FILED
OCTOBER 20, 2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of
)
) No. 31955-5-III
)
KEVIN LEE HILTON, )
)
Petitioner. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
SIDOOWAY, C.J. - Kevin Hilton seeks relief from personal restraint in the form of
a life sentence without the possibility of parole imposed for his 2008 Benton County
conviction of two counts of aggravated first degree murder in the shootings of his
landlords Lawrence and Josephine Ulrich. Mr. Hilton was originally convicted of the
murders in 2003. Those convictions were reversed on appeal when this court ruled that
incriminating gun shell evidence and other items including computers were seized from
Mr. Hilton's home pursuant to an invalid search warrant. See State v. Hilton, 131 Wn.
App. 1020 (2006), review denied, 158 Wn.2d 1027 (2007).
After he was again convicted on retrial, Mr. Hilton filed a direct appeal and this
court affirmed the judgment and sentence. See State v. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. 81,261
P.3d 683 (2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1037 (2012). This timely petition follows.
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
Mr. Hilton, who is represented by counsel, raises four grounds for relief in this
petition: (1) the State violated due process under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83
S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), by failing to provide the defense with material
exculpatory evidence before trial; (2) he was denied due process by the State's knowing
presentation of, and reliance on, false and misleading evidence to the jury; (3) he was
denied effective assistance of counsel; and (4) he was denied his constitutional right to
present a defense when the court prohibited him from presenting evidence that the
victims' daughter, Lisa Ulrich, was the real killer.
Mr. Hilton has filed a companion motion to disqualifY the Benton County
prosecutor and members of his office from representing the State in this petition and any
potential reference proceedings, as well as a motion for discovery and for an evidentiary
hearing. The petition and motions were referred to this panel for determination. RAP
16.11(b).
We deny Mr. Hilton's motions and dismiss his personal restraint petition.
FACTS
The facts are largely repeated from the appeal opinion, with additions as relevant
to the claims raised in this petition. I The Ulrichs' adult daughter Lisa discovered her
I We granted a motion by Mr. Hilton to incorporate the record from the second
direct appeal, cause no. 26899-3-III, into this petition; citations to a report of proceedings
are to the report of proceedings for that appeal.
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parents' bodies in their Richland home shortly after 9:00 a.m. on March 21, 2002. Both
had been shot at close range by a .45 caliber weapon. There was no sign of forced entry
I to the home. Their wallets were missing. Detectives found three .45 caliber "A-Merc"
brand shell casings at the murder scene that a fireanns expert determined were all fired
from the same gun. Five.45 caliber bullets were recovered-three from the murder
scene within the home and two from Josephine Ulrich's body. The other two shell
casings were never found.
II Officers and a paramedic who responded to the scene observed a partial boot or
shoe print in grease and several bloody partial shoeprints leading from a pool of blood on
f
I
~
the carpet about five feet inside the home's tile entryway. The victims' bodies were
I visible from the entryway. Lisa Ulrich testified she took only one step inside the door
and saw the bodies and did not go further inside, although physical evidence indicated
further entry may have been necessary to see the bodies.
I
The Ulrichs lived alone and were last seen alive in their home on the evening of
March 20 when Lisa and her children visited. They arrived around 4:30 p.m. and left
between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m., when the Ulrichs were about to eat dinner. Autopsies
revealed that the victims died from gunshot wounds inflicted within a few minutes to
three hours after they ate dinner.
The Ulrichs were longtime landlords and owned seven rental properties. One of
their tenants was Kevin Hilton, who lived 1.6 miles away. Affixed to Mr. Ulrich's hand
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when his body was discovered was a yellow sticky note folded to conceal an original rent
receipt dated March 20. The receipt, signed by Josephine Ulrich, was made out to Kevin
Hilton in the sum of$3,475, representing the exact total of his several months' delinquent
rent. The receipt book was never found. The sticky note concealing the receipt remained
in Larry Ulrich's hand despite blood evidence showing his body was dragged to to 12
feet by the murderer.
A telephone handset with caller ID was missing from the kitchen, close to where
the bodies lay. It was never found. Another caller ID box was kept upstairs. It showed
that the last call on March 20 was from Kevin Hilton at 6:42 p.m. A file folder on top of
the refrigerator contained an original three-day pay rent or quit notice prepared to Mr.
Hilton by Josephine Ulrich on March 15,2002.
Lisa Ulrich and her sister Jennifer (who lived out of state at the time of the
murders) were familiar with their parents' practices when accepting rent payments. Their
mother would typically issue a receipt only to renters making a cash payment in person.
Those paying by check received a receipt only if they asked for one. In most cases if a
renter wanted a receipt they would come to the Ulrichs' house and drop off the payment.
Jennifer and Lisa both testified that the receipt book currently in use was kept openly on
top of the refrigerator.
Police were able to contact all of the Ulrichs' tenants on March 21 except for Mr.
Hilton. Officers finally spoke with him at his home the next day. Asked about his
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whereabouts on the night of the murders, he told officers he had shopped for groceries at
WinCo, returned the book Hard Time to the Richland library, and then played volleyball
at Hanford High School from 8:30 to 10:30 p.m. He told them he owed the Ulrichs
$3,475 in back rent, but had reached a payment arrangement with them by telephone on
the evening of the murders. He said he telephoned the Ulrichs between 6:00 and 6:30
p.m. that day and they left a return message between 7 :00 and 7: 15 p.m. while he was
out. He said they agreed to his proposal for paying back rent. He said he erased the
message.
When asked about firearms, Mr. Hilton said he owned three rifles and showed
them to the officers. They noticed ammunition boxes, shell casings and reloading
equipment in his basement. He denied currently owning any handguns but described four
that he owned in the past, including two .45 caliber Norinco handguns. He had
participated in competitive shooting events in the past. He said he sold one Norinco to
Dirk Leach and the other to an unnamed individual at a Walla Walla gun show 6 or 8
months before March 22. Police were only able to trace the gun sold to Mr. Leach, and
testing showed it was not the murder weapon. See State v. Hilton, 164 Wn. App. 81, 86
n.3, 261 P.3d 683 (2011). When asked where he was on March 21, Mr. Hilton said he
went to Mattawa (about 51 miles from Richland along the Columbia River) to sell
primers to a guy, "VC," whose address and telephone number he did not have.
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On March 25, a detective recovered an envelope from the mail addressed to Larry
Ulrich from Mr. Hilton's return address that was postmarked March 21,2002. The
envelope contained a promissory note from Mr. Hilton dated March 19,2002, stating he
would pay the Ulrichs $2,000 plus interest on or before September 1, 2002. The
envelope also contained a letter to Larry Ulrich dated March 20, thanking him for his
understanding and summarizing that Mr. Hilton owed $3,475 in back rent and penalties,
$2,000 would be paid by note, and the $1,475 balance would be satisfied by work credit
at $12 per hour.
Jennifer Ulrich testified that her father had allowed renters, including Mr. Hilton,
to work for credit. But both Ulrich sisters testified that based upon their knowledge of
their parents' rental practices, they would not have made the type of agreement written up
by Mr. Hilton. Both sisters doubted they would allow Mr. Hilton to, in essence, stay
another six months rent free when he already owed them $3,400.
The police investigation uncovered only one gun shop (Schoonie's Rod Shop in
Benton City) and no other retailer or gun show seller in the area that stocked the very
uncommon "A-Mere" brand of.45 caliber ammunition between 1994 and 2002.
Schoonie's' owner Barbara Schoonover testified she stocked a total of74 boxes during
that time period and kept all sale and purchase records. She sold Mr. Hilton 28 of those
boxes in May-June 1994, as well as a .45 caliber Norinco handgun. She was certain that
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the shell casings found in the Ulrichs' home bore the same head stamp and were the same
kind of.45 caliber "A-Merc" ammunition that she sold Mr. Hilton.
Evidence was introduced at trial that Mr. Hilton did not appear on the WinCo
store's video system showing everyone who entered or exited the building on March 20.
Library records also showed that Mr. Hilton had returned Hard Time on March 19 (not
March 20), and that he next used the library on March 21, when he returned two books
and checked out another book. His volleyball teammates confirmed he arrived right at
the 8:30 p.m. start time, which was late for him because he typically arrived about 15
minutes early to warm up. He told his teammates he had to clean up garbage that spilled
in his kitchen so his cat wouldn't get into it.
Evidence was introduced that the most recent gun show in Walla Walla had taken
place 14 months before the killings, not 6 to 8 months earlier as claimed by Mr. Hilton.
With regard to Mr. Hilton's claimed Mattawa trip, law enforcement authorities
throughout the region could not identity anyone using the name "VC."
The parties presented conflicting expert testimony on whether Mr. Hilton's size
12 Yz-13 feet could have fit into the shoes that left the partial bloody footprints. The
State's forensic scientist opined based on a footprint taken from Mr. Hilton that his foot
could have fit inside the shoe that made the prints.
The defense presented testimony from Donald Short, president of Mr. Hilton's
Internet provider. During this testimony, the court admitted evidence showing the
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following times of Internet usage on Mr. Hilton's computers on the evening of March 20,
2002:
5:42:12 - 5:59:17 p.m.
6:20: 13 - 6:20:31 p.m.
7:41 :32 - 7:41 :42 p.m.
7:58:35 - 8:10:24 p.m.
10:41:17 - 10:45:36 p.m.
Ex. 490. While Mr. Short testified that the Internet was in use at Mr. Hilton's residence
at these times, he acknowledged on cross-examination that he could not say for certain
that a human was doing it "because you can automatic such a thing." Report of
Proceedings (RP) (Feb. 7,2008) at 3261. He explained, "If you set your email to check
periodically, especially on a dial-up connection, it can dial it in, do its thing, and then
eventually it will time out." Id. Defense lawyers asked Mr. Short on redirect about the
short logons for 8 seconds at 6:20 p.m. and 10 seconds at 7:41 p.m., and Mr. Short
testified that they were most likely human contact, such as an inadvertent click onto the
Internet or a quick logon to check e-mail, whereas an automated logon would take longer.
He was never asked if the 7:58:35 to 8:10:24 p.m. access was most likely human contact
or automated.
Mr. Hilton did not testifY at the first trial, but took the stand in his second trial and
denied killing the Ulrichs. He gave alibi testimony as to his whereabouts on March 20.
He claimed he went to Albertsons at about 7 :00 p.m., then bought gas at a Conoco
station, and then went to the library shortly after 7 :30 p.m. and returned two paperbacks.
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He denied telling officers that he went to Win eo, but admitted he did not tell them he
went to Albertsons. He corrected his original statement about his stop at the library,
testifying that he went just inside the doors to the paperback racks for only a few seconds
and returned two books. He claimed that his original statement to a detective on March
26, that he returned Hard Time on March 20, was his best guess at the time, but he later
realized he was mistaken about the date.
He claimed to have returned home and spent time on the computer before
volleyball. He admitted that he never mentioned the spilled garbage that delayed his
arrival at volleyball to detectives because the topic never came up and he considered it
unimportant.
He claimed that he and Josephine Ulrich discussed his payment proposal for the
rent arrears during the 6:42 p.m. call showing on the Ulrichs' upstairs caller ID. His
earlier statement to the police that he had called between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. was just an
estimate. He claimed that he never received a 3-day notice from Ms. Ulrich. His letter
describing the payment plan was mailed to the Ulrichs with a promissory note on March
21.
Mr. Hilton further testified that he owned no handguns at time of the murders. He
admitted to buying "A-Merc" ammunition and a .45 caliber Norinco handgun from
Barbara Schoonover years earlier. Mr. Hilton held a yard sale a month after the murders,
on April 26, 2002. As bearing on Mr. Hilton's credibility, a State's witness testified that
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he purchased a .45 caliber handgun and a .22 caliber rifle at that yard sale. The witness
positively identified Mr. Hilton in court as the seller of the guns, although it was later
shown in expert firearms analysis that the .45 caliber was not the murder weapon. Mr.
Hilton denied selling any gun at his April 26 yard sale. He said he sold his last .45
caliber handgun at a gun show in Walla Walla in February 2001 and explained that he
had previously only estimated that the gun show was six to eight months earlier. He was
unable to describe the purchaser of the gun in his initial trial testimony, but when he
resumed the stand the next day, he described the person as a white male with brown hair
who was shorter and more slightly built than him. He admitted that the Ulrichs only gave
him a receipt when he showed up in person and paid his rent in cash.
The jury disbelieved Mr. Hilton's alibi defense and found him guilty of the
murders. Other facts will be related as pertinent to the resolution of Mr. Hilton's claims.
ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
Personal Restraint Petition Review Standards
To obtain relief in a personal restraint petition (PRP), Mr. Hilton must show actual
and substantial prejudice resulting from alleged constitutional errors, or for alleged
nonconstitutional errors a fundamental defect that inherently results in a miscarriage of
justice. In re Pers. Restraint ofCook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 813, 792 P.2d 506 (1990). To
avoid dismissal, the petition must be supported by facts and not merely self-serving or
conclusory allegations. Id. at 813-14. The supporting evidence must be based on "more
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than speculation, conjecture, or inadmissible hearsay," and a failure to meet this burden
calls for dismissal of the petition. In re Pers. Restraint ofRice, 118 Wn.2d 876, 886, 828
P.2d 1086 (1992).
Ground 1: Brady claim
Mr. Hilton contends the State violated his right to due process under Brady, 373
U.S. 83, by failing to provide the defense with material exculpatory evidence before trial,
that being materials pertinent to usage of the Ulrichs' computers on the night of the
murders.
Under Brady, the prosecution has an affirmative duty to disclose evidence that is
favorable to a defendant. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432, 115
S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995). "[T]here are three components of a true Brady
violation: [t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is
exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." In re Pers.
Restraint ofStens on , 174 Wn.2d 474, 486-87, 276 P.3d 286 (2012) (quoting Strickler V.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82,119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1999)). With respect
to the third component, the "materiality of the evidence" and "prejudice" are spoken of
interchangeably. Stenson, 174 Wn.2d at 487. To prove materiality, a petitioner must
show'" there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Id. (internal quotation
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marks omitted) (quoting Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. at 433-34). A Brady violation is
shown when "[t]he favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in
such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435;
Stenson, 174 Wn.2d at 487. But if the defendant using reasonable diligence could have
obtained the information, there is no Brady violation. State v. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d 881,
896,259 P.3d 158 (201l).
In April 2002, the Richland Police Department asked Kennewick Police Detective
Simon Mantel to collect and analyze two computers from Mr. Hilton's home (computers
A and B) and two from the Ulrichs' home (computers C and D). Detective Mantel
produced a 6-page report of his computer analysis on September 19,2002. In a
discussion pertaining to computer C, which was in the Ulrichs' downstairs family room,
Detective Mantel stated on page 5 of his report: "Prior to the power outage, 2 user
initiated activity ended at 8:07:33 PM on 3/20/02." Br. in Support ofPRP, Appendix C
at 5. Mr. Hilton contends that evidence that user initiated activity on the Ulrichs'
downstairs computer continued until 8:07 p.m. is critical exculpatory evidence given
corroboration by his teammates that he arrived for volleyball at 8:30 p.m. There is no
2 A power outage occurred at several neighboring homes, including the Ulrichs', at
approximately 1:00 a.m. on March 21, 2002. The utility company restored the power
after 2:00 a.m. No cause for the outage was ever determined.
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dispute that the State provided the defense a copy of the Mantel report before Mr.
Hilton's first trial.
In 2003, Detective Mantel was called to active military duty and did not return to
the Kennewick Police Department. The State listed him as a witness for the first trial.
He was not called to testify.
In December 2002, Prosecutor Andy Miller asked Kennewick Police Detective
T.D. Scott to provide Detective Mantel's work from computer C to Sergeant Wehner of
the Richland Police Department and lD. Fluckiger of Battelle, a private company that
manages a national laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy in Richland. According
to Detective Scott's report dated December 24, 2002, Mr. Fluckiger requested the EnCase
Evidence file copy of computer C as designated in Detective Mantel's report. As with
Detective Mantel's report, the defense received Detective Scott's report in discovery.
On February 4, 2003, Mr. Miller wrote in a letter to defense counsel that the State
mayor may not be able to obtain Detective Mantel's presence at trial, but that his office
was working with Battelle to see if its personnel might be able to review the hard drives
and provide the testimony that would have been provided by the detective. Mr. Miller's
letter noted that defense counsel had received earlier notice of this contingency in
discovery. On February 28,2003, Mr. Miller wrote in another letter to defense counsel
explaining logistical limitations on dates that Detective Mantel could testify and
requesting a stipulation that the State could call him out of order during the defense case.
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There was no further mention of Mr. Fluckiger. Neither party called Detective
Mantel or Mr. Fluckiger as a witness at either trial, nor did either party seek to introduce
evidence of usage or activity on the Ulrichs' computers.
In support of the present petition, Mr. Hilton has filed a declaration from Mr.
Fluckiger dated June 27, 2013, in which he states that he met with defense investigator
Winthrop Taylor, who showed him Detective Scott's December 24, 2002 police report
referring to Mr. Fluckiger as having been asked to review Detective Mantel's work on the
computers. Mr. Fluckiger states in the declaration that Battelle's legal department gave
him permission to assist Mr. Miller in determining the nature and quality of Detective
Mantel's work on the condition Mr. Fluckiger would not testifY as an expert witness. He
met with Mr. Miller and a Kennewick police representative. He states that Mr. Miller
gave him a report that referred to EnCase forensic software and a single CD and asked
him to explain what the report said in terms Mr. Miller could understand. Mr. Fluckiger
reviewed the disk and felt comfortable that the information Detective Mantel had
provided was "fairly sound," but he never went into the EnCase files to determine what
was there. Br. in Support ofPRP, Appendix E, Fluckiger Declaration at 2. Instead, he
just looked at Detective Mantel's presentation and explained it to Mr. Miller. He recalls
looking to see if the times between one computer and another computer correlated with
one another and concluded that they did, but he did not go back and do a personal
evaluation of the original files.
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Mr. Hilton alleges a Brady violation based upon the fact that the State never
informed the defense that Mr. Fluckiger had confirmed, in terms that Mr. Miller could
understand, the soundness of Detective Mantel's report. Mr. Hilton's characterization is
that the State "possessed Detective Mantel's report, and knew his conclusions had been
confirmed by a second expert at Battelle: someone was using the Ulrichs' computer until
8:07 p.m. on the night they died-the same time Mr. Hilton was on his own computer at
his own home." Pet'r's Reply Br. at 31. Mr. Hilton contends that had the State disclosed
the Fluckiger confirmation, defense counsel would have taken another look at Detective
Mantel's report, and specifically checked his work on computer C.
Detective Mantel's conclusions were not suppressed
While forced to admit that the defense received the Mantel report, the Scott report,
and Mr. Miller's letters, Mr. Hilton likens his case to Stenson, 174 Wn.2d 474, in which
evidence was accessible to the defense but not in any meaningful manner. The evidence
of Stenson's guilt for two murders was largely circumstantial, but two key pieces of
evidence admitted at trial directly tied him to the shootings: (1) gunshot residue (GSR)
found inside the front right pocket ofjeans that Stenson was wearing when officers
arrived at his house, and (2) blood spatter on the front ofthose jeans that was consistent
with one of the victim's blood protein profile. Id. at 478. Fifteen years after his
conviction, postconviction counsel received (1) photographs taken before the testing of
the pockets for GSR, showing a sheriff s detective wearing Stenson's jeans with the right
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pocket turned out and showing the detective's ungloved hands, and (2) an FBI file
containing the GSR test results that revealed a person named Lundy, and not the State's
expert Peele, as Peele's trial testimony had implied, had performed the GSR tests at the
FBI laboratory. Id. at 479-80.
A defense investigator had been provided with pretrial access to the photographs
during a meeting with Rod Englert, a State's expert. Mr. Englert-who had been
provided with the defendant's pants on April 14, 1994-had turned the pockets out on
that date to look for blood evidence. Id. at 480. Mr. Englert also recommended at that
time that the pockets be tested for GSR, which they were, six days later-qfier having
been handled by the ungloved law enforcement officer. The State argued that it had not
suppressed the photograph because it had been available to the defense investigator from
Mr. Englert's file. But a trial court later found in a reference hearing that nothing in
materials provided to the defense team stated that the Englert examination had included
turning the pockets out or anyone being ungloved. Id. at 482. The appellate court agreed
with the trial court that the fact that the detective put his ungloved hand in the pocket
before the GSR testing '''should have been disclosed.'" Id. at 490.
Mr. Hilton contends that as with expert Englert in Stenson, the fact that the State
did not intend to call Detective Mantel made it reasonable for the defense to conclude
that he had nothing relevant to the case and no further inquiry was needed. Mr. Hilton
further asserts it was reasonable for the defense to rely on the State's constitutional
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requirement not to violate due process by presenting a theory when it possessed evidence
that disproved the theory. Mr. Hilton asserts that it was the Fluckiger confinnation that
would have pointed defense counsel to the truth about the use of computer C by a person
at 8:07 p.m., thereby rendering it material for Brady purposes and its withholding
prejudicial.
We reject Mr. Hilton's arguments. First, it is undisputed that the State disclosed
Detective Mantel's report to the defense before the first trial. Unlike the photographs in
Stenson, whose significance arose from their timing-something not apparent from the
photographs-the significance that Mr. Hilton attaches to Detective Mantel's report is
manifest in the detective's statement in the report that "user initiated activity [on
computer C] ended at 8:07:33 PM on 3/20102." Br. in Support ofPRP, Appendix C at 5.
Mr. Hilton points out that the information was among 2,000 pages of discovery, the
infonnation about the activity on computer C was in a single sentence on page 5 of the
report, and the State's witness summary for Detective Mantel stated only that he had
examined Kevin Hilton's computer. But the State has no obligation under Brady to point
the defense to specific documents within a larger mass of material that it has already
turned over. Mullen, 171 Wn.2d at 896. Moreover, as the Mullen court explained:
[W]here "a defendant has enough infonnation to be able to ascertain the
supposed Brady material on his own, there is no suppression by the
government." [United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.
1991)]. '''[W]here the defendant is aware of the essential facts enabling
him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence, the Government does
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not commit a Brady violation by not bringing the evidence to the attention
of the defense.'" Raley v. Ylst, 470 F.3d 792,804 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
United States v. Brown, 582 F.2d 197,200 (2d Cir.l978)).
Mullen, 171 Wn.2d at 896 (footnote omitted).
Besides having the Mantel report, the defense had Detective Scott's report
revealing the prosecutor's interest in computer C. The Scott report stated that Battelle's
Mr. Fluckiger had been asked to review the Mantel report with respect to the "work Det.
Mantel had done on 'Computer C'" and that Mr. Fluckiger needed and was provided
with "the Encase[ ] files for Computer C." PRP of Hilton, Holt Declaration, Exhibit 3 at
1. The prosecutor's subsequent letter to the defense stated that his office was working
with Battelle to see if its personnel might be able to review the hard drives and testify to
what Detective Mantel would have testified to. The defense had the essential facts to
which it now attaches significance.
We also observe, as relevant to this ground for relief and the next, that it is a
mischaracterization of the Mantel report to say that it states or opines that someone was
physically using the Ulrichs' downstairs computer at 8:07 p.m. on March 20. It does not.
Mr. Hilton supports his petition with an unsigned "declaration" from Detective Mantel,
which was prepared based upon an interview of Detective Mantel by defense investigator
Winthrop Taylor in 2012. Mr. Taylor states that the unsigned declaration is an accurate
account of matters Detective Mantel would testify to if called. Detective Mantel's
unsigned declaration explains the meaning of the "user initiated activity" he was looking
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for in 2002 as "the last activity on the computer that was not associated with any
automated recurring computer initiated programs." Pet'r's Br. in Support ofPRP,
Appendix D, at 3. He states that making that determination is a subjective expert opinion
that depends on an examiner's expertise and training in computer forensics. He prepared
his 2002 report in anticipation that he would either be deposed by a defense expert or
called to testify in court and his report sat on top of other files that would have allowed
him, at the time, easy access to the underlying data from which he drew his conclusions.
Although he was provided by Mr. Taylor in 2012 with a CD that appeared to contain his
report, he was unable to rebuild the supporting documents from the disk. While he
recalls it was important to make sure there was not some isolated recurring computer
generated program or non-user activity before he reached his conclusion that the activity
on computer C was user initiated, no underlying data is presented or explained.
The report's subjective opinion that user initiated activity ended at 8:07 p.m.
therefore does not shed light on when the user initiated activity began, the time of the last
certain human contact with the computer, or whether the computer merely tiined-out at
8:07 p.m. after a period of human inactivity.
Unlike in Stenson where material exculpatory evidence was suppressed by the
State, the Mantel report was never suppressed. In addition to full disclosure of the core
evidence-the report-the State notified the defense that it was exploring whether
Battelle would be able to provide an expert to testify to the matters otherwise expected
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from Detective Mantel, disclosed a report revealing that it had an interest in Detective
Mantel's work on computer C, and provided a report identifying Mr. Fluckiger by name.
The Fluckiger assessment and explanation was not material
Mr. Hilton is correct that the State never informed the defense of what Mr.
Fluckiger ultimately told Mr. Miller in 2003. But Mr. Hilton cannot demonstrate that the
Fluckiger assessment was material.
Mr. Fluckiger could add nothing, because he did not examine the actual files in the
computer and did not look at the hard drive. He did no analysis of his own and never
issued a report. He only looked at Detective Mantel's presentation and confirmed that he
felt comfortable that the information Detective Mantel had provided was fairly sound. 3
The State merely failed to disclose that, having been told by Battelle that he could not
testify as an expert, Mr. Fluckiger spoke with Mr. Miller, told Mr. Miller what he
understood the detective's report to say, and expressed his view that the report appeared
3 Although not dispositive of the petition, we reject as unsupported the State's
alternative theory that Detective Mantel's report is not material for Brady purposes
because he may have failed to account for the April 7, 2002 change to daylight savings
time when he did his report in September 2002. The State posits that if Detective Mantel
made this mistake in failing to realize the computer clock had set itself ahead one hour,
the true time that user initiated activity ended would have been 7:07 p.m. on March 20,
thus fitting well within the 6:42 p.m. to 7:41 p.m. timeframe for Mr. Hilton to have
committed the murders. But Detective Mantel's report indicates he examined the
computer on April 2, 2002-prior to daylight savings time taking effect on April 7.
Detective Mantel's report also indicates he confirmed the computer time with satellite
time. Pet'r's Br. in Support ofPRP, App. Cat 3.
20
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
competently prepared. This inconsequential assessment of information available to the
defense could not reasonably put the prosecution of Mr. Hilton in such a different light as
to undermine confidence in the verdict.
In a statement of additional authorities, Mr. Hilton calls our attention to Lapointe
v. Commissioner o/Correction, 316 Conn. 225, 112 A.3d 1 (2015), a rape/murder/arson
conviction where the petitioner received a new trial in state habeas proceedings due to the
prosecution's Brady violation for withholding the lead detective (Ludlow's) note
referencing the expert opinion of state fire investigators about the particular timeframe in
which the fire could have started. The Ludlow note was not disclosed to defense counsel
before trial. Lacking the exculpatory information, counsel did not call a witness (Martin)
who would have testified that the defendant was home watching television with her
during the entire relevant timeframe. The defendant was thus deprived of evidence
"establishing a complete and potentially compelling alibi [defense], thereby gravely
undermining the [validity] of the verdict" and entitling him to a new trial. Id. at 349.
Lapointe is also not helpful to Mr. Hilton. Unlike in that case, where expert
opinion was present but suppressed under Brady, the Mantel report was not withheld
from Mr. Hilton. And unlike in LapOinte, Mr. Hilton demonstrates no complete and
potentially compelling alibi claim that he failed to present as a result of a State
nondisclosure.
21
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
Mr. Hilton fails his burden under Cook of showing constitutional error in the form
of a due process violation under Brady.
Ground 2: Denial ofDue Process by the State's Knowing
Presentation ofand Reliance on False and Misleading Evidence to
the Court and Jury
Mr. Hilton next contends that the State presented known false and misleading
evidence and thus violated his right to due process in two ways: (1) failing to inform the
jury of the critical 8:07 p.m. usage ofUlrichs' downstairs computer when presenting its
time line for the murders, and (2) falsely informing the trial court (and this court in the
direct appeal) that a 2008 DNA4 test excluded Lisa Ulrich as the source of DNA on the
shell casings.
It is fundamental that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
cannot tolerate a state criminal conviction obtained by knowing use of false evidence or
improper manipulation of material evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 677, 105
S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,92 S. Ct.
763,31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 785, 17 L. Ed. 2d 690
(1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S. Ct. 1173,3 L. Ed. 2d 1217 (1959); Alcorta
v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S. Ct. 103,2 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1957); see also Troedel v.
Wainwright, 667 F. Supp. 1456, 1458 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (term "false evidence" includes
4 Deoxyribonucleic acid.
22
No. 3l955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
the "introduction of specific misleading evidence important to the prosecution's case in
chief [or] the nondisclosure of specific evidence valuable to the accused's defense.")
(quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637,647,94 S. Ct. 1868,401. Ed. 2d 431
(1974)). A new trial is required if the false evidence could in any reasonable likelihood
have affected the verdict. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153; Napue, 360 U.S. at 271; see Brown v.
Borg, 951 F.2d 10 11, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991).
Ulrich Computer Usage and a Murder Timeline
Mr. Hilton contends the State violated his right to due process by presenting a
knowingly inaccurate theory that he killed the Ulrichs before 7:41 p.m., even though the
State was aware from Detective Mantel's report and the confirmation from Mr. Fluckiger
that user initiated activity on the Ulrichs' downstairs computer continued until 8:07 p.m.
Mr. Hilton asserts that due process was violated by the State's failure to disclose the
Fluckiger confirmation to the defense and its presentation of the false impression that the
Ulrichs were dead before 7:41 p.m. He insists that the fact someone else was using the
Ulrichs' computer while he was at his home on his own computer, and after the State
theorized the Ulrichs were dead, puts the case in an entirely different light.
In addition to arguing the Ulrich computer evidence is not material but only
speculative, the State argues that it did not assert that the killings occurred before 7 :41
p.m.; rather, it left the timeframe open, relying on Mr. Hilton's discredited explanations
for his whereabouts for most of the evening and night of the murders.
23
No. 31955·5·111
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
The record bears out the State's position. In opening statement, the prosecutor did
not suggest a particular timeframe for the murders. He said the evidence would show Mr.
Hilton had plenty of time to murder the Ulrichs after Lisa Ulrich and her children left
during dinner time and before he arrived at his volleyball game.
In closing argument, the State argued in general terms that Mr. Hilton had plenty
of opportunity to commit the murders given the timeframe in which the Ulrichs died
according to the pathology experts. It argued broadly that "[d]uring the period of time
when Larry and Jo Ulrich were most likely murdered, the defendant cannot account for
his whereabouts. And then the defendant can't account for his whereabouts after 10:45
p.m." RP (Feb. 13,2008) at 3816·17. The prosecutor also suggested that Mr. Hilton
might have been at the Ulrich home both before and after volleyball on the night of the
murders, asking, "Did the defendant go back? Very, very possible." Id. at 3817. The
prosecutor emphasized Mr. Hilton's failed grocery store and library alibis, his inability to
prove his whereabouts after the 6:42 p.m. telephone call to the Ulrichs, and his
explanation to volleyball teammates (but not to police) of his unusual lateness due to a
garbage spill in his kitchen. In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor told the jury that the
Ulrichs were murdered on the night of March 20, and "[y]ou can set any time you want
from maybe 6:00 to 10:00, according to Doctor Selove and Doctor Reay, but that's when
they were murdered." Id. at 3896.
24
No. 31955-5-111
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
It was only defense counsel who proposed timeframes to the jury in order to shoot
them down. During opening statement, defense counsel contended that the State would
be stuck arguing that the murder occurred roughly between 7:40 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., with
Mr. Hilton getting off the Internet, scrambling over to the Ulrichs, shooting them,
running around the house and grabbing things, dragging bodies around and then calmly
showing up at volleyball at 8:30 p.m. In its closing argument, the defense focused on a
different timeframe, arguing that the 59-minute period from Mr. Hilton's 6:42 p.m.
telephone call to the Ulrichs until his computer logon at 7:41 p.m. was insufficient time
for him to commit the murders, clean up, and get ready to go to volleyball. Defense
counsel argued that Mr. Hilton was home on the Internet at 7:41 p.m. and again at 7:58
p.m. for over 10 minutes, and that a person who just committed murder would not be
sitting casually on the Internet for 10 minutes before cleaning up spilled garbage and
walking out the door to volleyball.
Thus only the defense, not the State, argued that the killings had to occur either
before or after 7:41 p.m.
In his reply brief, Mr. Hilton is forced to concede that the State did not commit to
a timeframe for the murder in the second trial. But he points out that the State did
commit to a 6:42 p.m. to 7:41 p.m. timeframe in the first trial and suggests that "perhaps"
the State "backed away from [the] time commitment" "because the prosecutor realized
this time was impossible given the evidence it possessed." Pet'r's Reply Br. at 31. Mr.
25
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
Hilton persists in arguing that the State created false inferences it knows were not
possible, even if no specific piece of evidence and no specific argument was false.
Pet'r's Reply Br. at 27. Yet Mr. Hilton is unable to direct us to even that evidence or
argument, general or specific, that he contends created false inferences.
Essentially, Mr. Hilton's position is that once the State invited the jury to consider
the entire 6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. timeframe, it was obliged to affirmatively present the
jury with Detective Mantel's conclusion about user initiated activity and concede that for
some time between 7:58:35 p.m. and 8:07:33 p.m., some human being other than Kevin
Hilton was using the downstairs computer at the Ulrich home at the same time that Kevin
Hilton was at his own home, using the Internet, thereby making it impossible for Mr.
Hilton to have committed the murder before his 8:30 p.m. arrival at volleyball.
The State's response offers several reasons why the evidence does not require any
such concession.
It points out first, as we previously touched upon, that Detective Mantel's
conclusion that user initiated activity on the Ulrichs' downstairs computer ended at
8:07:33 p.m. does not mean that someone was physically at the computer until that time.
Resp. to Pers. Restraint Pet. at 19 (Resp.) ("[User initiated activity] does not provide a
definite time at which a person stepped away from the computer.... Detective Mantel's
report does not conclude that an individual was definitely on the Ulrich computer at
8:07:33 p.m.").
26
No. 3 I 955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
It points out that Mr. Hilton might have been the person using the Ulrichs'
computer after 8:00 p.m. Resp. at 21 ("After murdering the Ulrich[s], the evidence
shows that the defendant took incriminating evidence from their residence. . .. He may
have checked the Ulrich computer to see ifhe could find any obvious evidence pointing
to him."). While Mr. Short, the defense computer expert, testified that a computer at Mr.
Hilton's home was engaged in Internet use from 7:58:35 p.m. to 8:10:24 p.m., the State
points out that Mr. Short agreed that the use could have been automated; Mr. Hilton
didn't need to be there. 5 Resp. at 17 ("[The 7:58:35 log onto the Internet] was less likely
to be human involved, according to the defendant's computer expert"); id. at 22 ("[N]o
5 As Mr. Hilton points out, the prosecutor stated at one point during his closing
argument that, "We know [Mr. Hilton's] home at 7:41. We know that at 7:58 to 8:09
he's on the [I]nternet." RP (Feb. 13,2008) at 3816. Mr. Hilton argues in his reply brief
that the prosecutor's statement in closing argument was a concession by the State and that
the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel now bars the State from making a directly contradictory
factual assertion. It cites no case holding that the State cannot recognize the reality on
appeal that evidence presented to the jury supported findings different from those that it
advanced in closing.
Mr. Short's testimony unquestionably allowed for the possibility that the Internet
use on Mr. Hilton's computer between 7:58:35 p.m. and 8: 10:24 p.m. was automated. RP
(Feb. 7, 2008) at 3261,3268. Jurors who were paying attention to Mr. Short's testimony
could have analyzed the evidence with that fact in mind notwithstanding the prosecutor's
single concession during lengthy closing arguments that Mr. Hilton was on the Internet at
7:58 p.m. (the closing arguments took most of an afternoon and account for almost 100
pages of the report of proceedings). The jurors were instructed, "It is important ... for
you to remember that the lawyers' statements are not evidence." RP (Feb. 13,2008) at
3791.
27
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ojHilton
one, including the defendant's computer expert, can state that the defendant was home
between 7:41 and 8:30 p.m.").
It points out that given the short distances involved and the likelihood that traffic
was light, it would have been possible for Mr. Hilton to leave his home at 8: 10 p.m.,
commit the murders, and still arrive at volleyball around 8:30 p.m. Resp. at 20-21 (Mr.
Hilton "had sufficient time to fire five shots at the Ulrich[s], make a quick search for
incriminate[ing] evidence, [missing some, ... and] would have been able to appear
within minutes at the volleyball game").
Mr. Hilton relies heavily on four cases: Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. I; Alcorta v.
Texas, 355 U.S. 28; Brown v. Borg, 951 F.2d 1011; and this court's opinion inState v.
Martinez, 121 Wn. App. 21, 86 P.3d 1210 (2004). But in all of those cases, the
defendants could point to false testimony known to the State, or false argument by the
State.
In Miller, the prosecutor made repeated references to the murder defendant's
"bloody shorts" that were allegedly stained with blood matching the victim's blood type.
The shorts were a key part of the prosecution's case, yet they were not actually the
defendant's shorts and the prosecutor knew at the time of trial that it was not blood on the
shorts, rather paint. The Court held that the prosecutor's knowing use of false evidence
violated the defendant's due process rights and warranted reversal of the conviction.
Miller, 386 U.S. at 5-7.
28
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
In Alcorta, the defendant was charged with murdering his wife while she sat in a
car kissing another man, Castilleja. Because Alcorta suspected the two were having an
affair, he claimed the killing was murder without malice, but in a fit of passion.
Castilleja testified for the State and denied any sexual relationship. Alcorta was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Castilleja later provided a sworn statement
admitting he had falsely testified at trial and that he had in fact had sexual relations with
the defendant's wife. Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 30. In habeas proceedings, the prosecutor
admitted knowing of the perjury, withholding the information from Alcorta, and taking
no steps to have Castilleja testify truthfully. The Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor's failure to correct known false testimony violated due process. Id. at 31-32.
In Brown, the defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder based upon
the prosecution's theory that he was involved in killing the victim during a robbery. A
detective testified to his opinion that the victim was killed during a robbery because a
ring was found on the ground, but his gold chains and wallet were missing. In closing,
the prosecutor argued there was no testimony that any property of value was found on the
victim. Brown, 951 F .2d at 1013. In fact the prosecutor knew during trial, but did not
inform the detective or defense counsel, that the victim's wallet and gold chains had been
given to his relatives by hospital personnel, who presumably had discovered them on his
person. Id. at 1014. The court found reversible misconduct because the prosecutor was
"[p]ossessed of knowledge that destroyed her theory of the case," and "had a duty not to
29
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
mislead the jury. Instead, she kept the facts secret in the face of a long-standing rule of
constitutional stature requiring disclosure, and then presented testimony in such a way as
to suggest the opposite of what she alone knew to be true: that the wallet and chains had
not been stolen in a robbery." Id. at 1015.
In Martinez, 121 Wn. App. 21, a State's witness identified two guns used in a
robbery as weapons the defendant had shown her in December 1999. The State
determined during pretrial investigation that the witness could not have correctly
identified one of the guns because it belonged to a third party until October 2000, but
rather than inform the defense, the prosecutor dissembled in opening statement, telling
the jury that it was expected the witness would identify the guns in some fashion: "[S]he
can't tell you that these are the same guns, I think she will say that they just looked the
same." Id. at 26. The prosecutor later notified the defense it would not question the
witness about the gun lineup and it was eventually revealed that the gun identified by the
witness could not have been the same gun used in the robbery. Id. at 28.
In upholding the trial court's dismissal of the charges for governmental
misconduct under erR 8.3(b), this court ruled that substantial evidence supported the fact
that the State waited so long to provide the exculpatory evidence to the defense as to be
"repugnant to principles of fundamental fairness" and a violation of due process.
Martinez, 121 Wn. App. at 35. The defendant was prejudiced in his right to counsel and
30
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
denied effective assistance because the late discovery compromised defense counsel's
ability to adequately prepare for trial. Id. at 34-35.
Unlike the defendants in Miller, Alcorta, Brown, and Martinez, Mr. Hilton is
unable to point to any false or misleading evidence or information that was relied on,
secreted, or proffered by the State. All he can show is that the State refused to draw or
argue the inferences that he would have drawn from the available evidence and chose not
to offer Detective Mantel's testimony or the results of his computer review. While every
"prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer" of the court, State v. Huson, 73 Wn.2d 660,663,
440 P .2d 192 (1968), charged with the duty of ensuring that an accused receives a fair
trial, the State was not required to present both its own and the defense case.
Mr. Hilton makes no showing, as is his burden under Cook, that the State misled
the jury with any false evidence or false inference.
DNA Report re Lisa Ulrich
Mr. Hilton next contends the prosecutor falsely informed the court during the
second trial that a 2008 DNA test excluded Lisa Ulrich as the source of DNA on the shell
casings. During trial, Washington State Patrol Crime Laboratory scientist Charles
Solomon testified that he tested the three shell casings from the murder scene and found
no detectable DNA on anyone shell casing, but was able to combine extracts from all
three to obtain a very small sample. He concluded the DNA came from female sources,
conclusively excluding Mr. Hilton. Mr. Solomon said laboratory tester Lisa Turpen
31
No.31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
could possibly have left her DNA on the sample during testing and he could not exclude
her or other females with allele matches. He also found DNA consistent with Ms.
Turpin's profile on an extract from one bullet found at the crime scene. Mr. Hilton and
the victims were excluded as a match for the DNA on that bullet.
After Mr. Solomon's testimony, and before Ms. Turpen testified, the State
proposed to offer a January 28, 2008 DNA report completed by Ms. Turpen. When asked
by the court for an offer of proof of what was new in this recent report, the prosecutor
stated:
Ms. Turpen did a DNA analysis of Jennifer Ulrich, Lisa Ulrich, and Carly
Connell and compared their DNA profiles to the shell casings and the bullet
Mr. Solomon testified about this morning, and that she concluded that none
of those three individuals contributed DNA to the shell casings or the
bullet.
RP (Feb. 1,2008) at 2670-71. The court denied admission of the report because ofits
late disclosure to the defense.
The prosecutor's offer of proof was mistaken. Ms. Turpen's report actually
stated with reference to Jennifer Ulrich, Lisa Ulrich, and Lisa's daughter, Carly Connell,
that no comparisons can be made to the trace DNA profile of limited genetic information
obtained from the combined extract of the shell casings and the extract of bullet 16. The
State concedes that the offer of proof was mistaken and overstated the conclusions of the
DNA report. It points out that it was not attempting to mislead the trial judge.
32
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
The offer of proof was made in connection with the State's request to offer
evidence that was excluded, and Mr. Hilton does not assign error to the report's
exclusion. His argument why the overstatement is reversible error is an attenuated one:
he contends that it was "material to the conclusion that defense counsel presented
insufficient evidence to allow its theory that Lisa Ulrich was the murderer." Br. in
Support ofPRP at 38.
The offer of proof was not made in connection with any argument about the
sufficiency of evidence to support a third party perpetrator theory. In fact, it is the law of
the case, based on this court's decision in the second appeal, that Mr. Hilton "never
sought to blame [Lisa Ulrich] for the killings and does not get to change his theory on
appeal." Hilton, 164 Wn. App. at 98.
While this court went on to hold in the second appeal that Mr. Hilton had not
presented or offered sufficient evidence to blame Ms. Ulrich for the killings in any event,
we would never weigh an offer of proof, followed by the exclusion of evidence, as if the
offer of proof was itself evidence-nor did we. In discussing the insufficiency of Mr.
Hilton's third party perpetrator evidence in the second appeal, no consideration was given
to the possibility that DNA evidence that was never admitted might have cut against the
theory. Id. at 100-01.
Mr. Hilton separately asks us to reconsider the sufficiency of his third party
perpetrator evidence in connection with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which
33
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
we do below. As discussed hereafter, since the State's mistaken overstatement never
factored into the decision on the second appeal, the disclosure that it was an
overstatement does not require reconsideration.
Mr. Hilton fails in his burden under Cook on his due process claims in ground 2.
Ground 3: Ineffective Assistance ofCounsel
Mr. Hilton next claims his trial lawyers were ineffective for failing to (1)
adequately investigate and present the State's evidence of his alibi (the Mantel report),
and (2) make an adequate offer of proof of their intent to present a third party suspect
defense.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Hilton must show that his
attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State
v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322,334-35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). A petitioner demonstrates
deficient performance by showing that counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Rice, 118 Wn.2d at 888. "In this regard,
the court must make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight and must
[ ] presume that counsel's conduct constituted sound trial strategy." Rice, 118 Wn.2d at
888-89 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Defense counsel's duties include making a
reasonable investigation or making a reasonable decision that a particular investigation is
unnecessary. Rice, 118 Wn.2d at 889. Defense counsel's decision not to investigate
34
No. 31955-5-II1
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
must be assessed in light of all the circumstances. Id. To show deficient performance,
the petitioner must show the absence of any conceivable legitimate trial tactic explaining
counsel's performance. Statev. Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 PJd 1260(2011);Statev.
Reichenbach, 153 Wn.2d 126, 130, 101 PJd 80 (2004). To demonstrate prejudice, a
petitioner must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the [trial] would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694.
A. Inadequate investigation ofalibi evidence
Mr. Hilton supports his claim of inadequate investigation of alibi evidence with
the declaration of his trial co-counsel, Kevin L. Holt, who states that he was the attorney
primarily responsible in trial preparation for investigating and presenting the computer
evidence. Mr. Holt acknowledges receiving the Mantel report in discovery. But he says
he never understood from the report that Detective Mantel had determined a person was
using the Ulrichs' computer at 8:07 p.m. on the night of the murders, and had he
understood that fact, he would have called him to testifY. Mr. Holt further states he was
never informed that Mr. Fluckiger had confirmed Detective Mantel's conclusion that a
person was using the Ulrichs' computer at 8:07 p.m. and, had he understood, he would
have interviewed and called Mr. Fluckiger to testifY. Mr. Holt states he had no strategic
purpose in not presenting evidence to the jury that a person was using the Ulrichs'
35
No. 31955-5-II1
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
computer at 8:07 p.m., when it was undisputed that Mr. Hilton was at home on his
computer from 7:58 to 8:10 p.m. Mr. Holt states the evidence would have contradicted
the prosecution's theory that Mr. Hilton killed the Ulrichs before he arrived home at 7:41
p.m., and would have meant either that they were still alive at 8:07 p.m., or the real killer
was there using their computer. Mr. Holt states he would have argued that the evidence
supported the theory that Lisa Ulrich was the killer because she had used her parents'
computer earlier that day to purchase event tickets and knew how to use it.
Mr. Hilton's co-counsel, Peter Connick, makes similar statements, although Mr.
Connick does not remember seeing Detective Mantel's 6-page report. He says he
undoubtedly reviewed it if it was provided in discovery.
Mr. Hilton now contends his attorneys Holt and Connick performed deficiently
by not following up on the Mantel report. He faults counsel for not sufficiently
interviewing Detective Mantel to learn the meaning of his conclusion, and for not having
their own expert examine the Ulrichs' computers. He concludes he was prejudiced by
counsels' failures because had they presented Detective Mantel's conclusion that
someone was using the Ulrichs' computer until 8:07 p.m., it would have refuted the
State's theory and given the jury the persuasive missing piece to verifY his alibi.
Mr. Hilton compares his lawyers' omissions to several cases where convictions
were reversed because counsel did not follow up on known exculpatory evidence that
refuted the prosecution theory of the case. First is Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321 (9th
36
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Duncan v. Baylor, 520 U.S. 1151, 117 S. Ct. 1329, l37 L. Ed. 2d
489 (1997), where the defendant was convicted of sexual assault. A criminologist's
pretrial report concluded that seminal fluid tests tended to eliminate the defendant as the
donor because he was a "secretor" and the semen donor was not. Baylor's counsel knew
of the reports, but never followed up with the criminalist or sought testing by another
expert. Counsel was unable to subpoena the criminalist during the trial because he was
on vacation. The jury therefore never learned about the report. Id. at l323. In
postconviction proceedings, the court found counsel ineffective for failure to adequately
investigate the known potentially exculpatory evidence and reversed the convictions. Id.
at l323-24.
In Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), the defendant's conviction for the
rape and murder of a girl was reversed for ineffective assistance because counsel failed to
call, or personally interview, three boys who claimed to have seen the victim alive a day
after petitioner was supposed to have killed her. Counsel conceded in habeas
proceedings that the boys' statements dovetailed with the defense and would not have
opened the door to any damaging evidence and presentation of their exculpatory
testimony would have entailed no risk to the defense. Id. at 1093.
In Sims v. Livesay, 970 F.2d 1575 (6th Cir. 1992), the defendant was convicted
of murdering his wife. The prosecution theory was that he shot her from a distance as she
lay in bed. The defendant claimed he entered the room to find her sitting in bed holding
37
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
the gun and intending to shoot herself and that she did so as he grabbed for the gun. Id. at
1576-77. Before trial, defense counsel was in possession of an FBI report revealing there
was gunpowder residue on a quilt on the bed. This evidence would have contradicted the
prosecutor's theory that the defendant shot the victim from a distance. Counsel was
aware that the prosecution would use the lack of powder marks on the victim to argue the
victim was shot from a distance, but failed to investigate the FBI report and did not
introduce the quilt into evidence. Id. at 1580. In reversing the conviction due to
ineffective assistance of counsel, the court reasoned the FBI report disclosed facts
suggesting the State's theory was easily refutable, and moreover, presented the defense
with a theory of the case that fully squared with the defendant's version of the events. Id.
at 1580-81.
In Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2003), the court found counsel's
performance deficient for failure to present either of two witnesses who could
conclusively verify the defendant's alibi that he was at Knott's Berry Farm at the time
that the murder victim disappeared from another location. In presenting the alibi, the
attorney relied instead on the testimony of witnesses who could only vaguely recall
corroborating circumstances. The court held that "[ w]hen defense counsel undertakes to
establish an alibi, but does not present available evidence of the time or even the date of
the alibi, or offer a strategic reason for failing to do so, his actions are unreasonable." Id.
at 871-72.
38
No. 3 1955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
Finally, in Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2013), the defendant was
convicted of committing lewd and lascivious acts on his stepdaughter. He alleged his
counsel was ineffective because he ignored evidence that the victim had recanted her
allegations in an Internet posting to a friend. Id. at 1161. Cannedy's "trial was largely a
'he said, she said' case, with no physical evidence linking [Cannedy] to the alleged
abuse." Id. He was the sole defense witness, and his only defense was that the victim
had fabricated the allegations. Id. The Internet posting would have explained the
victim's motive to implicate Cannedy falsely. Id. The court held that under these
circumstances, "[n]o competent lawyer would have declined to interview such a
potentially favorable witness when that witness had been clearly identified, the witness
was easily accessible and willing to provide information, and trial counsel faced a dearth
of defense witnesses." Id.
None of these cases are helpful to Mr. Hilton because all involved counsel's
failure to investigate evidence that was exculpatory on its face-in Baylor the defendant
was a "secretor" and the semen donor was not; in Lord the three boys said they saw the
victim alive a day after petitioner supposedly killed her; in Sims there was gunpowder
residue on the quilt; in Alcala the witnesses verified the defendant's alibi that he was at
Knott's Berry Farm when the murder victim disappeared from elsewhere; and in Cannedy
the victim recanted her allegations in an Internet posting to a friend.
39
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
In contrast, Detective Mantel's subjective opinion about "user initiated activity"
does not establish when hands-on use ended, and for that and the other reasons identified
by the State (that Mr. Hilton could have been the last user of the Ulrichs' computer and
that he had time to commit the murders after 8:10 p.m.) the Mantel report does not clinch
his defense.
In a second statement of additional authority, Mr. Hilton calls our attention to
Crace v. Herzog, 798 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2015). There, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's granting of habeas relief to the petitioner Hoyt Crace on
grounds he received ineffective assistance under Strickland because his trial counsel
failed to request a jury instruction on misdemeanor unlawful disp lay of a weapon as a
lesser included offense of second degree assault. The jury convicted Crace of the lesser
degree offense of attempted second degree assault-his third strike resulting in a life
sentence without possibility of parole. But the evidence entitled Crace to the unlawful
display of a weapon instruction had he requested it, and conviction for that offense
instead of the felony would have avoided a third strike.
In determining that counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland, the
court reasoned:
Crace's attorney's failure to request the instruction was neither strategic nor
deliberate. In a declaration ... he explicitly stated that the "only reason
[he] did not offer a lesser included instruction for unlawful display ofa
weapon was because [he] did not consider it." ... [T]he declaration is
properly before us and the state has made no attempt to dispute its
40
No. 31955-5-II1
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
assertions. We therefore conclude that Crace's counsel made no strategic
decision to forgo a lesser included offense instruction that commands our
deference, and we hold that his outright failure even to consider the
possibility of requesting a lesser included offense constituted deficient
performance.
Crace, at 852 (2nd, 3rd and 6th alterations in original).
The court concluded that Crace was prejudiced by counsel's shortcoming because
the evidence would have allowed the jury to rationally choose to convict Crace only of
unlawful display of a weapon and it was reasonably probable the jury would have done
so. Crace, at 850-51. This probability, the court concluded, is '" sufficient to undermine
[our] confidence in the outcome'" so as to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Id.
at 851 (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Here, as in Crace, we take at face value the unrefuted declarations of Mr. Hilton's
attorneys that they, in essence, simply overlooked Detective Mantel's supposed
conclusion that someone was using the Ulrichs' computer until 8:07 p.m. But unlike in
Crace where the admitted evidence readily warranted the critical lesser included
instruction, any deficient performance by Mr. Hilton's lawyers did not give rise to
prejudice when the premise that a person was physically present at the Ulrichs' keyboard
is purely speculative and thus cannot support Mr. Hilton's alibi and theory that Lisa
Ulrich was the killer. Crace is therefore not helpful to Mr. Hilton.
41
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
Mr. Hilton is unable to show the essential element of prejudice from his lawyers'
failure to investigate the Mantel report, call Detective Mantel or Mr. Fluckiger as a
witness, or have his own expert examine the Ulrichs' computer.
Mr. Hilton fails his burden under Cook on this claim.
B. Inadequate offer ofproofre third party suspect defense
Finally, Messrs. Holt and Connick state in declarations filed in support of the
petition that, contrary to our inference from the record in the second appeal that they
never sought to blame Lisa Ulrich for the murders, they fully intended to present that
third party perpetrator theory, and that their failure to articulate that intent was their error.
They state it was not for any tactical or strategic purpose. They state they also intended
to make an adequate record to preserve the issue for appeal. They believed the court's
exclusion of this evidence and argument was the trial court's most serious error,
completely frustrating their ability to defend Mr. Hilton.
Relying on Griffin v. Harrington, 727 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 20l3), Mr. Hilton now
claims that counsels' failure to make a clearer record of their intent to present the third
party perpetrator theory was deficient performance that prejudiced him because it denied
him the right to present the meritorious defense at trial and defeated appellate review of
the issue.
In Griffin, a prison inmate (Wilberger) alone implicated the defendant for
murder in a recorded statement to police. But defense counsel (Aval) knew Wilberger
42
No. 31955-5-II1
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
would testify differently from his statement and that the State would then offer his
previously recorded statement as substantive evidence. When Wilberger was called to
testify, he refused to take the oath. Griffin, 727 F.3d at 942. With no objection from
defense counsel, the trial court nonetheless proceeded with questioning of Wilberger by
the State and cross-examination by defense counsel. Wilberger denied implicating the
defendant. Id. at 943. When the State sought to admit his recorded statement the next
day, defense counsel objected on the grounds Wilberger had not testified under oath. The
trial court ruled counsel had waived the objection by not making it when the witness was
on the stand. The jury convicted Griffin. Id. The conviction was upheld on appeal, and
in a state habeas proceeding where the court concluded counsel had a credible tactical
reason for failing to object to the testimony. Id. at 944.
On federal habeas, the district court granted Griffin's writ and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed on appeal. The court explained:
We have no doubt from the record and from Aval's declaration that he
knew during Wilberger's testimony that his statements in court-in Aval's
words-"were made without any oath [and] could not technically be
considered evidence." What Aval did not know and what he did not
comprehend under settled state law, however, was that by failing timely to
object to that testimony in combination with conducting cross-examination,
he was waiving any objection he might have had to Wilberger's testimony.
The dire consequences of his ignorance on this point was first, that
Wilberger's prior inconsistent inculpatory statement then became
admissible against his client; and second, that his client would be barred on
appeal from raising any issue related to Wilberger's sworn testimony. We
repeat the California Court of Appeal's holding on direct appeal: "Because
defense counsel did not object to Wilberger's testimony but instead went on
43
No. 31955-5-111
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
to cross-examine him, any objection to Wilberger's testimony due to the
oath taking issue was waived."
Thus, by waiting to object until after Wilberger had been excused as
a witness, and until the next day, Aval unwittingly sealed his client's fate,
both at the trial and on appeal. He subsequently admitted that his failure
immediately to object was a mistake because he thereby failed "to preserve
the question for Mr. Griffin's appeal."
Griffin, 727 F.3d at 945-946 (alterations in original).
Ultimately, the court held that Griffin was prejudiced by counsel's shortcomings
in unwittingly waiving his client's confrontation rights when Wilberger's disclaimed
prior inconsistent statement constituted the only evidence in the prosecution's case that
Griffin was the shooter. Id. at 948. And on top of other "glaring deficiencies in the
prosecution's case, no physical evidence linked Griffin to the crime." Id. at 949. The
. court expressed doubt that Griffin would have been charged with the murder in the first
place without Wilberger's recorded statement. Id.
Mr. Hilton contends based on Griffin that his attorneys were likewise ineffective
because they unwittingly waived his third party perpetrator defense. He claims prejudice
because the defense was actually viable, particularly given counsel's alleged ineffective
assistance for not following up on the Mantel report and the State's misrepresentation
that the DNA report excluded Lisa Ulrich.
The State, on the other hand, contends counsel made the correct tactical decision
not to pursue a third party perpetrator argument for a reason we surmised in the second
44
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
appeal: "because the case against [Lisa Ulrich] was so weak that it would have made the
defense look desperate," Hilton, 164 Wn. App. at 102, and because there was no legal
ground for doing so anyway because Mr. Hilton could not meet his burden in the trial
court to show the evidence created a train of facts or circumstances that clearly pointed to
Ms. Ulrich as the perpetrator.
Insofar as the State's argument reflects our holdings in the direct appeal, we agree
with its contentions. But for purposes of this petition, whether Mr. Hilton (like the
defendant in Griffin) was prejudiced by any performance or omissions of counsel with
respect to the "Lisa Ulrich third party perpetrator" defense abides our resolution of Mr.
Hilton's ground 4, with the ultimate question being whether he presents additional and
sufficient third party perpetrator evidence for consideration by a jury. As we discuss
below, Mr. Hilton's arguments fail.
Ground 4: Denial ofConstitutional Right to Present a Defense
Mr. Hilton claims he was denied his constitutional right to present a defense when
the court prohibited him from presenting evidence that Lisa Ulrich was the real killer.
As a starting point, in PRPs, this court ordinarily will not review issues previously
raised and resolved on direct review unless the petitioner shows the ends ofjustice would
be served by reexamining the issue. In re Pers. Restraint ofGentry, 137 Wn.2d 378, 388,
972 P.2d 1250 (1999); see In re Pers. Restraint ofDavis, 152 Wn.2d 647,671, 101 P.3d
1 (2004). "This burden can be met by showing an intervening change in the law or some
45
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint 0/ Hilton
other justification for having failed to raise a crucial point or argument in the prior
application." Gentry, 137 Wn.2d at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re
Pers. Restraint o/Taylor, 105 Wn.2d 683, 717 P.2d 755 (1986), abrogated on other
grounds by In re Pers. Restraint o/Gentry, 179 Wn.2d 614,316 P.3d 1020 (2014)). As
explained in Gentry:
We take seriously the view that a collateral attack by PRP on a
criminal conviction and sentence should not simply be reiteration of issues
finally resolved at trial and direct review, but rather should raise new points
of fact and law that were not or could not have been raised in the principle
action, to the prejudice of the defendant.
Id. at 388-89.
Thus, in determining to what extent this court will revisit Mr. Hilton's third party
perpetrator issue, the initial focus is on whether he presents new relevant facts or points
of law not already inherent in the appeal opinion that are material to that defense. This
court applied well settled federal and state law in rejecting Mr. Hilton's third party
perpetrator issue on appeal. See Hilton, 164 Wn. App. at 99-103. We thoroughly
discussed why the facts did not support that defense even if Mr. Hilton had wanted to
raise it. Id. at 101-02. Mr. Hilton's purported new facts wiII be viewed through the same
legal principles as in the appeal, but also with heightened focus in light of the State
Supreme Court's intervening ruling inState v. Franklin, 180 Wn.2d 371,325 P.3d 159
(2014).
46
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
In Franklin, the court reiterated longstanding Washington law stemming from the
holding in State V. Downs, 168 Wash. 664, l3 P.2d 1 (1932), that other suspect evidence
is admissible only if the defendant can show "a train of facts or circumstances as tend
clearly to point out some one besides the [accused] as the guilty party." State v. Franklin,
180 Wn.2d at 379 (alteration in original) (quoting Downs, 168 Wash. at 667). The court
stated that the Downs test remains essentially unchanged: "some combination of facts or
circumstances must point to a non speculative link between the other suspect and the
charged crime." Franklin, 180 Wn.2d at 381. The Franklin court reiterated that the
Downs standard for relevance of other suspect evidence is whether there is evidence
'''tending to connect' someone other than the defendant with the crime." Id. (citation
omitted) (quoting Downs, 168 Wash. at 667). However, apparently for the first time in
Washington case law, the Franklin court also explained with respect to the Downs
relevance inquiry:
Further, other jurisdictions have pointed out that this inquiry, properly
conducted, "focuse[ s] upon whether the evidence offered tends to create a
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, not whether it establishes the
guilt of the third party beyond a reasonable doubt." Smithart v. State, 988
P.2d 583, 588 & n.21 (Alaska 1999).
Franklin, 180 Wn.2d at 381 (alterations in original).
Mr. Hilton asks us to reconsider the third party perpetrator issue in view of what
he considers additional evidence now known that undermines the State's argument
regarding supposed "lack" of evidence to implicate Lisa Ulrich: (1) the State's expert
47
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
concluded someone was using the Ulrichs' computer until 8:07 p.m. when Mr. Hilton
was then at his home on his own computer, and (2) the State's DNA test did not even
compare, much less exclude, Lisa Ulrich's DNA from that recovered from the shell
casings found at the scene. Mr. Hilton argues we should revisit the issue in light of the
prosecutor's withholding of evidence regarding use of the Ulrich computer that Mr.
Hilton says establishes it is impossible for him to be the murderer, and further adds to the
balance of circumstantial evidence that Lisa Ulrich is the likely perpetrator. Mr. Hilton
also says that in the context of the apparent close relationship between prosecutor Miller
and Lisa Ulrich that earlier gave rise to a defense motion to disqualify Mr. Miller and his
office before the first trial, the withheld evidence exposes his behavior to protect her from
being investigated as a suspect and makes purported lack of evidence against her
unreliable as a result of a tainted investigation.
As discussed, the Mantel report (which the defense had all along) and the
Fluckiger opinion do not provide evidence that anyone was in fact physically present at
the Ulrichs' computer at 8:07 p.m.-only speculation that cannot tend to place Lisa
Ulrich (or anyone else) there at that time; and, and most critically, cannot tend to create
reasonable doubt as to Mr. Hilton's gUilt when he cannot show that anyone was actually
present at the keyboard. As for the DNA report, the State's overstatement of its offer of
proof was not evidence and was not considered in finding Mr. Hilton's third party
perpetrator evidence insufficient earlier, so there is no reason to "reconsider" the issue on
48
No. 31955~5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
that basis at all. These items add nothing to the quantum of evidence already discussed in
the appeal. Nor does the Franklin case give cause to revisit our appeal decision.
Mr. Hilton further contends there are additional reasons for us to revisit the issue.
He first refers to an anonymous non-traceable telephone call from a citizen to the police
on March 29, 2002, in which the caller stated that Lisa Ulrich's parents disliked her new
boyfriend, intended to cut off financial support to her, and to pursue custody of her
children because they disapproved of how she was raising them. He also refers to a
police report documenting another anonymous telephone call from a citizen on April 3,
2002, in which the caller said he saw Lisa Ulrich and her boyfriend (Joe Yahne) at Fred
Rumsey's house on March 24, 2002, and that either Lisa or Joe was carrying a black
object that they did not have when they left. The caller did not know what the object
was. The police contacted Mr. Rumsey. He had no idea what someone might have seen,
but said he did not recall them bringing anything to his house except personal items.
Pet'r's Br. in Support ofPRP, Appendix H.6 Mr. Hilton now asserts that if counsel could
question Ms. Ulrich on these matters, the jury would be permitted to assess from her
answers whether she had a motive to kill her parents and whether she had access to
someone (e.g. Mr. Yahne or Mr. Rumsey) who would have been able to help her commit
6 Attorney Holt states in his declaration that the defense knew about both
telephone calls at the time of trial and wanted to present the evidence but could only
establish relevance if they could argue Lisa Ulrich was the murderer.
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No. 31955·5-111
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
the crimes. Mr. Hilton additionally states if allowed to present his theory, counsel would
have argued Lisa Ulrich was familiar with her parents' computer because she had used it
earlier on the day of the murder. And, according to Mr. Hilton, Lisa had no alibi up until
8:30 p.m. on March 20. Mr. Hilton contends he is entitled to a new trial to present the
above evidence.
The anonymous telephone calls, the unknown black object that cannot be
identified, and Lisa Ulrich's familiarity with her parents' computer are insufficient
support for a third party perpetrator claim because they contribute nothing to a train of
circumstances that tend to point to Lisa Ulrich as the guilty party, nor do they tend to
create any reasonable doubt as to Mr. Hilton's guilt. Over a decade after the anonymous
caBs were made, and following defense investigation for two trials and this petition, there
is still no substantiation for the hearsay innuendo against Ms. Ulrich conveyed in the
anonymous 2002 calls. As the State points out, there could be no cross-examination
regarding the anonymous telephone calls and unknown black object.
Given that Mr. Hilton still fails to present sufficient relevant evidence to allow him
to present to a trier of fact the theory that Lisa Ulrich murdered her parents, none of the
several cases on which he relies are helpful to him.
In United States v. Stever, 603 F.3d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 2010), the court held that
the defendant was denied his constitutional right to present a defense when the trial court
excluded relevant and reliable evidence probative to the central issue of whether he was
50
No.3l955-5-II1
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
complicit with Hispanic individuals in a marijuana growing operation on his mother's
remote land bordering Forest Service property in Oregon. The case against Stever was
circumstantial. His proffered defense was that a Mexican drug trafficking organization
(DTO) grew the marijuana and he had no knowledge of the operation. Id. at 756. His
offer of proof included government reports describing Mexican DTO operations on
public and private land and an expert witness who would testify that such operations in
Oregon excluded local Caucasian landowners. Id. By excluding the evidence, the trial
court prevented him from making his defense at all. Id. at 757. He was thus confined to
poking holes in the government's case and, as his lawyer argued in closing, holding the
prosecution to its burden of proof. The court concluded Stever's Sixth Amendment rights
were violated. Id.
As in Stever, Mr. Hilton contends the trial court's ruling on third party perpetrator
evidence precluded him from pointing to any alternative explanation for who committed
the crime and confined him to poking holes in the State's case and holding the State to its
burden of proof, thus literally preventing him from making his defense. He complains
that he was left with no way to respond to the prosecutor's query in closing argument,
"Who else could it be? Who else could it be? No one. No one." RP (Feb. 13,2008) at
3819. And the prosecutor's additional statement in closing, "No other reasonable, logical
explanation as to who killed the Ulrich[s] but the defendant." Id. at 3838.
51
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
Unlike in Stever, Mr. Hilton did not seek to present a third party perpetrator
theory. But even ifhe had, unlike the offer of proof in Stever, he fails to present relevant
and reliable evidence to support a defense that Lisa Ulrich was the killer. Moreover, Mr.
Hilton was also fully able to argue his alibi defense, albeit unsuccessfully.
Mr. Hilton also cites Kyles v. Whitely, 514 U.S. at 442 n.l3, as instructive for the
concept that the State's withholding of material eXCUlpatory evidence in violation of
Brady deprived him of the chance to further underscore through cross-examination that
Lisa Ulrich was the killer. But as discussed, the State did not commit a Brady violation
because it did not withhold material exculpatory evidence pertaining to the Ulrichs'
computer-much less evidence pointing to Lisa Ulrich as the perpetrator.
Finally, citing to United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, amended by 246 F.3d
1150 (9th Cir. 2001), Mr. Hilton contends that in the direct appeal, this court failed to
recognize it is the role of the jury to consider the relative weight of the evidence against
Lisa Ulrich and determine whether it presents legitimate alternative theories for how the
crime occurred.
In Vallejo, the defendant was charged with importing marijuana hidden in
compartments of his recently purchased car. He denied knowledge of the drugs. The
trial court excluded his proffered evidence that the still registered former owner of the car
had a month earlier been arrested, and since convicted and deported, for bringing a
similar amount of marijuana across the border, at the same port of entry, using the same
52
No. 31955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
method of concealment, but in a different car. Vallejo, 237 F.3d at 1022-23. On appeal,
the court held the exclusion of this evidence of third party culpability was an abuse of
discretion because "the similarity of circumstances surrounding [the former owner's]
arrest provid[ed] an alternative theory of how the drugs were secreted in Vallejo's car
without his knowledge," and had "unique relevance to the central defense theory that
Vallejo did not know of the drugs in the car." Id. at 1023. The court further explained
that exclusion of the evidence precluded him from answering the question by jurors: "If
defendant did not know there were drugs in the car and did not place them there himself,
who did?" Id. at 1023.
In arriving at its decision, the Vallejo court quoted from Professor Wigmore:
[I]fthe evidence [that someone else committed the crime] is in truth
calculated to cause the jury to doubt, the court should not attempt to decide
for the jury that this doubt is purely speCUlative and fantastic but should
afford the accused every opportunity to create that doubt.
Id. at 1023 (alterations in original) (quoting lA JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRlALSATCOMMON LAW § 139 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983)). The Vallejo court continued:
Accordingly, it is the role of the jury to consider the evidence and
determine whether it presents "all kinds of fantasy possibilities," as the
district court concluded, or whether it presents legitimate alternative
theories for how the crime occurred.
Id. at 1023.
Mr. Hilton seizes upon this reasoning to contend all of his evidence pertaining to
Lisa Ulrich is admissible on a third party perpetrator theory and the court erred in
53
No. 31955-5-111
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refusing to allow it. But besides his previous waiver of the issue already confirmed in the
direct appeal, he also overlooks the context of Vallejo, where the third party perpetrator
evidence was admissible because it was directly probative of Vallejos' culpability for the
crime. Id. As this court held in the appeal, Mr. Hilton proffered no such evidence in the
trial court. Nor does he point to any alleged third party perpetrator ~vidence in this
petition that warrants consideration by a jury. Vallejo (with its reliance on Wigmore) is
not helpful to Mr. Hilton.
Mr. Hilton makes no showing that the interests ofjustice require us to further
revisit his third party perpetrator issue-either on his alleged lack of waiver or the merits
of the claim. Gentry, 137 Wn.2d at 388. We decline to do so and reject his ground 4
arguments. We also reject the additional extensive attempts by Mr. Hilton (and the State)
in their briefing to rehash trial evidence already weighed by the jury and purported third
party perpetrator evidence already ruled not relevant to that theory.
Referring back to the ineffective assistance claim in ground 3, given the lack of
relevant admissible third party perpetrator evidence, Mr. Hilton cannot show prejudice by
any performance or omissions of counsel under the Strickland standards with respect to
the Lisa Ulrich third party perpetrator issue. We, thus, likewise reject his ground 3
ineffective assistance of counsel argument for failure to meet his burden under Strickland
and Cook.
54
No. 3 I 955-5-III
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
In light of our holdings rejecting each of Mr. Hilton's four grounds for relief, we
also deny his motion to disqualify Benton County Prosecutor Andrew Miller and his
office from this matter, and his motion for discovery and an evidentiary hearing. Both
motions are premised on the State's alleged possession of evidence that contradicted its
theory presented at trial to convict Mr. Hilton, that it withheld Brady evidence, and that it
knowingly made false statements to the court. Mr. Hilton asserts these matters present
"newly discovered evidence not available to the defense at the time of trial," that requires
Mr. Miller and members of his office who were involved in this case to submit written
statements or appear as witnesses in reference proceedings to respond to the factual
allegations of the State's own experts from its investigation. Mot. for Disc. and
Evidentiary Hr' gat 1-2; Mot. to Disqualify Prosecutor at 1-2. Mr. Hilton further states
that witnesses who have already voluntarily provided statements may, under direct
questioning, have additional material evidence to support his claims. He also suggests
that this court require the State to admit or deny specific allegations raised by his
evidence. RAP 16.9(b). Mot. for Disc. and Evidentiary Hr'g at 2.
First, to obtain an evidentiary hearing, "the petitioner must demonstrate that he has .
competent, admissible evidence to establish the facts that entitle him to relief." Rice, 118
Wn.2d at 886. The petitioner's factual allegations must be "based on more than
speculation, conjecture, or inadmissible hearsay." Id
55
No. 31955-5-111
In re Pers. Restraint ofHilton
Mr. Hilton fails this burden. He has produced no prima facie facts that entitle him
to relief-only speculation, conjecture, or innuendo that is not evidence sufficient to
command reference proceedings or necessitate further response from the State. The
purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to resolve genuine factual disputes, not to determine
whether the petitioner actually has evidence to support his allegations. Id. Mr. Hilton
fails to show that an evidentiary hearing-or discovery for what is in essence a fishing
expedition-is warranted here. These circumstances likewise render his motion for
disqualification unsupportable and without merit. Both of his motions are denied.
Mr. Hilton makes no claim entitling him to relief in a personal restraint petition.
He fails his burden under Cook and Rice.
The petition is dismissed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
Brown, J.
56