COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-09-041-CR
ASHLEY BREWER APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 16TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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I. Introduction
After a revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Appellant Ashley
Brewer’s deferred adjudication community supervision, adjudicated her guilty,
and sentenced her to eight-years’ imprisonment. In two issues, Appellant asks
us to abate her appeal to allow the trial court to address her complaints
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
concerning her punishment and argues that her eight-year sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 13
of the Texas constitution. We affirm.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
On October 3, 2007, and pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant pleaded
guilty to the second-degree felony of possession of a controlled substance. 2
See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(4)(a), (d) (Vernon 2003). The
trial court deferred adjudicating Appellant’s guilt and placed her on deferred
adjudication community supervision for eight years.
On February 13, 2008, the State filed a motion to proceed to adjudication
and alleged that Appellant had (1) failed to report;(2) failed to pay her
supervision fees, fine, court costs, and restitution; and (3) failed to complete
community service. 3 The State subsequently amended its motion to proceed
to adjudication on September 10, 2008, and October 29, 2008, and added
2
Appellant was charged by indictment with possession with intent to
deliver but pleaded guilty to a lesser-included offense.
3
The State’s initial motion to proceed to adjudication also included an
allegation that Appellant had failed to complete a drug and alcohol evaluation,
but the State withdrew that allegation in its October 29, 2008 amended
motion.
2
allegations that Appellant had (1) committed a new criminal offense during the
term of her community supervision; (2) used illegal narcotics, barbiturates, or
controlled substances; (3) consumed alcohol; (4) failed to maintain employment;
(5) failed to notify of a change of employment or address; and (6) failed to
submit to alcohol and drug testing.
Following a hearing on the State’s motions to adjudicate guilt, the trial
court found the State’s allegations true and sentenced Appellant to eight years’
confinement. 4 Appellant did not object to her sentence at the time it was
imposed, and she did not file a motion for new trial. This appeal followed.
III. Discussion
A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Appellant contends in her first issue that her eight-year sentence violates
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section
13 of the Texas constitution. However, Appellant did not object to her eight-
year sentence at the time it was imposed nor complain about it in a motion for
new trial. As we recently held in Kim v. State,
4
The punishment range for a second degree felony is two to twenty
years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33
(Vernon 2003).
3
It is axiomatic that errors that are asserted on the part of the
trial court must generally be brought to the trial court’s attention in
order to afford the trial court an opportunity to correct the error, if
any. To preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence
is grossly disproportionate, constituting cruel and unusual
punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely
request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the
ruling desired. . . .
[Appellant’s] complaint about the alleged disproportionality of
his sentence was not raised at the time it was imposed or in a
motion for new trial. Therefore, he preserved nothing for our
review.
283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (internal
citations omitted); see also Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 151–52 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding defendant failed to
preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint of grossly disproportionate
sentence); Acosta v. State, 160 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2005, no pet.) (holding defendant failed to preserve his Texas constitution
complaint of grossly disproportionate sentence). Just as in Kim, Appellant did
not object to her eight-year sentence at the time it was imposed or complain
about it in a motion for new trial. See Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475. Appellant
therefore preserved nothing for our review. See id.
Further, even if we were to reach the merits of Appellant’s complaint, her
eight-year sentence is well within the statutory range of two to twenty years
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for second-degree felonies. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33. And
punishment imposed within the statutory range is generally not subject to
challenge for excessiveness. See Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475–76 (stating
punishment assessed not excessive where it was based on sentencer’s
informed normative judgment and fell within the legislatively prescribed range);
Dale v. State, 170 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)
(“Generally, punishment assessed within the statutory limits is not excessive,
cruel, or unusual punishment.”). Appellant could have been sentenced to as
many as twenty years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine but received only an
eight-year sentence with a $1,500 fine. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33.
We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
B. Motion to Abate Appeal
Appellant contends in her second issue that we should abate her appeal
to allow the trial court to address her complaints concerning her eight-year
sentence.5 The State counters that Appellant has failed to rebut the
5
Appellant argues a motion for new trial was the only time her
complaint could have been raised, but we note that Appellant’s prior counsel
could have objected to her sentence when it was imposed at the sentencing
hearing. See Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475 (holding failure to raise complaint of
disproportionate sentence not preserved when it “was not raised at the time it
was imposed or in a motion for new trial” (emphasis added)).
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presumption that she was represented by counsel during the thirty-day period
for a motion for new trial. We agree with the State.
A defendant is entitled to counsel during the period for filing a motion for
new trial. Cooks v. State, 240 S.W.3d 906, 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Funk
v. State, 188 S.W.3d 229, 231 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). Trial
counsel, whether retained or appointed, has the duty to consult with and fully
advise his client concerning the meaning and effect of the trial court’s
judgment, the right to appeal from that judgment, and the necessity of giving
notice of appeal and taking other steps to pursue an appeal. Oldham v. State,
977 S.W.2d 354, 360–61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (op. on reh’g), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1181 (1999); Funk, 188 S.W.3d at 231. Trial counsel also has the
duty to express his professional judgment as to possible grounds for appeal and
their merit and to delineate the advantages and disadvantages of appeal.
Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 360–61; Funk, 188 S.W.3d at 231. Accordingly,
when trial counsel does not withdraw and is not replaced by new counsel after
sentencing, a rebuttable presumption exists that trial counsel continued to
represent the defendant during the time for filing a motion for new trial. Smith
v. State, 17 S.W.3d 660, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Oldham, 977 S.W.2d
at 363; Funk, 188 S.W.3d at 231–32.
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The court of criminal appeals held in Oldham that Oldham did not “rebut
the presumption that [she] was represented by counsel and that counsel acted
effectively” even though Oldham had “filed a pro se notice of appeal and
indigency on the twenty-eighth day after sentencing, there [was] a notation in
the letter of assignment that attorney of record on appeal [was] to be
determined, and appellate counsel was appointed sixty-two days after
sentencing.” Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 362–63. Further, the court stated that
“[w]hen a motion for new trial is not filed in a case, the rebuttable presumption
is that it was considered by the appellant and rejected.” Id. at 363.
Here, the trial court sentenced Appellant on January 13, 2009, Appellant
filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 11, 2009, the twenty-ninth day after
sentencing, and Appellant’s motion for new trial was due on February 12,
2009. See Tex. R. App. P. 21.4(a) (“The defendant may file a motion for new
trial before, but no later than 30 days after, the date when the trial court
imposes or suspends sentence in open court.”). Further, Appellant’s trial
counsel did not file a motion to withdraw until February 20, 2009. That
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel did not learn of his February 10, 2009
appointment until February 17, 2009, is not significant to this issue because,
even assuming that Appellant’s trial counsel no longer represented her as of the
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time her appellate counsel was appointed on February 10, 2009, Appellant still
has not rebutted the presumption that she was represented by trial counsel for
twenty-eight of the thirty days she had to file a motion for new trial. See
Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 362–63; see also Stephens v. State, Nos. 09-06-
00406-CR, 09-06-00407-CR, 09-06-00414-CR, 2007 WL 2127208, at *3–4
(Tex. App.—Beaumont July 25, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (holding appellant did not rebut presumption where trial counsel did
not withdraw until after motion for new trial deadline); Tucker v. State, No. 02-
06-00054-CR, 2007 WL 439070, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 8, 2007,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding appellant did not
rebut presumption even when trial counsel was permitted to withdraw before
thirtieth day and record reflected appellant had counsel for twenty-one of the
thirty days he had to file a motion for new trial).
Further, Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal supports that she was
represented by counsel because the “pro se notice of appeal is evidence that
[s]he was informed of at least some of [her] appellate rights.” Smith, 17
S.W.3d at 663; see also Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at 363 (“[T]he fact that the
appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal is evidence that she must have been
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informed of at least some of her appellate rights, and we presume she was
adequately counseled unless the record affirmatively displays otherwise.”).
We hold Appellant has failed to rebut the presumption that trial counsel
continued to represent her during the thirty-day period for filing a motion for
new trial. See Smith, 17 S.W.3d at 662. We therefore deny Appellant’s
motion to abate this appeal and overrule her second issue.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s two issues, we deny Appellant’s motion to
abate this appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.
DAUPHINOT, J. concurs without opinion.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: March 25, 2010
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