, twenty—two $5() bills, and
twenty-two $100 bills totahng $8,300.00. Martinez claimed to not know anything about it.
Detective Burks also testified to the condition of the sending unit, which is “the top of the
gas tank where all your stuff is plugged in.” 1—Ic explained the area was sealed off with silicone,
which was “odd because silicone is not used in vehicles. F-Ic testified that in his opinion, “it was
used in the past or it was used that day to transport narcotics and/or money.”
Detective Burks testified that Martinez admitted to smoking ajoint inside the car. However,
when Martinez testified and! the State asked if he smoked inside the car, Martinez pleaded the Fifth
Amendment.
Detective Burks further explained that based on his training, education, and! years of
experience with the Rockwall County Special Crimes Unit, he believed the $8,300 was illegal
proceeds from the sale of narcotics. 1—Ic substantiated his opinion because (1) Martinez and Guzman
gave inconsistent stories, (2) the vehicle was in disarray, (3) he smelled raw and burnt marijuana,
and (4) the packaging and location of the money was suspicious. All of these factors led him to
believe that, at some point, the vehicle carried a significant amount of marijuana. He also explained
the amount of money in the vehicle would be from the sale or purchase of a felony amount of
inarij uana, not a misdeincanor amount.
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The day after 1)etective I3urks recovered the money Ironi the SUV. the money was
transported to ()liicer Josh Ellis’s home tor a K—9 snit’f test. The mone was placed in a cabinet in
()flicer Ellis’s garage. He let his K-9 partner loose in the garage. and the dog alerted to the odor of
narcotics on the money. The dog specifically alerted by scratching on the cabinet where the money
was hidden, Officer Ellis explained his dog was certified to detect marijuana, metharnphetamine,
cocaine, and heroine but could not indicate the specific type of drug on the money.
After a bench trial, the court granted a tinal judgment of frrfeiture in iiivor ol the State in the
amount of $S3OO.OO. It further entered findinus of fact and conclusions of law in which it
concluded:
6. The alert by the drug dog on the currency, the evidence of
marijuana in the vehicle, the amount and location of the money found
in the vehicle, the alterations to the vehicle, the nervousness and
inconsistencies of stories of both occupants of the vehicle, and the
expert testimony of both officers supports the conclusion that more
likely than not the $8,300.00 found in the vehicle had recently been
in close proximity to a felony amount of mari)uana and was
substantially connected to the commission of’ a felony drug offense
and is thereFore contraband.
7. The State of Texas met its burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the $8,30000 in United States Currency was
property used or intended to be used in the commission of a felony,
or was the proceeds derived from a felony, specifically used in the
commission of a felony, or was the proceeds derived from a felony,
specifically the possession of a felony amount of marijuanaa
violation of chapter 481 of the Texas Controlled Substance Act—and,
thus, subject to ForFeiture.
This appeal followed.
Requirements for Forfeiture
In forfeiture proceedings, the burden is on the State to show probable cause for seizing a
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person’s property. 556. 70() in US. Currency v. State, 73() S.W.2d 659, 6(, I (Tex. 1987). Probable
cause in the context of torfeiture statutes is a reasonable belief’ that a substantial connection exists
between the property to he firfeited and the criminal activity defined by the statute. Id. It is that
link, or nexus, between the property to be torleited and the statutorily detmed criminal activity that
establishes probable cause, without which the State lacks authority to seize a person’s property. hi.
Proof may he made by circumstantial evidence, hut the proof must raise more than a mere
surmise or suspicion regarding the source of the money. $43, 774.00 in US. Currency v. State, 266
S.W.3d 178, 183 (Tex, App.—Texarkana 2008. pet. denied). However, the State is not required to
exclude every possible means by which Martinez might have acquired the money. $7,058.84 in US.
Ciu’reny v. State, 30 S.W.3d 580, 586 (Tex. App.-— Texarkana 2000. no pet.). The court may draw
any and all reasonable infi.rences from the circumstances shown by the evidence. Id.
in the statutory scheme, property, including currency, is subject to seizure and fortèiture if’
it is found to he contraband. TEX. (‘ODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.02(a) (West Supp. 2011).
Contraband is property used or intended to be used in the commission of certain felonies or proceeds
derived from those fi.Ionies. TEx. CoD1:CIuM. PRoC. ANN. art. 59.0l(2)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 2011).
In this case, contraband is money derived from or intended for use in manufacturing, delivering,
selling, or possessing a controlled substance. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 5902(2)(B)(i)
(West Supp. 2011); see $43,774.00 in U.S. Currency v. State, 266 S.W.3d at 182. Delivery or
possession of marijuana greater than four ounces is a felony for which the forfeiture statute applies.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 59.02(2)(A)(1), (B)(l ): TEx. HI:ALTH & SAFETY C0DEANN.
§ 481.120-.121 (West 2010).
Standard of Review
Under the civil preponderance of evidence standards, evidence is legally insufficient when
there is a complete absence ol evidence ol a vital lad, the court is barred from giving weight to the
only evidence ollered 10 prove a vital tact, the evidence offered is Ho more than a scintilla, or the
evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. City of Keller v, Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802. 810 (Tex. 2005). Ultimately, the question is whether the evidence at trial would enable
reasonable and Ihirminded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. at 827. In making this
determination, we credit favorable evidence ifa reasonable fact—finder could and disregard contrary
evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could not. Id. So long as the evidence falls within the zone
of reasonable disagreement. we may not substitute our judgment far that of the fact-finder. Id. at
822.
When considering a factual sufficiency challenge, we must consider and weieh all of the
evidence, not just that evidence that supports the verdict $43, 774.00 in US. Currency, 266 S.W.3d
at 183. After considering and weighing all of the evidence, we set aside a verdict only if the
evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance ofthe evidence
that it is clearly wrong and unjust. hi.
The trial court’s findings of fact have the same force and dignity as a jury’s verdict on jury
questions and are reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency by the same standards that are applied
in reviewing the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury’s answer to a jury
question. Id.
When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in a forfeiture case, courts have considered
the following factors: (1) the proximity of the money to the drugs and to evidence of drug trafficking,
(2) evidence that the money was previously in contact with drugs, such as through a canine alert, (3)
suspicious activity consistent with drug trafficking, (4) the amount of money at issue, and (5) the
presence of expert testimony indicating that there was probable cause to seize the property subject
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to forfeiture, iii (hat a substantial connection exists between the property to be forh.ited and the
criminal activIty. Anirim i .Staw. 86 S. W.2d 809, 8 14 (Tex. App. Austin 1 993, no writ). With
these factors in mind, we analyze the evidence as presented in this record.
Legal Sufficiency of the Evidence
Martinez argues that while the smell of marijuana. inconsistent stories by the passenger and
driver, and his admission of smoking marijuana may have given Detective Burks probable cause to
search the SUV, such evidence did not rise to the level of a reasonable belief that a substantial
connection or nexus existed between the money seized and the commission of a Felony for which
the lbrfeiture statute would apply. We disagree.
Although Detective Burks did not find any marijuana inside the SUV, he hrnnd shakes,
stems, and seeds throughout the car, including underneath the cargo area and the carpet. He also
detected the odor of both burnt and raw marijuana inside the vehicle. Martinez admitted to smoking
a joint while dnving Moreover, Detective Burks found the money he seized hidden inside the SUV,
which was in close proximity to the marijuana shakes, seeds, and stems. He testified that in his
opinion the vehicle had been used to transport narcotics.
The record also shows the money was previously in contact with drugs. The Texas Supreme
Court has authorized the consideration of a drug detection dog’s alert in determining if money found
in a search has a substantial connection to criminal activity. State v. $11,014.00, 820 S. W.2d 783,
785 (Tex. 1991). While a positive alert by a drug detection dog, standing alone, does not constitute
evidence that the money was use(l in connection with a drug deal, courts have held the alert
constitutes at least some evidence it was derived from the sale and/or distribution of drugs.
$7,058.84 in U.S. Currency, 30 S.W.3d at 588; $11,014.00, 820 S.W.2d at 785.
liere, the money was placed inside a cabinet in Officer Ellis’s garage. When the dog
searched the garage, he scratched on the cahinet, which alerted to the odor ot a narcotic. Ofliccr
EHis testified the dog is trained once a week or every other week with “clean money,” which is
money that has never been in circulation, He said his dog had never had any difficulty differentiating
clean money from money that had been in contact with narcotics. Thus, this evidence is more than
a scintilla to connect the presence of narcotics and the money seized.
The record also supports suspicious activity consistent with drug trafficking. In $43, 774.00
U.S. Currency v, State, the court concluded a secret compartment that opened by a remote switch
constituted a suspicious condition consistent with drug trafficking. 266 S.W.3d at 186. While there
could be other reasons to install a secret compartment. “the ver existence ofa hidden compartment
in a vehicle indicates the user of the vehicle may attempt to hide or secrete items in it.” Id.
Detective Burks testi lied that the dashboard area ot’ the SU V had been altered. lie saw fresh
fingerprints underneath it and observed that wooden screws held it in place rather than the usual
plastic grommets. He opined it was a good place to hide narcotics. He fbund the rubber-banded
envelope full of’ money stuffed up underneath the dash and behind a door area. He had to bang the
dash for the money to fall out. He explained money “stuffed up in a dash [was] unusual.” There
was also evidence that the sending unit part of the gas tank was sealed off with silicone. He testified
that in his opinion, “it was used in the past or it was used that day to transport narcotics and/or
money.” Thus, the alterations made to the SUV constitute suspicious activity consistent with drug
trafficking.
While the amount of money is not dispositive, it is a factor to consider. See $7, 058.84 in US.
Currency, 30 S.W.3d at 589 (noting probable cause for a felony does not arise solely from one piece
of evidence, but rather from the total pattern of circumstantial evidence). While perhaps not
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substantial, the recovery of S30() is not an insignificant amount of money. Further, [)etcetive
l3urks testified that for a ““)9 vehicle, it’s probably .. worth more than that vehicle.,” which calls
into question Martinez’s story that he had the cash on hand to purchase the SUV. Likewise,
Detective l3urks stated it was significant that he found two hundred fortythree $20 bills in the
envelope because “when people are buying narcotics, they generally use $20 hills.”
Finally. Officer Burks provided his expert opinion that 58.300 buys more than fiur ounces
of marijuana and it sells for more than four ounces. He testified the money was contraband because
of “the inconsistent stories, the disarray in the vehicle, the smell of narcotics, the smell of marijuana,
the smell of’ raw marijuana, and the way it was packaged and hidden.”
After weighing the evidence, we conclude some evidence supports the trial court’s
conclusion the money was “used or intended to be used in the conunission of a felony, or was the
proceeds derived from a felony, specifically used in the commission of a felony, or was the proceeds
derived from a felony, specifically the possession of a felony amount of marijuana,” See, e.g.,
$43, 774.00 in U.S. Curreiui’, 266 S.W.3cl at 187 (concluding the evidence of a compartment that
appears to be installed for the purpose of secreting items, together with a positive dog alert on that
compartment supports a finding that money was derived from, or intended for use in, distribution
or possession of a controlled substance). Thus, considering the evidence in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s findings and conclusions and indulging in every reasonable inference that supports
them, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient. Martinez’s legal sufficiency challenge is
overruled.
Factual Sufficiency of the Evidence
Based on the evidence, we likewise conclude the State’s case was not so weak that the trial
court’s findings and conclusions were clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. Martinez argues it was
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as reasonably probable thai he hid the mone so it would not get stolen. The equal intirencc rule
applies in weak circumstantial evidence cases where the facttinder would have to guess whether a
vital fact exists. Lewis i. Anderv(m, 173 SW.3d 556, 562 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005. pet. denied).
As detailed above, the circumstantial evidence in this case is not weak.
Although Martinez testified he had the money in his possession because he was looking to
buy a classic car, he hid it because he did not want anyone to find it, and he lied because the police
made him nervous, this conflicting evidence was considered and rejected by the trial court. We may
not reassess his credibility or substitute our judgment for that oithe fact—finder, even if the evidence
could support a different result. See Maritime Overs’ea.v Corp. v, Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex.
199$). The trial court judged the credibility of the witnesses, determined the weight to he given the
testimony, and resolved conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony. Accordingly, Martinez’s
factual sufficiency challenge is overruled.
Conclusion
Having overruled Martinez’s challenges to the legal and Factual sufficiency of the evidence,
we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
fri4AEL J. O’NE,TtL
7
JUSTICE
1 1090 IF.U05
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JUDGMENT
$S,300.OO iN U.S. CURRENCY, Appellant Appeal from the 382nd Judicial District
Court of Rockwall County, Texas,
No. O5 I I —009() I CV V. (Tr.Ct. No. —O9--8).
Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neill,
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices FitzGerald and Lang-Miers,
participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
A1”F’l RM EI) It is ORDERED that appellee The State of Texas recover its costs of this appeal
from Aladin Martinez.
.Judgment entered November 1. 2() 12.
v1l( ‘I I\! I J. ( )‘Nl’ILI
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