UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-6815
SALRAMON GONZALES, a/k/a Alex Ramirez,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
ENNIS T. OATES,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:12-hc-02045-D)
Submitted: July 30, 2015 Decided: October 16, 2015
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Salramon Gonzales, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Salramon Gonzales seeks to appeal the district court’s
order denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for
reconsideration of the district court’s order denying relief on
his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012) petition. The order is not
appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a
certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012);
Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir. 2004).
A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies
relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is
debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003).
When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the
prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural
ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable
claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S.
at 484-85.
In United States v. McRae, 793 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2015), we
“address[ed] the question ‘whether, in light of Reid . . . and
Gonzales v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), [a habeas applicant]’s
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appeal of the district court’s dismissal of his Rule 60(b)
motion as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion is subject to
the certificate of appealability requirement.’” Id. at 396. We
held that no certificate of appealability is required for this
Court to “address the district court’s jurisdictional
categorization of a Rule 60(b) motion as a successive habeas
petition.” Id. at 398.
Importantly, McRae abrogates the COA requirement only in
the narrow situation where the district court construes a Rule
60(b) motion as a successive habeas petition. See id. at 400 n.7
(noting that McRae represents “an abrogation of only a small
part of Reid’s reasoning” and that “Reid’s reasoning remains
almost entirely intact”). Applying Reid and McRae here, we hold
that appellate review of the district court’s order denying
Gonzales’ Rule 60(b) motion is subject to the COA requirement.
The district court did not recharacterize Gonzales’ postjudgment
filing as a successive § 2254 petition, and it otherwise did not
reject the motion on jurisdictional grounds. See Allen v.
Mitchell, 276 F.3d 183, 187 n.3 (4th Cir. 2001) (“statute of
limitations established by § 2244(d) is not jurisdictional”).
For the reasons set forth, we conclude that Gonzales has
not demonstrated he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, we deny
a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral
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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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