COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-10-00030-CR
SAMUEL DAVID FARHAT APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 2 OF DENTON COUNTY
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OPINION
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Samuel David Farhat appeals his conviction for the Class B
misdemeanor offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI). In a single point, Farhat
argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress blood
evidence seized with a warrant. Farhat argues that the affidavit underlying the
search warrant is insufficient because it did not provide the magistrate with a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed that he was
intoxicated. We will reverse and remand.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 11, 2008, at approximately 12:50 a.m., Corporal Patrick Finley
of the Highland Village Police Department was traveling eastbound on Justin
Road in Denton County, Texas, when he observed Farhat‘s vehicle traveling in
the opposite direction at ten miles per hour below the posted speed limit of forty
miles per hour. Corporal Finley made a u-turn, followed Farhat‘s vehicle for
approximately one-half mile, and observed the vehicle weave from side to side
and signal a right-hand turn before turning left into a KFC restaurant‘s parking lot.
The officer initiated a stop in the KFC parking lot.
When Corporal Finley approached the driver‘s window, he noticed two pill
bottles in the center console. Farhat refused to perform any sobriety tests, so
Corporal Finley placed him under arrest. Corporal Finley then prepared a sworn
affidavit for a blood-draw search warrant, and the magistrate subsequently
signed a search warrant based on the affidavit.
The affidavit in support of the blood warrant states, in total,
On 01-11-2008 at approximately 0050 hours, I, Cpl. Finley #516 was
driving eastbound in the 1900 block of Justin road and visually
observed a vehicle turning from Sellmeyer onto Justin road. I turned
around at the light and started westbound when I could see a vehicle
driving very slow approximately 30 miles an hour in a 40 mile per
hour zone. I pulled my patrol vehicle behind the vehicle a silver
BMW with dealer plates. The vehicle was weaving from sided [sic]
to side and continued for about a half a mile in the left lane. As the
vehicle approached the KFC parking lot the vehicle turned on the
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right turn signal and crossed over the left lane into the parking lot. I
activated my overhead lights and conducted a traffic stop in the
parking lot at 2180 Justin road KFC. I noticed two pill bottles in the
center console and asked where the driver later identified as Farhat,
Samuel David, A/M DOB 05-04-1966 the defendant [sic]. I asked
the defendant to step out of the vehicle to check to see if he was ok
to drive. The defendant refused to do any road side test and was
placed in double locked properly spaced handcuffs.
Farhat was charged by information with DWI. He filed a pretrial motion to
suppress the blood evidence, alleging that the affidavit supporting the search
warrant was legally insufficient. After a hearing, the trial court denied Farhat‘s
motion. Farhat pleaded no contest. The trial court sentenced him to 160 days‘
confinement, probated for eighteen months, and a fine of $600.
Farhat requested that the trial court make findings of fact and conclusions
of law concerning its suppression ruling; the trial court entered the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
At about 12:50AM on January 11, 2009, Corporal Patrick Finley of
the City of Highland Village Police Department was [traveling]
westbound in the 1900 block of Justin Road in Denton County,
Texas when he observed a vehicle traveling at 30 MPH in a 40 MPH
zone. He further observed that the vehicle weaving from side to side
and travelled in the left lane of traffic (a reasonable interpretation
being that he was driving in the wrong lane, to wit: the oncoming
lane) for approximately one-half a mile. The Officer stopped the
vehicle, identified as a BMW with dealer plates, in a parking lot at
2180 Justin Road. Upon contacting the driver, the Officer observed
two pill bottles in the console, and asked the driver, identified as
Samuel David Farhat to step out of the vehicle. The driver refused
to participate in roadside tests to determine intoxication. The Officer,
suspecting the driver may be intoxicated, based on the erratic driving
behavior, the pills in the console, and the Officer‘s opportunity to
personally observe the driver, subsequently placed the driver under
arrest. Corporal Finley further sought and obtained a search warrant
for the driver‘s blood from a qualified magistrate.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Viewing the issuing magistrate‘s determination in a reasonable,
commonsense, and realistic manner, the four corners of the affidavit
provided sufficient probable cause to issue a warrant for seizure of
the defendant‘s blood.
III. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole point, Farhat argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress because Corporal Finley‘s affidavit did not provide a
substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude that probable cause existed to
support the issuance of the blood-draw search warrant.
A. Standard of Review and Law on Search Warrant Affidavits
The police may obtain a defendant‘s blood for a DWI investigation through
a search warrant. Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(j) (Vernon Supp. 2010); State v.
Johnston, 305 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. stricken). A
search warrant cannot issue unless it is based on probable cause as determined
from the four corners of an affidavit. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Tex. Const. art. I, §
9; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(b) (―A sworn affidavit . . . establishing
probable cause shall be filed in every instance in which a search warrant is
requested.‖); Nichols v. State, 877 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1994, pet. ref‘d).
Under the Fourth Amendment and the Texas constitution, an affidavit
supporting a search warrant is sufficient if, from the totality of the circumstances
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reflected in the affidavit, the magistrate was provided with a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed. Swearingen v. State, 143 S.W.3d 808,
810–11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Nichols, 877 S.W.2d at 497. Article 18.01(c)
requires an affidavit to set forth facts establishing that (1) a specific offense has
been committed, (2) the item to be seized constitutes evidence of the offense or
evidence that a particular person committed the offense, and (3) the item is
located at or on the person, place, or thing to be searched. Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(c); see Tolentino v. State, 638 S.W.2d 499, 501 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1982). Probable cause for a search warrant exists if, under the
totality of the circumstances presented to the magistrate in an affidavit, there is at
least a ―‗fair probability‘‖ or ―‗substantial chance‘‖ that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found at the specified location. Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697,
702 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 257
n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 2342 n.13 (1983)). The affidavit must contain
―sufficient information‖ to allow the issuing magistrate to determine probable
cause because the magistrate‘s action ―cannot be a mere ratification of the bare
conclusions of others.‖ Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S. Ct. at 2333. In order to
ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate‘s duty does not occur, courts
are to ―conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are
issued.‖ Id.
When reviewing a magistrate‘s decision to issue a warrant, we apply a
deferential standard in keeping with the constitutional preference for a warrant.
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Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Swearingen, 143
S.W.3d at 810–11; Emenhiser v. State, 196 S.W.3d 915, 924–25 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2006, pet. ref‘d). No magical formula exists for determining whether
an affidavit provides a substantial basis for a magistrate‘s probable cause
determination. Tolentino, 638 S.W.2d at 501. Instead, when a court reviews an
issuing magistrate‘s determination, the court should interpret the affidavit in a
commonsense and realistic manner, recognizing that the magistrate may draw
reasonable inferences. See Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61 (―When in doubt, we
defer to all reasonable inferences that the magistrate could have made.‖); see
also Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Nichols, 877
S.W.2d at 498. Nevertheless, a magistrate should not read into an affidavit
material information that does not otherwise appear on its face. Cassias v. State,
719 S.W.2d 585, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Jordan, 315 S.W.3d 660,
664 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. granted). A magistrate should not have to
resort so much to inferences and ―common sense‖ conclusions that skirt the
boundaries of what constitutes a substantial basis; when too many inferences
must be drawn, the result is a tenuous rather than a substantial basis for the
issuance of a warrant. Davis, 202 S.W.3d at 157.
B. Affidavit Did Not Provide
Substantial Basis for Concluding that Probable Cause Existed
The four corners of Corporal Finley‘s affidavit demonstrate that:
(1) Farhat was driving thirty miles per hour in a forty-mile-per-hour zone at
approximately 12:50 a.m.;
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(2) he was weaving from side to side;
(3) he continued in the left lane for about one-half mile;
(4) he turned on his right-turn signal but turned left into a KFC restaurant‘s
parking lot;
(5) the officer, upon stopping Farhat, saw two pill bottles in the center
console of Farhat‘s vehicle;
(6) Farhat refused field sobriety tests; and
(7) Corporal Finley believed that Farhat had committed DWI.
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the affidavit does not provide
the magistrate with a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed.
See Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 810–11; Tolentino, 638 S.W.2d at 501. In other
words, we hold that the meager facts contained within the four corners of the
affidavit did not provide the magistrate with a substantial basis to conclude that
there was a fair probability or substantial chance that Farhat had committed the
offense of DWI or that evidence of intoxication would be found in Farhat‘s blood.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(c)(1); Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 702
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 257 n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 2342 n.13).
The trial court‘s findings of fact state that Corporal Finley suspected Farhat
of DWI ―based on the erratic driving behavior, the pills in the console, and the
Officer’s opportunity to personally observe the driver.‖ [Emphasis added.] But
the affidavit contains no mention of what those personal observations were. Cf.,
e.g., Cotton v. State, 686 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (evidence of
intoxication may include the odor of alcohol on one‘s breath or body, bloodshot
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eyes, slurred speech, unsteady balance, and a staggered gait); Campos v. State,
623 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (smell of beer on defendant and
defendant‘s ―thick-tongued‖ speech and unsteadiness on his feet); Stratton v.
State, No. 09-09-00220-CR, 2010 WL 2696158, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
July 7, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant had
strong odor of alcohol on his breath, had red, glassy eyes, was heavy footed, and
was thick-tongued); State v. Dugas, 296 S.W.3d 112, 117 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref‘d) (defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech,
was unsteady on his feet, admitted to consuming alcohol, failed multiple field
sobriety tests, and became dazed and confused); Martin v. State, No. 02-08-
00128-CR, 2009 WL 2414294, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth August 6, 2009, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (defendant was involved in
automobile crash, fled the scene, walked and talked in a manner that led officers
to believe he was very intoxicated, and was combative toward officers). ―It is
one thing to draw reasonable inferences from information clearly set forth within
the four corners of the affidavit . . . [but] it is quite another matter to read material
information into an affidavit that does not otherwise appear on its face.‖ Cassias,
719 S.W.2d at 590 (citation omitted); Jordan, 315 S.W.3d at 664. Because the
affidavit is totally devoid of any of the officer‘s specific personal observations of
Farhat, the affidavit contains no facts within its four corners from which the
magistrate could have reasonably inferred from Farhat‘s demeanor, behavior, or
appearance that there was fair probability or substantial chance that Farhat had
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committed the offense of DWI or that evidence of intoxication would be found in
Farhat‘s blood. See Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d at 61; cf. Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 702
(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 257 n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 2342 n.13). The
magistrate‘s probable cause determination cannot be a mere ratification of
Corporal Finley‘s conclusions. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S. Ct. at 2333.
And contrary to the trial court‘s finding that the officer saw ―pills in the
console‖ of Farhat‘s vehicle, the affidavit states only that the officer saw two pill
bottles in the center console. The affidavit does not state that the bottles actually
contained pills, and even if a reasonable inference could be drawn that the
bottles did contain pills, the affidavit was silent as to the type of pill bottles,
whether they were prescription or over-the-counter medicine bottles, whether
Farhat admitted to consuming pills from the bottles, or whether Farhat‘s
demeanor or appearance suggested that he had consumed them. Cf., e.g.,
Bailey v. State, No. 10-06-00297-CR, 2008 WL 2687094, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Waco July 9, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding
probable cause established when defendant wrecked her car into a ditch, had
several prescription pill bottles in the car, admitted to taking three pills, and failed
three sobriety tests); Dennis v. State, No. 08-01-00207-CR, 2002 WL 1301577,
at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso June 13, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication)
(holding that sufficient evidence of intoxication existed when appellant‘s speech
was slurred, balance was unsteady, and reactions were slow, and when fifteen to
twenty prescription pill bottles were found in his car). The naked assertion of
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―two pill bottles,‖ without other facts and circumstances pointing to intoxication,
cannot support an inference that the bottles contained intoxicating pills or that
Farhat had consumed them, causing intoxication. See Jordan, 315 S.W.3d at
664 (holding that even though affidavit supported conclusion that defendant had
been driving while intoxicated on some date, affidavit‘s missing date left no fact
from which magistrate could infer date).
Farhat‘s driving behavior—driving ten miles per hour below the forty miles-
per-hour speed limit, weaving from side to side, and turning on his right-turn
signal before turning the opposite direction into the parking lot—and his refusal to
perform field sobriety tests are part of the totality of the circumstances to
consider in determining whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding probable cause existed. See, e.g., Maxwell v. State, 253 S.W.3d
309, 314 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref‘d) (considering defendant‘s
refusal to perform field sobriety tests, weaving within lane, failing to use turn
signal, and speeding as part of totality of circumstances for probable cause to
arrest); State v. Garrett, 22 S.W.3d 650, 654–55 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no
pet.) (considering defendant‘s unlawful and erratic driving behavior and refusal to
perform field sobriety tests, along with other facts, in determining that officers had
probable cause to arrest). We cannot agree with the trial court‘s finding that a
reasonable interpretation of Corporal Finley‘s statement in his affidavit that
Farhat ―continued for about a half a mile in the left lane‖ was that Farhat ―was
driving in the wrong lane, to wit: the oncoming traffic.‖ Why would an officer
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follow a vehicle that is driving into oncoming traffic for half a mile without
immediately turning on his patrol vehicle‘s overhead lights and executing a stop?
The affidavit clearly demonstrates that Corporal Finley did not activate his
overhead lights during that one-half mile; he waited until after Farhat turned into
the KFC parking lot to initiate a stop. Thus, the magistrate could not have
reasonably inferred from or read into the affidavit that ―continu[ing] for about a
half a mile in the left lane‖ meant ―driving in the wrong lane, to wit: the oncoming
traffic.‖ See Davis, 202 S.W.3d at 157; Cassias, 719 S.W.2d at 590.
The remaining facts contained in the affidavit show that Farhat was driving
ten miles below the speed limit shortly before 1:00 a.m., that he ―was weaving
from sided [sic] to side,‖ that he turned on his right-turn signal before turning the
opposite direction into the parking lot, and that he refused field sobriety tests.
We do not know from the affidavit the extent of Farhat‘s weaving or whether he
was weaving outside of his lane or into oncoming traffic nor is it reasonable to
infer such facts. Cf., e.g., Hernandez v. State, 983 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1998, pet. ref‘d) (holding that defendant‘s slow swerve into another
same-direction lane did not give rise to lower standard of reasonable suspicion to
stop for suspicion of DWI); State v. Tarvin, 972 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1998, pet. ref‘d) (―Although mere weaving in one‘s own lane of traffic can
justify an investigatory stop when that weaving is erratic, unsafe, or tends to
indicate intoxication or other criminal activity, there is nothing in the record to
show that Hill believed any of the above to be the case.‖). This case is about
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probable cause for a blood draw, not whether Corporal Finley had reasonable
suspicion to stop Farhat, and we cannot see how the facts contained within the
affidavit, and reasonable inferences therefrom, establish that there was a fair
probability or substantial chance that evidence of intoxication would be found in
Farhat‘s blood. Cf. Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 702 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238,
257 n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 2332, 2342 n.13). Too many inferences must be drawn
and too many facts must be read into the affidavit in this case, which result in at
most ―a tenuous rather than a substantial basis‖ for the issuance of a warrant.
Davis, 202 S.W.3d at 157; see Cassias, 719 S.W.2d at 590.
The State relies heavily on Rodriguez to argue that the combined logical
force of the facts actually contained in Corporal Finley‘s affidavit substantiates
the probable cause determination of the magistrate. See 232 S.W.3d at 64
(holding that the only issue was whether the facts actually contained in the
affidavit were sufficient to establish a fair probability that evidence of a crime
would be found). However, Rodriguez turned on two simple and reasonable
inferences that did not distort common sense or require reading additional facts
into the affidavit. See id. (explaining that magistrate could infer (1) that package
of cocaine found in backseat of car belonging to appellant‘s uncle was the same
package that police saw appellant‘s uncle take from garage and throw in the
backseat and (2) that, based on this fact, more drugs were located in that
garage). In the instant case, the only way to make inferences that would support
a finding that a substantial basis existed to support a probable cause
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determination is to read additional facts into the affidavit and to then draw
inferences from those additional facts. We recognize that affidavits are often
drafted by nonlawyers, in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation, but that
does not excuse the affiant from the requirement that the facts set forth in the
four corners of the affidavit must show that there is probable cause to issue a
search warrant. See id. at 63–64.
Based on the facts contained within the four corners of the affidavit and
any reasonable inferences therefrom, according deference to the magistrate‘s
probable cause determination, and conscientiously reviewing the totality of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, we hold that the magistrate did not have a
substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability or substantial
chance that Farhat had committed the offense of DWI or that evidence of
intoxication would be found in Farhat‘s blood. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 18.01(c); Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S. Ct. at 2333; Rodriguez, 232 S.W.3d
at 60; Swearingen, 143 S.W.3d at 810–11; Tolentino, 638 S.W.2d at 501. That
is, focusing on the combined logical force of the facts that are contained in the
affidavit and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the affidavit did not provide the
magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 18.01(c); Tolentino, 638 S.W.2d at 501.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by denying Farhat‘s motion to
suppress.
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C. Harm Analysis
Having found error, we must conduct a harm analysis to determine
whether the error calls for reversal of the judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 44.2.
Because the error involved is of constitutional magnitude, we apply rule 44.2(a)
and reverse unless we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did
not contribute to Farhat‘s conviction or punishment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a);
Hernandez v. State, 60 S.W.3d 106, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The question is
whether the trial court‘s error in denying Farhat‘s motion to suppress was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186,
194 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In applying the ―harmless error‖ test, our primary
question is whether there is a ―reasonable possibility‖ that the error might have
contributed to the conviction. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998) (op. on reh‘g), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070 (1999).
The only evidence that Farhat was intoxicated came from the results of a
blood test, obtained in violation of Farhat‘s constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure. We are thus unable to determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that the trial court‘s error in denying Farhat‘s motion to
suppress did not contribute to Farhat‘s conviction or punishment for DWI. See
Williams, 958 S.W.2d at 195. We sustain Farhat‘s sole point.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Having sustained Farhat‘s sole point, we reverse the trial court‘s order
denying his motion to suppress and remand to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
PUBLISH
DELIVERED: January 6, 2011
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Samuel David Farhat v. State
Combined Opinion