Salramon Gonzales v. Ennis Oates

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-6815

SALRAMON GONZALES, a/k/a Alex Ramirez,

Petitioner - Appellant,

ENNIS T. OATES,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:12-hc-02045-D)

Submitted: July 30, 2015 Decided: October 16, 2015

Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Salramon Gonzales, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Salramon Gonzales seeks to appeal the district court’s

order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for

reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on

his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not

appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012);

Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004).

A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003).

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural

ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S.

at 484-85.

In United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2015), we

“address[ed] the question ‘whether, in light of Reid . . . and

Gonzales v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), [a habeas applicant]’s

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appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his Rule 60(b)

motion as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion is subject to

the certificate of appealability requirement.’” Id. at 396. We

held that no certificate of appealability is required for this

Court to “address the district court’s jurisdictional

categorization of a Rule 60(b) motion as a successive habeas

petition.” Id. at 398.

Importantly, McRae abrogates the COA requirement only in

the narrow situation where the district court construes a Rule

60(b) motion as a successive habeas petition. See id. at 400 n.7

(noting that McRae represents “an abrogation of only a small

part of Reid’s reasoning” and that “Reid’s reasoning remains

almost entirely intact”). Applying Reid and McRae here, we hold

that appellate review of the district court’s order denying

Gonzales’ Rule 60(b) motion is subject to the COA requirement.

The district court did not recharacterize Gonzales’ postjudgment

filing as a successive § 2254 petition, and it otherwise did not

reject the motion on jurisdictional grounds. See Allen v.

Mitchell, 276 F.3d 183, 187 n.3 (4th Cir. 2001) (“statute of

limitations established by § 2244(d) is not jurisdictional”).

For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Gonzales has

not demonstrated he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, we deny

a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma

pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral

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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED