Opinion issued June 23, 2011
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-09-00777-CV
____________
RALPH O. DOUGLAS, Appellant
V.
ALLETTE B. WILLIAMS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 189th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2002-15440
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Ralph O. Douglas, who appears pro se,[1] challenges the trial court’s rendition of summary judgment in favor of appellee, Allette B. Williams, in Douglas’s suit against Williams for fraud. In five issues, Douglas contends that the trial court erred in granting Williams’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion and not ruling on his summary-judgment motion, motion for sanctions, and motion to compel discovery.
We affirm.
Background
In his petition, Douglas[2] alleged that in February 2000, he retained Williams, an attorney, to represent him in a criminal matter and he paid her a $5,000 retainer. However, he subsequently retained another attorney and requested a refund of this retainer, but Williams refunded only $4,250 of the retainer pursuant to an agreement with his family. Douglas asserted that Williams withheld a portion of his retainer through “fraud” and coercion and she breached her fiduciary duty using “fraud and deception.”
Williams denied Douglas’s allegations and subsequently filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion, asserting that there was no evidence to support Douglas’s claims. The trial court granted Williams’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion.
No-Evidence Summary Judgment
In his five issues, Douglas generally complains that the trial court erred in granting Williams’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion, refusing to rule on a variety of his motions, and abusing its discretion in “refus[ing] to deem the requests admitted.”
To prevail on a no-evidence summary-judgment motion, a movant must allege that there is no evidence of an essential element of the adverse party’s cause of action or affirmative defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Fort Worth Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004). We review a no-evidence summary judgment under the same legal-sufficiency standard used to review a directed verdict. Gen. Mills Rests., Inc. v. Tex. Wings, Inc., 12 S.W.3d 827, 832-33 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.). Although the nonmoving party is not required to marshal its proof, it must present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); see Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). A no-evidence summary-judgment motion may not be granted if the nonmovant brings forth more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements. See Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d at 600. More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). When reviewing a no-evidence summary-judgment motion, we assume that all evidence favorable to the nonmovant is true and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Spradlin v. State, 100 S.W.3d 372, 377 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.).
In his response to Williams’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion, Douglas asserted that Williams had failed to respond to his requests for admission, her answers to these requests were deemed admitted, and these answers created “fact issue[s]” that precluded summary judgment. However, in his response, Douglas did not set forth the substance of the requests. He also did not attach these requests to his summary-judgment response. Our review reveals that these requests for admission are not contained in the record. Rather than actually including these requests in the record, Douglas attached only a copy of a letter from Williams to Douglas acknowledging that she had received a “discovery request.” Williams’s letter did not refer to any specific requests for admission, and it did not even indicate that Douglas had served requests for admission upon Williams. In sum, Douglas failed to present any evidence that he had actually served any requests for admission upon Williams. There is no support for Douglas’s argument that the trial court erred in refusing to deem any matters admitted.
Douglas presented no other evidence in support of his claims. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting Williams’s no-evidence summary-judgment motion. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). To the extent Douglas sought to present any other issues to this Court for review, he has inadequately briefed those issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i).
We overrule Douglas’s issues.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Bland, and Massengale.
[1] We note that parties who appear pro se must comply with all applicable laws and rules of procedure and are held to the same standards as are licensed attorneys. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184 (Tex. 1978); Kanow v. Brownshadel, 691 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
[2] Our Court has recently affirmed a trial court order declaring Douglas a vexatious litigant under chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. In re Douglas, 333 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.101– 11.056 (defining vexatious litigants as persons who abuse the legal system by filing numerous, frivolous lawsuits). Our sister court has recently catalogued the long history of cases that Douglas has pursued in both the First and Fourteenth Courts of Appeals. See Douglas v. Porter, No. 14–10–00055–CV, 2011 WL 1601292, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 26, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).