A Fit R1 Opinion issnel October 31, 201 2.
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No. 05-11—00085—CR
CASEY DERFK FIELI)S, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from 11w County Court At Law No. 2
Cohn County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 0028388309
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, Richter, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Richter
Appellant plead guilty to and was convicted of driving while intoxicated and
sentenced to nine months community supervision and a $200.00 fine. In a single issue on
appeal, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment. The background of the case and the procedural posture are well
known to the parties, and therefore we limit our recitation of the facts. We issue this
memorandum opinion pursuant to TEx. R. App. P. 47.4 because the law to be applied is well
settled.
A Wylie police officer stopped appellant after he drove through an intersection and
into lanes of oncoming traffic beibre making an improper tell turn. Appellant denied
drinking alcohol, but he had slurred speech and claimed to be unfamiliar with the area even
though his driver’s license listed a Wylie address. After the officer administered field
sobriety tests, lie arrested appellant and transported him to the Wylie pollee station. At the
police station, appellant agreed to give a sample of his breath. During the fifteen minute
period before the test, appellant was placed in the Intoxilyzer room, and received Miranda
warnings. Appellant’s breath alcohol concentration results were 0.119 and 0.120.
Appellant moved to suppress the “statement/video evidence that was collected
incident to arrest.” The court conducted a hearing on appellant’s motion, during which time
two videos were admitted into evidence without objection. There was no testimony at the
hearing.’ At the conclusion of the bearing, the trial court denied the motion. No findings of
fact and conclusions of law were requested or made.
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion
to suppress. We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard. St George v. State, 237 S.W.3d 720,725 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
do not engage in our own factual review. Id. The trial judge is the sole trier offact and judge
of credibility ofthe witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Id.; Guzman v.
State, 955 S.W.2d 85,89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We review issues of law de novo. See
Despite appellant’s characterization, we note for the record that the prosecutor and counsel for the defense
did
not “testify” at the hearing, but mther made argumant to the court
—2—
4madnr r. Stow, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (fex. (‘rim. App. 2007;.
With no citation to the record or authority or application of the law to the Ihets.
appellant’s argument consists of the statement that “the evidence that was subject to the
Motion for Suppression clearly shows that the appellant was subjected to seventy-four (74)
minutes of questioning prior to being read his Miranda rights.” Affording appellant’s
argument liberal construction in terms of compliance with the applicable rules of appellate
procedure, we understand appellant to complain that the length of the time between the
traffic stop and the time the Miranda warnings were administered was “too long.” To the
extent appellant intended to argue otherwise, his arguments are waived. See Tnx. R. APP. P.
38.1.
In addressing appellant’s contention, we note at the outset that appellant’s
characterization ofthe record is misleading and inaccurate. Appellant seems to suggest that
he was questioned during the traffic stop for seventy-four minutes. The record reflects
however, that the length of time between the traflic stop and the Miranda warnings is
actually fifty minutes, and includes the traffic stop, roadside questioning, intoxication
investigation, arrest, transport to the police station, and time in the Intoxilyzer room. But
regardless of the length of the detention, “there is no constitutional stopwatch on traffic
stops.” United States v. Birgharn, 382 F.3d 500,511 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).There is no
bright-line nile for the number ofminutes a detention can last. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33. 39(1996).
Although the length ofa detention may render a traflic stop unreasonable, there is no
-3-
rigd. hrnhiiine iime lijuitatioji. (,,l!c(/Suw, i’. w
7 , 47() I J.S. 675. 7o) (I 95). lnsicad,
hu,
common sense and ordinary human experience must govern over rigid criteria. hi. at 685.
The reasonableness of the duration ola detention depends on whether the police diligently
pursued a means nm vestigation that was likely to eon 11cm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defindant. Id. at 686. In
determining the reasonableness of the duration of a detention, the trial and appellate courts
ma consider legitimate law en loreement purposes served by an’’ delay in the oHieers
investigation. 1(1. at 685.
Here, appellant does not complain that he was detained beyond the time necessary to
complete the investigation, or that the police were not diligent. Therefore, we conclude the
trial court did not err in denying appellants motion to suppress. Appellant’s issue is
overruled. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed,
NA,VI’IN RICLITE .
JUT1CE
Do Not Publish
Trx. R. P. 47
11 0085F.U05
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JUDGMENT
CASEY DEREK FIElDS. Appellant Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
of Collin County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 002
No. 051 100085CR V. 8388309).
Opinion delivered by Justice Richter,
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Bridges and Lang participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered October 31, 2012.
MAWI’IN RICHT
J UATIC E