COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-09-00293-CR
WILLIAM YORK APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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A jury convicted Appellant William York of theft of property under $1,500
after having been previously convicted of theft two or more times. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 31.03(e)(4)(D) (Vernon 2003). The jury assessed his
punishment at one year and 364 days’ confinement, and the trial court sentenced
him accordingly.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
York’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet
the requirements of Anders v. California2 by presenting a professional evaluation
of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. This
court afforded York the opportunity to file a brief on his own behalf, and he has
filed one. The State has also filed a brief.
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);
Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only
then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed the record, counsel’s brief, York’s pro se brief,
and the State’s brief. We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous
and without merit; we find nothing in the record that arguably might support an
appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: WALKER, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and GABRIEL, J.
2
386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).
2
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: January 6, 2011
3