Filed 10/19/15 In re K.B. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re K.B., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E063284
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J249521)
v. OPINION
J.B. et al.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cheryl C. Kersey,
Judge. Affirmed.
Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant J.B.
William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant K.P.
1
Jean-Rene Basle, County Counsel, Jamila Bayati, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of K.P. (mother) and J.B. (father)
(collectively parents) as to K.B. (minor born November 2010). Mother contends
insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision that the beneficial parental
relationship and sibling relationship exceptions to termination of parental rights did not
apply. Father joins mother’s arguments. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 15, 2013, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS)
received a report alleging physical abuse and neglect to A.P. (born January 2001),
mother’s eldest child, who showed up to school with bruising to his legs consistent with
being whipped with a belt.1 On May 16, 2013, CFS received another call and immediate
response referral reporting physical abuse and neglect. The reporting party indicated that
M.P. (born September 2005), mother’s second oldest child, had arrived at school with
bruising around both eyes; her forehead; and on the back, left side of her head. School
staff indicated they had observed numerous other unexplained injuries over the school
year.
1 This appeal is based solely on the juvenile court’s termination of parents’
parental rights as to K.B.; however, we shall discuss mother’s other children where
relevant to this case. Father is the biological and presumed father of K.B. only. R.P. is
the biological father of A.P. and M.P. and the presumed father of AP., M.P., and B.P.
N.C. is the biological father of B.P, but did not receive services.
2
M.P. informed the social worker she had received the injuries as an allergic
reaction to latex at the dentist’s office stating, “‘My mom wanted me to tell you that.’”
When asked how she actually received the injuries, M.P. responded, “‘Because my mom
was slapping me in my face and punching my head.’”2
When asked how A.P. received his injuries, M.P. responded, “‘He got in trouble at
school and got spanked with the belt.’” M.P. stated, “‘I get spankings too, but [A.P.] gets
harder spankings because he’s older and bigger than me.’” M.P. reported minors “are
spanked regularly and often times have bruises as a result.”” B.P. confirmed M.P.’s
accounts. A.P. admitted to being hit in the head repeatedly by father.
M.P. and B.P. both reported mother and father fought often with raised voices
using swear words; they would push and hit one another as well. In a recent fight,
2 Police contacted the doctor’s office to which mother had brought M.P. for
treatment of the injuries. The physician’s assistant whom M.P. saw stated the injuries
were the result of an allergic reaction to latex and that she did not “notice any marks or
bruises that would indicate to her [M.P.] had been struck or abused by anyone.” The
investigating officer concluded that “at no time was I led to believe [M.P.] was the victim
of [] child abuse at the hands of her mother or anyone else she lives with . . . . My own
observations of the mark on [M.P.’s] face led me to believe the origin of the mark was
consistent with the physician’s findings, that it was only a rash caused by an allergic
reaction.” The officer found that any suspicion of abuse was unfounded. Moreover,
there were allegations by mother and others that M.P. had a tendency to make up stories
regarding abuse. Furthermore, the investigating officer noted inconsistencies in the
derivations of the injuries reported by M.P. Nonetheless, the social worker asserted that
personnel whom she contacted at the medical clinic had done no testing to render the
diagnosis of an allergic reaction. Rather, staff had relied upon mother’s report of what
happened. Likewise, the social worker noted M.P. had been assessed by two separate
nurses at her school who both indicated the bruises were not the result of an allergic
reaction.
3
mother had thrown objects at father. A.P. confirmed M.P. and B.P.’s allegations of
domestic violence in the home.
Mother had six prior referrals for allegations including general neglect and sexual,
emotional, and physical abuse between 2009 and 2013. All were deemed unfounded
except the sexual abuse allegation, which was found inconclusive. Father had two prior
referrals, one in 2010 and one in 2011; both allegations were for physical abuse that were
deemed unfounded. When M.P. was asked how she had sustained injuries in 2012, she
responded, “‘Mommy hit me like this,” and “demonstrated smacking in the face.”
Social workers took minors into protective custody and placed M.P., B.P., and
K.B. together. A.P. was placed separately due to behavioral problems. On May 22,
2013, the juvenile court detained minors.
In the jurisdiction and disposition report filed June 7, 2013, B.P. was reported as
stating she had been “struck with an open hand and belt by” father. She reported father
struck K.B. with a belt also. K.B. stated father “used extreme forms of physical
discipline resulting in bruising to the child’s . . . body.” The court found true allegations
that mother and father used inappropriate forms of punishment against minor’s siblings.
The court removed minor from parents’ custody and granted them reunification services.
In the status review report filed January 28, 2014, the social worker recommended
the court continue parents’ reunification services. The social worker noted parents
“continue to be engaged in services and have made substantial progress.” They “have
reported that they have gained an increased knowledge regarding parenting and coping
4
skills and have reported an[] improvement in their relationship and communication.”
They “seem to have a close attachment to” K.B.
Nonetheless, the social worker also observed, “There have been reports by the
children that the mother has instructed them to misbehave in the foster home and it
appears as though the mother and [father] are not supportive of the children’s placement
. . . .” Thus, “Although[] the parents have done well in completing the required services,
the undersigned is unable to make a determination regarding the parents’ benefit at this
time. At this time, there are still concerns regarding the parents’ ability to maintain the
children’s safety and well-being . . . as there have been several referrals alleging abuse
that have been received since the last court hearing.” “[S]ince the last hearing there have
been reports of allegations of abuse that are currently being investigated which present[]
with some concerns regarding returning the children at this time.”3
At a hearing on February 7, 2014, counsel for CFS noted, “There’s been some
disclosures by . . . [M.P.] of a sexual abuse nature regarding [father], and [father] lives
with the mother. So there is a concern about that, so we’re just asking that visits—that’s
being investigated—not be ordered as unsupervised but authority to do so, and we’ll
continue to assess.” The allegations were apparently made on or about January 6, 2014.
At the six-month review hearing on February 26, 2014, the court authorized a
Child Assessment Center (CAC) interview of minors and a physical exam of M.P.
3 The social worker neglected to include any details in the report of the further
allegations of abuse.
5
Nonetheless, the court noted, “I know based on my experience with the case that
reunification is going to occur . . . .” The court ruled parents had made substantial
progress on their case plans and there was a substantial probability of return of minors to
parents.
A.P.’s counsel noted A.P. “told me he visits three or four times a month with his
siblings.” Mother’s counsel reported, “Mother indicates they all visit together when the
parents visit. That’s when all the kids visit together.” The court ordered sibling
visitation four times monthly.
The court ordered visitation between mother and K.B., B.P., and M.P. one time
weekly for up to four hours; the social worker was given authority to liberalize visitation.
The court ordered visits between father and A.P. once weekly for two hours; the social
worker was, again, given authority to liberalize visits. Visits with the female minors
were authorized if deemed appropriate after the CAC interviews.
An undated report from CAC indicated minors were seen on February 27, 2014.
M.P. indicated that while mother and M.P.’s siblings were out at the store, she was left
alone with father. Father came into the living room without underwear on, wiggled his
penis at her, and told her to touch it. When M.P. said no, he told her she had to. M.P.
repeatedly told father “no”; father eventually told her to go to sleep in her room.
In a report filed on April 4, 2014, the social worker recommended mother continue
to receive unsupervised visitation with minors so long as she was ordered not to leave
minors alone with father. The social worker additionally requested authority to liberalize
6
visits up to and including overnight visits when deemed appropriate. On April 10, 2014,
counsel for minors B.P., M.P., and K.P. filed an objection to the recommendation of
unsupervised and extended visitation. On April 28, 2014, the court barred visitation
between father and M.P. and B.P. as detrimental. The court initially indicated it would
order visitation between father and K.B., but the visits would need to be supervised by
someone other than mother. Nevertheless, the court actually ordered unsupervised
visitation between both parents and K.B. The court ordered unsupervised visitation
between all minors and mother.
In a status review report filed August 15, 2014, the social worker recommended
the court return K.B. and A.P. to parents’ custody under family maintenance services.
K.B. and A.P. had expressed their desire to return home. She recommended B.P. and
M.P. be “returned” to R.P.4 At the next hearing on August 26, 2014, counsel for K.B.
objected to return of K.B. to parents due to the allegations of sexual abuse by father
against M.P.
In a CAC interview filed on September 8, 2014, B.P. reported that father, while
naked, grabbed her hair, pulled her into a room, got on top of her, and began to place his
penis in her mouth. She resisted, moving her head from side to side. Father placed his
hands around B.P.’s neck. Father’s sister then walked in and told father to get away from
B.P. Mother was outside smoking while the incident occurred. B.P. initially reported the
incident on May 19, 2014.
4 It actually appears R.P. had never had prior custody of either minor.
7
In the police report, father admitted being at a home where minors stopped with
mother in order that mother’s friend could take care of an emergency. Mother’s friend
denied father even saw minors. Father also denied seeing any of the minors. Father
offered to take a polygraph examination.
During the polygraph examination, father admitted seeing B.P. and giving her a
hug that day. After initially denying he called B.P. a “brat,” father admitted to doing so.
Father later admitted to pulling B.P.’s hair too hard, forcing her to the ground. Father
then stated he bent over the victim to give her a hug in which position his crotch was in
her face. He remembered pulling up his pants as “they were falling down.” However,
his penis never came out, nor did he try to place it in B.P.’s mouth.
In an “Information to the Court” filed September 8, 2014, the social worker
conveyed the contents of the police report and father’s polygraph examination. The
social worker recommended, with respect to K.B., terminating reunification services for
father and returning K.B. to mother with family maintenance services when appropriate.
At a hearing on September 8, 2014, it was noted mother had been visiting with
M.P. and B.P. once monthly for four hours. Counsel for minors asked that future visits
be supervised as M.P. and B.P. were afraid of mother and uneasy about visits. The court
ordered visits supervised. Father was reported to be moving out of mother’s home. In a
report filed September 24, 2014, the social worker recommend parents’ reunification
services as to M.P. and B.P. be terminated. She recommended continued services for
parents as to K.B. and A.P.
8
At the 12-month review hearing on September 24, 2014, the juvenile court
indicated it would dismiss the case as to B.P. and M.P. with family law orders granting
mother and R.P. joint legal custody and R.P. primary legal custody. The juvenile court
terminated parents’ reunification services as to M.P. and B.P., but continued services as
to K.B. and A.P. The court authorized extended visits including unsupervised overnight
and weekend visitation upon execution of an approval packet.
In a status review hearing report filed November 21, 2014, the social worker
recommended A.P. remain in mother’s home with family maintenance services while
parent’s reunification services as to K.B. be terminated. The social worker noted parents
“are still involved despite their claims that they have separated. On September 23, 2014,
the undersigned visited the home unannounced for a second attempt where [mother]
allowed the undersigned to view the home, where there were no visible indicators that
[father] was living in the home. On November 18, 2014, the undersigned visited the
home unannounced where [father] was not initially visible in the home.” “The
undersigned later found [father] in the mother’s bedroom closet when the mother was
asked to view the content of the room.”
The social worker noted parents had visited consistently with K.B. with no issues.
K.B. had resided in her current foster home since July 23, 2013.
The social worker further noted, “The therapist reported . . . that [mother]
appeared to not take responsibility for the circumstances surrounding the children’s
removal from her care and seem[ed] [in] denial. The therapist also reported that [mother]
9
seemed to not have a connection [sic] in regards to feelings about the children’s initial
removal. The therapist noted that she had concerns regarding the mother’s ability to
protect [K.B.] if returned to her care . . . .” Mother’s therapist concluded “it does not
appear it would benefit the best interest of [mother’s] children to be returned home.”
Father’s therapist noted father denies any prior physical discipline as well as any
inappropriate sexual behavior. The therapist also noted “that [father] has plans to resume
his relationship with mother.” The social worker concluded, “At this time, there appears
to be continued risk of detriment to [K.B’s] physical and/or emotional well being as the
mother . . . has not been able to demonstrate her ability to protect the child from harm
despite previous sexual and physical abuse allegations against the father. . . . Although
the parents have engaged in services and were able to complete the components, it
appears as though [parents] may lack substantial benefit from these services.”
At the 18-month review hearing on November 24, 2014, mother testified she had
engaged in six sessions with a licensed counselor; she had two left to complete
counseling. She testified she was no longer with father. Father had come to her house
three to four times to talk with A.P. as A.P. was having a hard time in school and refused
to talk about with anyone except father.5 Mother also said father was at her house when
the social worker arrived in order to pick something up and “freaked out” and “hid in my
closet.”
5 At the hearing on September 15, 2014, A.P. himself informed the court he did
not want father in the house.
10
Mother said she visits with minor every chance she gets, twice a week for four
hours total, only having missed once when she was sick. Initially during visitation K.B.
is “abrasive or hostile because she doesn’t understand what’s going on. After a while, 20
minutes, she is totally warmed up and a goof ball . . . .” Mother acknowledged
inappropriate physical discipline, such as soft spanking by both parents, but denied any
sexual abuse.
Father testified he was at mother’s house to talk with A.P. and pick up a few
things. When the social worker arrived he “freaked out” and hid. He lived with his
stepfather since he was told he had to move of mother’s home two months earlier. Father
goes over to mother’s home to speak with A.P. for an hour or two and then leaves.
Father acknowledged spanking minors, which he now believes to be inappropriate, but
denied any sexual abuse.
Father testified he was lying to police when he told them he engaged in some sort
of physical activity with B.P. in which he grabbed her, pulled her hair, and caused her to
fall backward. He only said those things because the officer wanted him to say them.
Father never actually saw B.P. that day.
The juvenile court denied parents reunification services as to K.B. Parents filed
notices of intent to file writ petitions on November 24, and December 1, 2014. Counsel
for both parents later filed letters indicating they would not be filing writs. We dismissed
mother’s and father’s writ cases on December 31, 2014, and January 7, 2015,
respectively.
11
On March 13, 2015, the social worker filed the Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.266 report in which she recommended parents’ parental rights as to K.B. be
terminated. The social worker noted K.B. “misses her siblings and knows that her family
has deteriorated since the children’s removal from their mother’s home. Her reaction of
sadness is appropriate under the circumstances and is not a cause for concern. [K.P.]
doesn’t stay sad for long . . . .” K.B. lived with her half siblings with whom she shares
“common experiences and emotional bonds. [K.B.] continues to have telephone calls,
Skype visits[,] and face to face visits with her two [] half sisters . . . who now live with
their father in Northern California.” She has occasional visits with A.P. who lives with
mother. K.B. “receives visits from her siblings when her parents have visitations, or
when her sisters are in town. Her last visit with [M.P.] and [B.P.] was on March 7,
2015.”
The social worker observed that, “From the beginning of this case, the parents . . .
have visited the child . . . consistently, rarely missing a visit and informing ahead of time
if reschedule is needed. Initial visits by the parents were done together, but are now
separate, and there are no issues reported regarding how the visits go.”
The social worker further noted K.B.’s current placement “is very stable and the
foster mother wishes to adopt the child.” K.B. developed emotional attachments to the
prospective adoptive parent who has been her primary caregiver for nearly half her life.
6 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
12
The prospective adoptive parent “cares deeply for [K.B.] and demonstrates a willingness
and ability to care for her permanently. [The prospective adoptive parent] has expressed
a desire to adopt [K.B.] and provide for her well-being on a permanent basis.”
At the section 366.26 hearing, mother testified A.P. had never lived with K.B.
Mother had not missed any visits. K.B. calls her “‘mommy,’” shows affection by
hugging and kissing her, tells her she loves her, and says she misses her at the beginnings
of visits. Minor calls the prospective adoptive parent by her first name or “‘Pretend
Mommy’” or “‘Mommy.’” Mother believed she was bonded with K.B. and severance of
that bond would be detrimental to K.B. Mother testified K.B. calls father “‘daddy.’”
Mother is, “Um, kind of’” still in a relationship with father.
A.P. attends visits with K.B. as his school schedule permits, at least once a month.
A.P. calls K.B. “‘Big Bear.’” She hugs and kisses him and tells him she loves him. The
prospective adoptive parent recently had an overnight visit for the children.
The juvenile court found parents had engaged in regular visitation and contact
with K.B. The court exposited, “The child does have a relationship with both Mother and
Father, but the benefit to the child of maintaining that relationship has to outweigh
benefits of adoption, and I would have to find there is detriment or the child would be
greatly harmed by termination of parental rights. The evidence does not substantiate that
high burden. Although the contact with [] parents and [K.B.] have, I am sure has been
some benefit to the minor, [] she is in a stable, concurrent planning home. The
prospective adoptive parent [has] had her for almost two years . . . .”
13
The court further noted, “So both parents, although maintaining regular visitation,
they have been friendly visitors. They have not taken care of the day-to-day needs of
[K.B.] for a significant amount of time, almost two years.” The court found parents had
failed to meet their burden that the beneficial parent child exception to termination of
parental rights applied. Thus, the court terminated parents’ parental rights as to K.B.
DISCUSSION
A. Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
Mother argues insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination
the beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply to termination of her parental
rights. Father joins the argument to the extent reversal will also reverse termination of
his own parental rights. We disagree.
Once reunification services have been terminated and a child has been found
adoptable, “adoption should be ordered unless exceptional circumstances exist.” (In re
Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.) Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i),
one such exception exists where, “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” A
beneficial relationship is established if it “‘promotes the well-being of the child to such a
degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with
new, adoptive parents.’” (In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534, quoting
In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The parent has the burden of proving
14
termination would be detrimental to the child. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
1339, 1350; In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1207.)
“‘[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent[-]child
relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new
family would confer. If severing the natural parent[-]child relationship would deprive the
child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly
harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not
terminated.’ [Citation.]” (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555.)
“[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will
prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D.,
supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350; accord, In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51.)
“We determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s ruling by
reviewing the evidence most favorably to the prevailing party and indulging in all
legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling. [Citation.] If the
court’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence, the reviewing court must affirm the
court’s rejection of the exceptions to termination of parental rights . . . .” (In re S.B.
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298.)
Here, there is scant evidence in the record regarding the type of bond between
K.B. and mother. Although the reports and testimony establish mother regularly and
consistently visited with minor, there is little to support mother’s burden of establishing
there was a bond and, if so, how strong that bond was. Indeed, mother herself testified
15
K.B. was initially “abrasive or hostile” during visitation. Minor was two and half years
old when removed from mother’s custody. She had been placed with the current
prospective adoptive parent on July 23, 2013, where she had resided for nearly two years
when mother’s parental rights were terminated. Minor was now in a stable, permanent
placement with someone whom she had established an emotional bond. Substantial
evidence supported the juvenile court’s ruling.
Contrary to mother’s contention, the juvenile court did not err in characterizing
parents as “friendly visitors.” Ultimately, such a characterization was well within the
court’s discretion and nothing in the record establishes there was any more serious degree
of bond between parents and K.B. Simply because parents raised K.B. for two and a half
years did not establish the requisite degree of bond two years after K.B. had been
removed from their custody to justify an exception to the presumption in favor of
adoption.
Mother accurately describes the law as not requiring what the juvenile court
described as “day-to-day” care for a child in order to apply the beneficial parent
relationship exception. (In re C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555, fn. 5 [“‘Day-to-day
contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child relationship. A
strong and beneficial parent-child relationship might exist such that termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child, particularly in the case of an older child,
despite a lack of day-to-day contact and interaction.’”].) However, as discussed ante,
regardless of whether parents had day-to-day interaction with minor, there is insufficient
16
evidence of the degree of a bond necessary to outweigh minor’s need for a safe and stable
placement. Moreover, minor was not an older child. Sufficient evidence supports the
juvenile court’s findings and orders.
B. Sibling Relationship Exception.
Mother contends the juvenile court erred in not applying the sibling relationship
exception to termination of parental rights. Father joins her argument. CFS argues
mother forfeited the argument by failing to raise it below. We disagree with CFS that
mother forfeited the issue. However, we hold substantial evidence supported the court’s
ruling.
The juvenile court has no sua sponte duty to raise the applicability of the sibling
relationship exception when not raised by parents. Where parents failed to raise the issue
below, they have forfeited the issue on appeal. (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th
287, 291-292.) Although we have discretion to address the issue where not raised below,
“a determination concerning the sibling relationship exception raises factual questions
that are unsuitable for resolution on appeal.” (Id. at p. 292.)
Here, counsel for mother argued at the section 366.26 hearing that, “In addition to
the parental bond, the mother also testified she believes there is a bond between [K.B.]
and[,] at least, [A.P.], who is in the mother’s care, and that does not discount the
relationship between [M.P.] and [B.P.] We believe there is a bond there.” This was
sufficient to preserve the argument for appeal.
17
The sibling relationship exception applies if the court finds a compelling reason
for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to a “substantial
interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and
extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with
a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or
has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the
child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to
the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
“Reflecting the Legislature’s preference for adoption when possible, the ‘sibling
relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party
opposing adoption. It only applies when the juvenile court determines that there is a
“compelling reason” for concluding that the termination of parental rights would be
“detrimental” to the child due to “substantial interference” with a sibling relationship.’
[Citation.] Indeed, even if adoption would interfere with a strong sibling relationship, the
court must nevertheless weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling
relationship against the benefit the child would receive by gaining a permanent home
through adoption. [Citation.]” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 61.) Parents have
the burden of establishing the applicability of the exception. (See In re Megan S. (2002)
104 Cal.App.4th 247, 252.) The juvenile court may properly consider evidence that the
prospective adoptive parents intend to maintain contact between minor and the siblings
18
and, thus, that adoption would not interfere with the sibling relationship. (In re Daisy D.
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292.)
In reviewing challenges to a trial court’s decision as to the applicability of these
exceptions, we will employ the substantial evidence or abuse of discretion standards of
review depending on the nature of the challenge. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th
1308, 1315-1316.) We will apply the substantial evidence standard of review to evaluate
the evidentiary showing with respect to factual issues, such as whether the child has a
close and strong bond with a sibling (for the sibling relationship exception). (Id. at
p. 1315; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), (v).) However, a challenge to the trial court’s
determination of questions such as whether, given the existence of a sibling relationship,
there is a compelling reason for determining that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child “is a quintessentially discretionary determination.” (In re Scott B.
(2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469.) We review such decisions for abuse of discretion. In
the dependency context, both standards call for a high degree of appellate court
deference. (Ibid.; Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
Here, the social worker noted K.B. missed her siblings, but concluded that her
sadness was appropriate under the circumstances and was not a cause for concern as she
did not stay sad for long. K.B. continued to have telephone calls, Skype visits, and face-
to-face visits with B.P. and M.P. She had occasional visits with A.P., with whom mother
testified K.B. had never lived. Minor also received visits from her sisters when they were
19
in town. Her last visit with M.P. and B.P. was on March 7, 2015. The prospective
adoptive parent had arranged an overnight visit for the children.
As noted above, minor was now in a stable, permanent placement with someone
whom she had established an emotional bond. There is no indication in the record that
any interference with her sibling relationship would prove detrimental to minor.
Moreover, the evidence sufficiently establishes minor would benefit more from living in
a permanent adoptive home than she would suffer from any interference with her sibling
relationships. Finally, the prospective adoptive parent appears to have encouraged
visitation allowing telephonic, Skype, and in-person visits, extending even to an
overnight visit. Thus, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implied finding
the sibling relationship exception did not apply.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
KING
J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
Acting P. J.
MILLER
J.
20